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Abstract
Biometric identification, which recognizes an individual based only on physiological or behav-
ioral characteristics, is nowadays used for commercial applications such as computer login,
physical access control, and time and attendance management. It has a potential to provide
the best authentication solution with regard to security and convenience because it does not
require a user ID, password, nor card but recognizes a user based on his/her biometrics (i.e.
something you are). In biometric identification, however, the following factors cause problems
with security and convenience, and become serious as the number of enrollees increases: (1)
false accepts; (2) wolves and lambs who cause false accepts against many others; (3) false
rejects; (4) the number of biometric inputs; (5) response time. False accepts, wolves, and
lambs are factors which aﬀect security, while false rejects, the number of inputs, and response
time are factors which aﬀect convenience. They are related to each other, and have prevented
biometric identification from being applied to large-scale applications. The goal of this study
is to optimize security and convenience in biometric identification in terms of these factors.
Firstly, we make an attempt to optimize false accepts, false rejects, and the number of
inputs. We focus on MSPRT’s (Multi-hypothesis Sequential Probability Ratio Tests), multi-
hypothesis tests which can minimize the average number of observations, and propose two
sequential fusion schemes in identification: the PPSI (Posterior Probability-based Sequen-
tial Identification) scheme and the LRSI (Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Identification)
scheme. The PPSI scheme is based on MSPRT and can minimize the average number of
inputs (referred to as ANI), while the LRSI scheme is a simpler one which can be carried out
quickly. Then we prove that the LRSI scheme can also minimize ANI by proving that this
scheme is equivalent to MSPRT. We also discuss the conditions to achieve the optimality, and
show the eﬀectiveness of the two schemes through experimental evaluation using the NIST
BSSR1 Set1, a multi-modal score dataset (one face and two fingerprints).
Secondly, we make an attempt to further optimize response time. To this end, we turn
our attention to metric space indexing methods which have been developed in the area of
similarity search, and focus on pseudo-score based indexing schemes which compute, for each
object in the database, a pseudo-score which is easily computed and highly relevant to a
score (distance or similarity), and compute scores in order of the pseudo-score. We first
propose the PPS (Posterior Probability-based Search) scheme which normalizes each pseudo-
score to the posterior probability of being in the answer to the range query. We proved that
the PPS scheme has an optimal property with regard to the number of score computations
and the expected number of retrieval errors. We also showed that it outperforms the two
state-of-the-art schemes: the standard pivot-based indexing scheme and the permutation-
based indexing scheme, through experimental evaluation using various kinds of datasets from
the Metric Space Library. We then make an attempt to combine metric space indexing
and sequential fusion, and propose the PPSS (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Search)
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scheme, a modification of the PPS scheme to use not only pseudo-scores at the current
input but past pseudo-scores and scores as information sources. We also propose a technique
which optimizes the number of pivots (biometric templates selected from the database to
compute pseudo-scores) with regard to retrieval errors. We demonstrate that our proposals
significantly reduce the number of score computations of the PPSI scheme while keeping false
accepts, false rejects, and the number of inputs, using a large-scale multi-modal dataset (1800
enrollees; one face and two fingerprints) obtained by combining the NIST BSSR1 Set3 and
the CASIA-FingerprintV5.
Finally, we attempt to optimize the trade-oﬀ between security against wolves and lambs
and convenience in terms of the number of inputs and false rejects. To clarify our target,
we first introduce a taxonomy which classifies wolves into three categories (zero-eﬀort wolves,
non-adaptive spoofing wolves, and adaptive spoofing wolves) and lambs into two categories
(zero-eﬀort lambs and spoofing lambs). Then, we propose the MLRSV (Minimum Likelihood
Ratio-based Sequential Verification) scheme as a sequential fusion scheme in verification. We
prove that this scheme has security against wolves and lambs, except for adaptive spoofing
wolves, and minimizes ANI and false rejects under some conditions. We also discuss the
conditions to achieve the security and optimality, and propose an input order decision scheme
based on the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence to further reduce ANI in the case where the
KL divergence diﬀers from one modality to another. We finally demonstrate the eﬀectiveness
of our proposals using a multi-modal (one face and eight fingerprints) dataset obtained by
combining the NIST BSSR1 Set3 and the CASIA-FingerprintV5.
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1.1 Background
The information society has grown rapidly over the past two decades. Since 1995, the number
of Internet users has increased dramatically and reached 2.7 billion in 2013 [46]. Nowadays
various devices such as PCs, smartphones, tablets, and sensors are connected to informa-
tion networks, and various services such as healthcare, education, games, music, banking,
and payments are provided over the networks. As the physical world is more and more con-
nected to the digital world, personal authentication, which associates an identity with an
individual, plays an increasingly crucial role in protecting information or physical assets from
unauthorized access.
The personal authentication methods recognize an individual using some information
which can be classified into the following three factors:
• Knowledge (i.e. something you know): secret information such as passwords,
passphrases, and personal identification numbers (PINs).
• Possession (i.e. something you have): physical possessions such as ID cards, smart
cards, physical keys, mobile phones, and passports.
• Inherence (i.e. something you are): physiological characteristics (such as finger-
print, face, iris, vein, retina, palmprint, and DNA) or behavioral characteristics (such
as voice, signature, keystroke, and gait). They are also known as biometrics.
The first and second factors are now widely used (e.g. password to login to a computer, ID
card to enter a room). However, the authentication methods based on these factors have
problems with security and convenience. The first factor such as passwords can be guessed
or cracked. To prevent the guessing attack, a user needs to use the password which is hard to
remember and change it periodically. The second factor such as cards can be stolen, misused,
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forgotten, or lost. The essential problem common to these factors is that these methods
cannot distinguish a genuine user from an impostor who illegally acquired the knowledge or
possession.
We note here that security and convenience are related to each other, and a security
solution which lacks convenience can eventually fail to strengthen, or even weaken, the security
of the system. This contradiction is known as the security vs. convenience dilemma [18]. For
example, password expiration mechanisms which require users to change passwords frequently
often induce a counterproductive behavior such as writing down passwords on a piece of paper
[1]. Many bank customers also write their PINs on their cards, and thus jeopardize two-factor
authentication which uses both knowledge and possession [99]. This kind of problem has long
been discussed in the area of usable security [9, 83]. The important thing is that we need to
design a system which is simultaneously secure and convenient.
Biometric authentication associates an identity with inherence (i.e. something you are),
the third factor. Since biometrics is not forgotten unlike passwords and is much harder to
steal than cards, a biometric authentication system can recognize an individual in a more con-
venient and secure manner. From an algorithm standpoint, the biometric system recognizes
an individual using a similarity or distance, called score, between his/her biometric sample
(referred to as a query sample) and a biometric feature enrolled in advance (referred to as a
template). For example, the system computes the Hamming distance between iriscodes [27],
the Euclidean distance between eigenfaces [114], or the percentage of matched minutiae [52]
as a score, and makes a decision whether the individual is genuine or not by comparing the
score to a predetermined threshold. Throughout this dissertation, we refer to a person who
inputs a query sample as a claimant, and a person who enrolls a template as an enrollee.
Depending on the application context, a biometric authentication system can operate in
either of the following two modes: verification and identification [14, 58]. In the verification
mode, a claimant claims an identity via an ID number, a user name, or a smart card, and
inputs his/her query sample. Then, the system computes a score between the query sample
and a template corresponding to the claimed identity, and makes a decision whether the
claimant is genuine or not. This type of biometric authentication is now used for various
commercial applications such as ATM, payments, and computer login.
In the identification mode, a claimant does not explicitly claim his/her identity, and
only inputs a query sample. Then, the system computes scores between the query sample
and templates in the database (i.e. one-to-many matching), and outputs a candidate list
of people whose templates are similar to the query sample. Biometric identification can be
further classified into two categories: negative identification and positive identification [14, 58].
Negative identification determines whether a person is not in the database as he/she (explicitly
or implicitly) claims. This type of identification has long been used for criminal investigation.
In 1960’s, the NIST engineers started a research of automated fingerprint identification at the
request of the FBI [74]. The resulting AFISs (Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems)
have been used worldwide, with a significant improvement of the fingerprint identification
technology.
On the other hand, positive identification determines whether a person is in the database
as he/she claims, and is nowadays used for commercial applications such as computer login,
physical access control, and time and attendance management. In these applications, the
positive identification system typically outputs at most one candidate (i.e. accepts as some
enrollee or rejects as a non-enrollee) and provides service appropriate to the identified user.
The advantage of positive identification over verification is its convenience: a claimant does
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not have to input an ID number nor present a card. For example, a finger-vein identification
system only requires a claimant to input his/her finger on the sensor. Another example is
remote biometric identification (e.g. face at a distance, iris at a distance) [113] which identifies
a claimant at a distance. Since it does not require a claimant to perform any action to be
recognized, and recognizes him/her based on “something you are” (an inherence factor), it
even has a potential to provide the best solution with regard to both security and convenience.
However, positive identification has problems with security and convenience which diﬀer
from the ones of the knowledge-based or possession-based authentication and become serious
as the number of enrollees increases. The problems have prevented positive identification
from being applied to large-scale applications.
In the following, we describe the problems in detail (hereinafter, we will simply use the
term “identification” to refer to positive identification):
• Problems with security:
– False accepts: The biometric identification system can incorrectly accept a non-
enrollee (a person not enrolled) as some enrollee, or accept an enrollee as another
enrollee. Since these two types of identification errors are false accepts, they can
cause security problems. Although these errors can be reduced by raising a thresh-
old for a similarity (or lowering a threshold for a distance), this can cause the
increase of false rejects: the identification errors in which the system incorrectly
rejects an enrollee as a non-enrollee. That is, there is a trade-oﬀ between false
accepts and false rejects, as also described later. The important thing is that false
accepts in identification increase as the number of enrollees increases, since the
number of those who can be incorrectly identified increases. In Section 3.2.1, we
show that they can increase almost in proportion to the number of enrollees.
– Wolves and lambs: It is known that diﬀerent users have diﬀerent degrees of
accuracy in biometric authentication, and claimants and enrollees who cause false
accepts against many others are referred to as wolves and lambs, respectively [29].
Although they cause security problems in both verification and identification, we
consider they are particularly problematic in identification due to the following
reasons: (1) In identification, wolves can cause many false accepts even if they do
not intend to impersonate others. Since they know that they have such threatening
biometrics as a result, the incidents may even encourage them to actively attack
many databases to impersonate others. (2) Although lambs are a vulnerability in
verification, they can be a threat in identification because they can make the system
identify many claimants as them, and lose the availability of the system. As it is
often said that the overall security of a system is determined by the weakest link in
the chain [5], the overall security of the identification system can be determined by
these animals. False accepts caused by the animals also increase with the increase
of enrollees, and are in a trade-oﬀ relationship with false rejects. Recently, an
artifact which causes many false accepts is also proposed [116].
• Problems with convenience:
– False rejects: False accepts can be reduced by raising a threshold for a similarity
(or lowering a threshold for a distance), as described above. However, this can cause
the increase of false rejects in which the system incorrectly rejects an enrollee as a
3
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Figure 1.1: Factors which aﬀect security and convenience in positive biometric identification. They
become serious with the increase of enrollees.
non-enrollee, and make the system inconvenient. Since there is a trade-oﬀ between
false accepts and false rejects, both of the problems can eventually become serious
as the number of enrollees increases.
– The number of inputs: A false reject induces a retry attempt in which a claimant
inputs the same biometrics again. Although this attempt may result in acceptance,
it takes time and eﬀort for him/her to input additional samples. That is, not only
false rejects but the number of inputs are factors which cause inconvenience. To
date, a considerable number of multi-modal biometric fusion schemes [57, 96, 97]
which combine multiple sources of information (e.g. fingerprint, face and voice;
index and middle fingers) have been proposed to reduce identification errors (false
accepts and false rejects). However, these schemes can also cause the increase of
the number of inputs. That is, there is a trade-oﬀ between false accepts, false
rejects, and the number of inputs. Thus, the problem of the number of inputs can
also become serious as the number of enrollees increases.
– Response time: As the number of enrollees increases, the number of score com-
putations increases. Thus, the total response time also increases as a result, which
makes the system inconvenient. There is also a trade-oﬀ between the response
time and the identification accuracy in general. For example, a great number of
classification or indexing methods [67] have been proposed to reduce the number
of score computations while keeping a genuine score (i.e. a score between the same
person), as described in Section 2.2 in detail. However, as the number of score
computations decreases in these methods, the errors in which the system fails to
compute a genuine score increase, and consequently false rejects increase.
Figure 1.1 shows the factors which aﬀect security and convenience in biometric identification.
They are related to each other, and become serious with the increase of enrollees. Although
biometric identification has a potential to provide highly convenient and secure way of au-
thentication, the above problems have to be addressed to make it widely used for commercial
applications.
1.2 Goals
The goal of this study is to optimize security and convenience in positive biometric identifi-
cation. Here we include false accepts, wolves, and lambs as factors which aﬀect security, and
false rejects, the number of inputs, and response time as factors which aﬀect convenience.
Other than the above problems, there are also problems which are common to both verifi-
cation and identification. For example, several biometric systems are vulnerable to a spoofing
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attack where an attacker presents an artifact such as gummy fingerprints [70] and photographs,
and a number of liveness detection methods [100] have been proposed to counteract them.
Another example is a leakage of biometric information. Since biometric features such as
fingerprints and veins are unchangeable throughout a lifetime, they cannot be changed or
revoked like passwords even if they are leaked. A number of template protection schemes,
which transform the biometric features by a kind of encryption function and match them in
the transformed domain, have been proposed to prevent the leakage of the original biometric
features [54]. However, liveness detection and template protection are not the focus of this
dissertation. As will be described in Chapter 7, our proposals in this dissertation can be
combined with both of them to increase the total security of the system.
On the other hand, studies on optimization of false accepts, security against wolves and
lambs, false rejects, the number of inputs, and response time in identification seems to be
lacking. For example, Nandakumar el al. [76] proposed a multi-modal fusion scheme in
identification which can minimize the identification error probabilities, as described in Sec-
tion 2.1.3 in detail. However, since this scheme identifies the claimant after he/she inputs
all the query samples, it always requires him/her to input all the query samples, which can
cause inconvenience. While most of the conventional fusion schemes make a decision after the
claimant inputs all the query samples [57, 96, 97], some studies proposed a fusion scheme in
verification which makes a decision each time a claimant inputs a query sample [2, 68, 87, 107].
The former scheme is referred to as a parallel fusion scheme, while the latter as a sequential
fusion (or serial fusion) scheme. A sequential fusion scheme can reduce identification errors
while keeping down the number of inputs required. No studies, however, have ever proposed
a sequential fusion scheme in identification which can optimize the trade-oﬀ between identi-
fication errors and the number of inputs, to the best of our knowledge. Similarly, no studies
have ever tried to optimize response time and security against wolves and lambs, along with
the above factors. In this dissertation, we aim at optimizing all of them.
1.3 Organization of This Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe previous
work related to this dissertation. Among them, we focus on score level approaches which use
scores as information sources because they have several advantages over other approaches.
We describe the advantages of score level approaches and clarify challenges which have not
been solved in previous work.
In Chapter 3, we make an attempt to develop optimal sequential fusion schemes in iden-
tification with regard to identification errors (false accepts and false rejects) and the number
of inputs. To this end, we focus our attention on MSPRT’s (Multi-hypothesis Sequential
Probability Ratio Tests) [30], multi-hypothesis tests which can minimize the average number
of observations. Dragalin et al. [30] found two such tests and referred to them as Test δa
and Test δb, respectively. In this chapter, we firstly propose two sequential fusion schemes in
identification: the PPSI (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Identification) scheme and
the LRSI (Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Identification) scheme. The PPSI scheme is
based on MSPRT (Test δa) and can minimize the average number of inputs (referred to as
ANI) under some conditions, while the LRSI scheme is a simpler one which can be carried
out quickly. We secondly prove that the LRSI scheme can also minimize ANI by proving that
this scheme is equivalent to MSPRT (Test δb) under some conditions. We also discuss the
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conditions to achieve the optimality of each scheme. We finally demonstrate the eﬀectiveness
of our two schemes through experimental evaluation using the NIST BSSR1 (Biometric Score
Set - Release 1) Set1 dataset [77], a multi-modal score dataset (one face and two fingerprints).
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we make an attempt to further optimize response time. To
reduce response time using only scores as information sources, we turn our attention to metric
space indexing methods (also known as metric access methods, or distance-based indexing
methods) [23, 82]. These methods have been developed in the area of similarity search where
the system outputs the objects (e.g. images, movies, or documents) in the database which are
similar to the query object presented by the user. Although there are a great variety of metric
space indexing schemes, we focus on the ones which compute, for each object in the database,
some value which is easily computed and highly relevant to a distance (or similarity), and
compute scores in order of the value [4, 6, 22, 32]. In this dissertation, we refer to such values
as pseudo-scores, and such indexing schemes as pseudo-score based indexing schemes. The
reason we focus on this type of indexing scheme is that it performs very well even if features
are in a high dimensional space and includes some state-of-the-art schemes. For example, the
permutation-based indexing scheme [4, 22] is one of the most successful metric space indexing
schemes, and has received considerable attention in recent years [33, 35, 36, 79, 102].
In Chapter 4, we propose the PPS (Posterior Probability-based Search) scheme which nor-
malizes each pseudo-score to the posterior probability that the corresponding object is within
the search radius of the query sample (i.e. answer to the range query). This scheme can en-
hance the performance of any pseudo-score based scheme and has an optimal property with
regard to response time. After describing its algorithm and optimal property, we demonstrate
that this scheme outperforms the two state-of-the-art schemes: the standard pivot-based in-
dexing scheme [22] and the permutation-based indexing scheme [4, 22], through experimental
evaluation using various kinds of datasets from the Metric Space Library [37].
In Chapter 5, we make an attempt to combine metric space indexing and sequential
fusion. We first propose a sequential indexing and fusion framework in identification which is
constructed from (I) a pseudo-score based indexing scheme, (II) a sequential search scheme
which searches templates using pseudo-scores and scores as a clue, and (III) a sequential fusion
scheme. Then we propose the PPSS (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Search) scheme
as (II), a modification of the PPS scheme to use not only pseudo-scores at the current input
but past pseudo-scores and scores as information sources. We also propose a technique which
optimizes the number of pivots: templates selected from the database which are necessary to
compute pseudo-scores. We demonstrate that our proposals significantly reduce the number
of score computations of the PPSI scheme while keeping identification errors and ANI, using a
large-scale multi-modal dataset (N = 1800 enrollees; one face and two fingerprints) obtained
by combining the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [77] and the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [21].
In Chapter 6, we address an interesting problem of optimization which includes wolves
and lambs as factors which aﬀect security. Here we consider the verification mode to simplify
the problem, and attempt to optimize the trade-oﬀ between security against wolves and lambs
and convenience in terms of the number of inputs and false rejects. To clarify our target,
we first introduce a taxonomy which classifies wolves into three categories (zero-eﬀort wolves,
non-adaptive spoofing wolves, and adaptive spoofing wolves) and lambs into two categories
(zero-eﬀort lambs and spoofing lambs). Then, we propose the MLRSV (Minimum Likelihood
Ratio-based Sequential Verification) scheme as a sequential fusion scheme in verification. We
prove that this scheme has security against wolves and lambs, except for adaptive spoofing
wolves, and minimizes ANI and false rejects under some conditions. We also discuss the
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conditions to achieve the security and optimality, and propose an input order decision scheme
based on the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence [25] to further reduce ANI in the case where the
KL divergence diﬀers from one modality to another. We finally demonstrate the eﬀectiveness
of our proposals using a multi-modal (one face and eight fingerprints) dataset obtained by
combining the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [77] and the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [21].
In Chapter 7, we sum up the contributions of our line of work, and provide a future
direction of this study which is necessary to establish a secure and convenient biometric
identification system.
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In this chapter, we introduce previous work related to this dissertation. Figure 2.1 shows
a typical model of a biometric identification system. At the enrollment phase, an enrollee
presents his/her biometric sample and a sensor captures a raw biometric data (e.g. digital
image). Then, a feature extractor extracts a biometric feature (e.g. minutiae [52], eigen-
face [114], iriscode [27]) from the raw biometric data, and enroll it as a template. At the
identification phase, a claimant inputs his/her query sample to a sensor, and a feature extrac-
tor extracts a biometric feature in the same way. Then, a matcher performs a one-to-many
matching and outputs scores (similarities or distances) against templates. Finally, a decision
module makes a decision who the claimant is (i.e. accepts as an enrollee or rejects as a
non-enrollee).
As described in Section 1.1, the problems of false accepts, false rejects, and the number
of inputs are related to each other, and become worse as the number of enrollees increases.
Response time also increases with the increase of enrollees. Furthermore, the existence of
wolves and lambs can cause serious security problems.
We introduce related work to solve these problems. We mainly explain (1) multi-modal
biometric fusion for accuracy improvement, (2) classification and indexing for reducing re-
sponse time, and (3) countermeasures against wolves and lambs as related work. We describe
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Figure 2.1: Biometric identification system model.
each of them in Section 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.1, respectively (we also explain related work on the
Biometric zoo [29], a classification of users which includes wolves and lambs, from several
directions in Section 2.3). Among them, we focus on score level approaches which use scores
as information sources in this dissertation. We describe the advantages and challenges of
them in Section 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.
2.1 Multi-modal Biometric Fusion
There are several approaches to improving accuracy in biometric authentication. They can
be broadly categorized into the following two types: (1) improving a module such as a sensor,
feature extractor, and matcher, and (2) using a multi-modal biometric fusion scheme [57, 96,
97]. The former approach is generally specialized in a certain modality such as fingerprint,
and all of the sensor, feature extractor, and matcher are often updated together since they
are related to each other. The latter approach combines multiple sources of information to
achieve high accuracy. This section focuses on the latter and describes its related work.
2.1.1 Fusion Scenarios
There are a variety of scenarios in multi-modal biometric fusion systems depending on the
number of biometric traits, instances, samples, and sensors [57, 96, 97]:
1. Multiple sensors: The system captures a single biometric trait using multiple sensors
(e.g. multiple images of the face) and combines them.
2. Multiple biometric traits: The system combines multiple biometric traits of an
individual (e.g. fingerprint, face and voice).
3. Multiple instances: The system combines a multiple instances of the same body trait
(e.g. index and middle fingers). It is also referred to as multiple units.
4. Multiple samples: The system acquires multiple samples from the same biometric
trait and combines them. It is also referred to as multiple snapshots.
5. Multiple algorithms: The system processes the same biometric data using multiple
feature extractors or multiple matchers, and combines multiple features or multiple
scores. The scenario where multiple features are combined is referred to as multiple
representations, and the one where multiple scores are combined as multiple matchers.
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In multiple sensors, multiple samples, or multiple algorithms (i.e. 1, 4, 5), the system combines
multiple information sources obtained from the same biometric trait. Thus, the information
sources to be fused are strongly correlated in these scenarios. On the other hand, in multiple
biometric traits or multiple instances (i.e. 2, 3), since the system combines diﬀerent biometric
traits or instances which are independent or weakly dependent, a significant improvement of
accuracy can be expected [58]. Therefore, we focus on multiple biometric traits and multiple
instances in this dissertation.
2.1.2 Levels of Fusion
According to the type of a module (i.e. sensor, feature extractor, matcher, or decision module)
which outputs the information sources to be fused, multi-modal biometric fusion can also be
classified as follows [57, 97]:
1. Sensor level fusion: This type of fusion combines multiple raw biometric data from
the sensor(s). Sensor level fusion can be used in the multiple samples scenario or the
multiple sensors scenario. For example, some studies proposed a fingerprint mosaicking
scheme which uses multiple samples from the same fingerprint to construct a composite
fingerprint template [56, 94]. Another example is a mosaicking scheme in face recog-
nition proposed by Yang et al. [125] where 2D face images captured using multiple
cameras are used to construct a panoramic face model.
2. Feature level fusion: This type of fusion combines multiple features, and can be
broadly classified into the following two types: homogeneous feature fusion and het-
erogeneous feature fusion [57]. Homogeneous feature fusion combines multiple features
obtained by applying the same feature extractor to multiple samples of the same bio-
metric trait (i.e. multiple samples or multiple sensors). For example, Jiang and Ser [60]
proposed a fusion scheme which estimates a single resultant minutia set as a weighted
average over multiple minutia sets from the same fingerprint. Heterogeneous feature
fusion combines multiple features from diﬀerent feature extractors, diﬀerent biometric
traits, or diﬀerent instances (i.e. multiple representations, multiple biometric traits, or
multiple instances). For example, Kumar et al. [62] proposed a fusion scheme which
combines a palmprint feature and a hand geometry feature. Ross et al. [95] proposed a
scheme which concatenates feature vectors and then reduce the size of the concatenated
vector to solve the curse of dimensionality problem where the increase of the vector size
can degrade the performance especially when the number of training samples is small.
3. Score level fusion: This type of fusion combines multiple scores, and can be classified
into the following categories: density-based score fusion, transformation-based score
fusion, and classifier-based score fusion [97]. Density-based score fusion estimates a
probability density function (pdf) of scores given a class label (e.g. genuine or impostor),
and makes a decision using the pdf. For example, Nandakumar et al. [75] proposed a
likelihood ratio-based fusion scheme in verification using the pdf of genuine scores and
that of impostor scores. This scheme is based on the likelihood ratio test, and minimizes
the false accept probability for a fixed false reject probability (i.e. optimizes the trade-oﬀ
between false accepts and false rejects) if the pdfs are perfectly estimated. They modeled
each pdf as a finite Gaussian mixture model (GMM). Transformation-based score fusion
normalizes scores from the diﬀerent matchers to make them compatible, and combines
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the normalized scores using the combination rule such as the sum, max and min rule [55].
Classifier-based score fusion uses a classifier which learns a decision boundary between
genuine scores and impostor scores without estimating a pdf of scores. Examples of
classifiers include SVM [11], k-NN classifier [118], logistic regression [117, 118], and
random forest [64].
4. Decision level fusion: This type of fusion combines multiple decision results. The
AND rule and OR rule [14] are examples of decision level fusion. In verification, the AND
rule outputs accept only if all the matchers output accept, while the OR rule outputs
accept if at least one of the matchers output accept. Although they have been originally
developed in the verification mode, they can also be extended to the identification mode.
One way to do so is to apply the AND/OR rule to each enrollee and output the candidate
list [14]. Another example is a majority voting [57, 97] which makes a final decision as
follows: if more than half matchers make the same decision, adopt the decision result;
otherwise, reject.
In the identification mode where the matcher outputs a ranking of the enrollees, there is also
rank level fusion [57, 97] which combines multiple ranking results. However, we leave out the
details of this type of fusion in this dissertation.
2.1.3 Multi-modal Biometric Fusion in Identification
Although most of the conventional multi-modal biometric fusion schemes are proposed in the
verification scenario, some studies proposed a fusion scheme in the identification mode.
For example, Hong and Jain [43] proposed a score level fusion scheme which integrates faces
and fingerprints in identification. This scheme first narrows down enrollees to some candidates
using the face matcher, and normalizes a score to the FAR (False Accept Rate) value (the
error rate that an impostor is incorrectly accepted in verification) for each candidate and
modality. Then, it computes the product of the FAR values (referred to as the FAR product)
for each candidate, and identifies the claimant by comparing the minimum value of the FAR
products to a threshold (if it is smaller than the threshold, accept as the corresponding
enrollee; otherwise, reject). Nandakumar et al. [76] proposed a scheme which computes,
for each enrollee, the posterior probability of being the same person as the claimant using
scores, and compares the maximum posterior probability to a threshold (if it is larger than
the threshold, accept; otherwise, reject). This scheme is based on the Bayes decision theory
(BDT) [31] and minimizes the identification error probabilities if the posterior probability is
correctly estimated.
2.1.4 Sequential Fusion
Since we focus on multiple biometric traits or multiple instances as described in Section 2.1.1,
we do not consider a scenario, such as multiple sensors and multiple algorithms, where the
system combines multiple information sources from a single biometric trait. However, most
of the conventional schemes in the multiple biometric traits scenario or multiple instances
scenario are parallel fusion schemes which make a decision after the claimant inputs all the
query samples. Since the parallel fusion schemes always require the claimant to input all the
query samples, they can make the system inconvenient.
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Table 2.1: Classification of the score level fusion schemes and decision level fusion schemes introduced
in Section 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 2.1.4.
parallel sequential
verification likelihood ratio (GMM) [75], sum [55], max [55],
min [55], SVM [11], k-NN [118], logistic regres-
sion [117, 118], random forest [64], AND [14], ma-
jority voting [57, 97].
OR [14], LRSV [107].
identification FAR product [43], Bayes decision theory (BDT)
[76], AND [14].
OR [14].
On the other hand, some fusion schemes make a decision each time a claimant inputs a
query sample, and are referred to as a sequential fusion (or serial fusion) scheme. This type of
fusion scheme can improve accuracy while keeping down the number of inputs required. The
OR rule [14] can be regarded as the simplest example of sequential fusion schemes because
it can terminate the verification (or identification) process if some modality outputs accept.
Some literatures studied other sequential fusion (or serial fusion) schemes in verification [2,
68, 87, 107]. For example, Takahashi et al. [107] proposed a sequential fusion scheme in
verification which compares a likelihood ratio to a threshold each time the claimant inputs a
query sample. This scheme is based on SPRT (Sequential Probability Ratio Test), a statistical
hypothesis test which minimizes the average number of observations among all tests with the
same error probabilities, if the samples are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
[71, 121, 122] (we describe SPRT in Section 3.3 in more detail). In this dissertation, we
refer to this scheme as the LRSV (Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Verification) scheme.
Since the LRSV scheme applies SPRT to biometric verification, it can minimize ANI (the
average number of inputs) among all sequential fusion schemes with the same verification
error probabilities. In other words, this scheme can optimize the trade-oﬀ between verification
errors and the number of inputs. Allano et al. [2] evaluated this scheme with respect to the
cost which includes the processing time and the financial cost of sensors.
Table 2.1 shows the classification of the score level fusion schemes and decision level fusion
schemes we have introduced so far in terms of whether they are in the verification mode or
identification mode, and whether they are parallel or sequential.
2.2 Classification and Indexing
There are also several approaches to reducing response time in biometric identification. They
can be classified into the following categories: (1) improving a matcher, (2) using a feature
level classification or indexing scheme [67], and (3) using a metric level indexing method
[23, 82]. The first approach reduces the one-to-one matching time (time to compute a score
between one query sample and one template), while the second and third approaches reduce
the number of score computations. Although we can also reduce response time by running
multiple servers in parallel, we exclude such a solution due to the following reasons: it takes
cost to prepare multiple servers; in physical access control systems, the one-to-many matching
process is carried out in the client side (i.e. control device) to avoid communication failure.
The first approach is generally specialized in the matcher, and program optimization is
its example. In the following, we describe the second and third approaches in detail.
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2.2.1 Feature Level Classification/Indexing
The second approach, a feature level classification or indexing scheme, is widely studied
in biometrics. Feature level classification divides templates into some predefined classes in
advance. At the identification phase, it reduces the number of score computations by assigning
a query sample to some class and searching only templates in the class. For example, the
Galton-Henry classification scheme [38, 41], which classifies fingerprints into the categories
such as arch, tented arch, left loop, right loop, and whorl, has been used by law enforcement
agencies worldwide. However, in feature level classification, the number of classes is generally
small and features are non-uniformly distributed among the classes. They are problems in
eﬀectively reducing the number of score computations.
Feature level indexing, also known as continuous classification, does not assign a query
sample to a predefined class but provides a continuous ordering of templates by using a
numerical vector which simply represents a feature [67]. For example, Cappelli et al. [20]
proposed a fingerprint indexing scheme which uses templates corresponding to the above five
classes (arch, tented arch, left loop, right loop, and whorl) to create a numerical vector. This
scheme computes the cost of the adaptation of each template to a biometric sample and uses a
five-dimensional vector composed of the normalized costs for providing a continuous ordering.
Tan et al. [109] compared the performance of feature level indexing with that of feature level
classification, and reported that the former outperformed the latter. Nowadays, feature level
indexing is widely studied especially in fingerprints [19, 45, 51, 63, 101].
2.2.2 Metric Space Indexing
The third approach, a metric space indexing method (also known as metric access method, or
distance-based indexing method) has been developed in the area of similarity search [23, 82].
Here the goal is generally to find a set of objects (e.g. images, movies, or documents) in the
database whose distance (or similarity) to the query object is less than (or more than) the
threshold (i.e. answer to the range query) or the k-nearest neighbor objects (i.e. answer to
the k-NN query). This method reduces the number of score computations between the query
object and the objects in the database using an index which is constructed based on scores.
The main feature of this method is that it can be applied as long as a score measure (i.e.
a measure of distances or similarities between objects) is defined. In fact, it has a variety
of applications which retrieve complex data such as audio, images, videos, documents, and
biometrics.
One way to categorize metric space indexing methods is based on whether they guarantee
to return the correct answer or not. The former ones are referred to as exact indexing schemes,
while the latter ones are referred to as approximate (or inexact) indexing schemes. Exact
indexing schemes make use of the triangle inequality for distances to discard the objects
which are not in the correct answer. To date, a considerable number of exact schemes have
been proposed: BK-tree [16], AESA [119], LAESA [73], VP-tree [126], GH-tree [115], GNAT
[15], etc. The problem of these schemes is that they suﬀer from the curse of dimensionality
[23]: the triangle inequality is eﬀective only in the case where features are in a low dimensional
space, and they end up computing almost all scores in a high dimensional space. Biometric
features are often in a high dimensional space (e.g. Daugman [27] used 2048-bit iriscodes)
and score measures in biometrics often do not satisfy the triangle-inequality.
Approximate indexing schemes are designed to quickly find an approximate answer even
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if features are in a high dimensional space or score measures do not satisfy the triangle-
inequality. Examples of them include what we call pseudo-score based schemes [4, 6, 22, 32].
They compute, for each object in the database, a pseudo-score which is easily computed
and highly relevant to a score, and compute scores in ascending (or descending) order of
the pseudo-scores. By stopping searching at some halting point, they reduce the number
of score computations. The example of pseudo-score based schemes is the standard pivot-
based indexing scheme [22], the permutation-based indexing scheme [4, 22], the distance
regression-based indexing scheme [32], and BoostMAP [6]. Among them, the permutation-
based indexing scheme, which was independently proposed by Cha´vez et al. [22] and Amato
and Savino [4], is known to outperform other existing schemes in some cases by a wide margin,
and has received considerable attention as one of the most successful metric indexing schemes
[33, 35, 36, 79, 102] (we describe the algorithm of this scheme in Section 4.2.3 in detail).
There are other types of approximate indexing schemes: PAC-NN [24], the probabilistic
incremental search [17], SASH [44], iAESA [35], PP-Index [33], M-Index [79], etc. Some
studies also proposed an approximate indexing scheme for biometric identification [10, 39, 65]
(we describe them at the beginning of Chapter 5 in detail).
2.3 Biometric Zoo
It is known that diﬀerent users have diﬀerent degrees of accuracy in biometric authentication.
Doddington et al. [29] classified users in speaker recognition as follows:
• Sheep: those who are easily recognized (default users);
• Goats: those who are particularly diﬃcult to recognize;
• Lambs: those who are particularly easy to imitate;
• Wolves: those who are particularly successful at imitating others.
This concept is known as the biometric zoo (or Doddington’s zoo). Goats cause many false
rejects, while wolves and lambs cause many false accepts. Doddington et al. also showed the
existence of these animals through statistical tests on scores [29].
To date, numerous studies have been made on this issue from several directions. Poh and
Kittler [88] examined the potential of some score-based measures as an index characterizing
recognizability of a user. They also proposed BMI (Biometric Menagerie Index), a measure
to quantify the extent of the biometric zoo [89]. Yager and Dunstone [124] introduced a
new class of animals considering a relationship between genuine and impostor scores. Teli
et al. [110] investigated the consistency of the biometric zoo across algorithms and datasets.
Similarly, Paone and Flynn [81] investigated the consistency across algorithms and two irises
for a single user.
Although the above work studied the diﬀerence of recognizability among individuals, re-
cent studies also proposed a sophisticated attack relevant to the animals. For example, Une
et al. [116] proposed a universal wolf sample, an artifact which has extremely high similarities
(or extremely low distances) against all templates. They also proposed WAP (Wolf Attack
Probability), the maximum probability of false accepts caused by a query sample, as a secu-
rity measure for wolves, and showed that the proposed artifact can achieve WAP = 100[%] in
the most basic verification system which compares a score to a threshold. It should be noted
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that if the artifact is enrolled in the database in identification, it can make the system identify
all claimants as the enrollee who input the artifact, thus completely losing the availability of
the system. We refer to such template as a universal lamb template.
An attack to a template update mechanism, which updates a template using query sam-
ples presented at the authentication phase, is also proposed by Wang et al. [123]. They
applied the Frog-Boiling attack to keystroke template update mechanisms to changes the
victim’s template little by little towards a template of an ill-performing animal such as a
lamb. Although this attack assumes that the attacker already has a query sample which can
impersonate the victim, we consider this is still threatening in identification because lambs
can lose the availability of the system as described above. Therefore, we do not consider
template update mechanisms in this dissertation.
In the following, we introduce related work on countermeasures against wolves and lambs.
2.3.1 Countermeasures against Wolves and Lambs
Some studies proposed countermeasures against wolves. For example, Inuma et al. [47]
proposed a countermeasure which estimates a feature distribution for each of all human beings
and determines a verification threshold for each query sample using the feature distributions.
This method can keep WAP less than a desired value if the feature distributions are perfectly
estimated. Kojima et al. [61] proposed another countermeasure in verification using decision
results (accept or reject) with biometric samples other than the template to detect wolves.
Since the former countermeasure uses feature distributions and the latter one uses decision
results, they can be regarded as a feature level approach and a decision level approach,
respectively.
As for lambs, we can counteract them before authentication since lamb templates are
presented at the enrollment phase. For example, we can detect a lamb template at the
enrollment phase, by computing scores against other templates in the database [49], and
make the enrollee to re-enroll another biometrics. Although this method can easily detect a
universal lamb template mentioned above, it can miss a more ambiguous lamb template which
has high similarities to some people and low similarities to others. Since human beings can
present such an ambiguous lamb template rather than a universal lamb template as shown
by Doddington et al. [29], countermeasures against such a template is necessary.
We can counteract ambiguous lamb templates at the authentication phase, using a score
normalization scheme [85] which uses enrollee-specific parameters or impostor distributions.
To date, a number of score normalization schemes have been proposed, and a survey of them
is given in [85]. For example, Z-norm [7] attempts to normalize an impostor distribution of
each enrollee to a distribution with zero-mean and unit-variance. Since impostor distributions
of lambs are also centered around the distribution, this scheme can improve security against
lambs. Another example is a selective fusion scheme in verification proposed by Ross et al.
[98]. This scheme detects weak templates such as lamb templates and goat templates, and
invokes fusion only for enrollees who have such weak templates. Since this scheme requires
only such enrollees to input multiple biometrics, it can reduce verification errors caused by
lambs and goats while keeping down the number of inputs of other enrollees.
We finally note that all of the above countermeasures against lambs (i.e. lamb detection,
score normalization, and selective fusion) are score level approaches.
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2.4 Advantages of Score Level Approaches
In Section 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.1, we explained related work on multi-modal biometric fusion,
classification and indexing, and countermeasures against wolves and lambs. According to the
level of information sources (i.e. raw data, features, scores, or decision results), they can
be classified into sensor level approaches, feature level approaches, score level approaches,
and decision level approaches. The information available to the system becomes compressed
as it is processed from the sensor to the decision module. The raw data contains the richest
information, while the decision result contains the poorest information (e.g. a binary sequence
representing an enrollee ID or a non-enrollee). Approaches which use richer information have
a potential to provide a better performance.
Nonetheless, in this dissertation we focus on score level approaches which use scores as
information sources. The reason for this is as follows:
1. Most commercial biometric systems do not provide access to features nor raw data
[57, 97], and both of the feature level approaches and sensor level approaches cannot
be applied to such systems. On the other hand, score level approaches can be applied
to such systems if they provide access to scores. For example, in BioAPI [48], the
international standard for the API used for the development of the biometric system, a
one-to-one matching function outputs a score.
2. A template protection scheme [54], which transforms features (or raw data) by a kind
of encryption function and matches them in the transformed domain, can make feature
level approaches (or sensor level approach) diﬃcult to apply. For example, feature level
indexing needs to extract a numerical vector from a distorted image [93] or an image
which is indistinguishable from a random sequence [106]. On the other hand, score
level approaches can be used in conjunction with a template protection scheme which
outputs scores [93, 106, 111, 112].
3. The feature level approaches and sensor level approaches generally specialize in a certain
modality such as fingerprint, face, and iris. On the other hand, score level approaches
can be applied to any kind of modality since they only use scores as information sources.
4. In practice, it is not always the case that feature level approaches or sensor level ap-
proaches can provide a better performance than score level approaches. This is because
features or raw data are more diﬃcult to handle than scores. For example, the dimen-
sion of features or raw data is often very high (e.g. 2048-bit iriscodes [27]), and can
be changed from one acquisition to another (e.g. the number of minutiae varies from
sample to sample), while the dimension of scores is only one. Thus, the estimation of
feature distributions, which is required in the countermeasure against wolves in [47], is
generally much more diﬃcult than the estimation of score distributions. There are also
experimental results where score level fusion outperformed feature level fusion [62, 95].
5. On the other hand, since scores are easy to handle as described above (e.g. the dimension
of scores is one) and contain much richer information than decision results, score level
approaches generally provide a much better performance than decision level approaches
(in Section 3.6, we also show that the proposed score level fusion schemes significantly
outperform the OR rule, one of the decision level fusion schemes).
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Figure 2.2: Challenges we attempt to address in this dissertation. Although Nandakumar et al. [76]
made an attempt to optimize false accepts and false rejects in identification using the Bayes decision
theory (BDT), we attempt to further optimize the number of inputs in Chapter 3. In addition to these
factors, we attempt to optimize response time in Chapter 4 and 5, and security against wolves and
lambs in Chapter 6.
The improvement of a module such as a sensor, feature extractor, and matcher also has the
first and third problems (i.e. generally specializes in a certain modality and cannot be made
in the commercial biometric systems). Conversely, in the application where we can make the
improvement of the module, score level approaches can be further applied to provide a better
performance.
2.5 Challenges
Recall that the goal of this dissertation is to optimize security and convenience in biomet-
ric identification, where we include false accepts, wolves, and lambs as factors which aﬀect
security, and false rejects, the number of inputs, and response time as factors which aﬀect
convenience. Although we have so far introduced a number of related work, there are still
some major challenges which need to be addressed:
• Firstly, little attention has been given to the optimization of identification errors and the
number of inputs in biometric identification. Most of the conventional multi-modal bio-
metric fusion schemes are proposed in the verification mode or parallel fusion schemes,
as described in Section 2.1.3 and 2.1.4. For example, Nandakumar et al. [76] proposed a
fusion scheme in identification which can minimize the identification error probabilities
(i.e. optimize false accepts and false rejects), using the Bayes decision theory (BDT).
However, this scheme is a parallel fusion scheme which always requires the claimant to
input all the query samples, making the system inconvenient. In Chapter 3, we make
an attempt to develop sequential fusion schemes in identification which optimize the
trade-oﬀ between identification errors and the number of inputs.
• Secondly, no studies have ever tried to optimize response time along with the above
factors (identification errors and the number of inputs) in biometric identification, to
the best of our knowledge. In this dissertation, we take two steps to achieve this goal. In
Chapter 4, we make an attempt to develop metric space indexing schemes which have an
optimal property with regard to the number of score computations, and outperform the
state-of-the-art metric space indexing schemes such as the permutation-based indexing
scheme [4, 22] described in Section 2.2.2. In Chapter 5, we make an attempt to optimize
the trade-oﬀ between identification errors, the number of inputs, and response time, by
combining metric space indexing and sequential fusion in identification.
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• Last but not least, no studies have ever tried to optimize security against wolves and
lambs and convenience in biometrics. In Chapter 6, we consider the verification mode
to simplify the problem, and attempt to optimize the trade-oﬀ between security against
wolves and lambs and convenience in terms of the number of inputs and false rejects.
Figure 2.2 shows challenges we attempt to address in this dissertation. Although we focus
on score level approaches which have several advantages as described in Section 2.4, it should
be noted that the fact that the above three challenges have not been solved is true for all of
the sensor level, feature level, score level, and decision level approaches.
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3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to develop sequential fusion schemes in biometric identification
which optimize the trade-oﬀ between identification errors and the number of inputs. Taka-
hashi et al. [107] proposed a sequential fusion scheme in verification which we call the LRSV
(Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Verification) scheme. This scheme is based on SPRT (Se-
quential Probability Ratio Test), a statistical hypothesis test which can minimize the average
number of observations among all tests with the same error probabilities [71, 121, 122]. Since
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this scheme applies SPRT to biometric verification, it can minimize ANI (the average number
of inputs) among all sequential fusion schemes with the same verification error probabilities.
However, in constructing optimal sequential fusion schemes in identification, we must
note that SPRT is a binary test which accepts either a null hypothesis or an alternative
hypothesis (i.e. binary classification). In contrast, biometric identification accepts a claimant
as one of the enrollees in the database or rejects him/her as a non-enrollee (i.e. multi-class
classification). Noda and Kawaguchi [78] proposed a technique which reduces the utterance
length in speaker identification by extending SPRT to multi-class classification and using
features as information sources. However, it is not proved that this technique can minimize
the average utterance length since SPRT is optimal only in the case of binary classification.
3.1.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we provide a theoretical basis for optimal sequential fusion in biometric
identification. To this end, we focus our attention on MSPRT’s (Multi-hypothesis Sequential
Probability Ratio Tests) [30], multi-hypothesis tests which can minimize the average number
of observations in the case of multi-class classification. More specifically, Dragalin et al. [30]
found two such tests and referred to them as Test δa and Test δb, respectively. Then, the
main contributions of this chapter can be written as follows:
1. We firstly propose two sequential fusion schemes in identification: the PPSI (Posterior
Probability-based Sequential Identification) scheme and the LRSI (Likelihood Ratio-
based Sequential Identification) scheme. The PPSI scheme is based on MSPRT (Test
δa) and can minimize ANI (the average number of inputs) under some conditions, while
the LRSI scheme is a simpler one which can be carried out quickly.
2. We secondly prove that the LRSI scheme can also minimize ANI, by proving that this
scheme is equivalent to MSPRT (Test δb) under some conditions. We also discuss the
conditions to achieve the optimality.
3. We finally demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of our proposals through experimental eval-
uation using the NIST BSSR1 (Biometric Score Set - Release 1) Set1 dataset [77], a
multi-modal score dataset (one face and two fingerprints).
3.1.2 Organization of This Chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we define accuracy measures for positive
biometric identification. In Section 3.3, we describe MSPRT’s [30] in detail. In Section 3.4, we
propose the PPSI scheme and the LRSI scheme as sequential fusion schemes in identification.
In Section 3.5, we prove that the optimality of the LRSI scheme with regard to ANI, and
discuss the conditions to achieve the optimality. In Section 3.6, we show the experimental
results using the NIST BSSR1 Set1 [77], and discuss the results. Finally, we conclude this
chapter in Section 3.7.
3.2 Accuracy Measures for Positive Biometric Identification
In the verification mode, two kinds of error rates are defined: FRR (False Reject Rate) and
FAR (False Accept Rate). FRR is the error rate that the system rejects a genuine individual
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Figure 3.1: Three error rates in positive identification (EFRR/EFAR/NFAR).
as an impostor. FAR is the error rate that the system accepts an impostor as a genuine
individual. High FRR causes inconvenience, and high FAR causes security problems.
In the identification mode, FNIR (False Negative Identification Rate) and FPIR (False
Positive Identification Rate) are defined as accuracy measures [50]. FNIR is the error rate
that the system does not include an enrollee who inputs a query sample in the candidate list.
FPIR is the error rate that the system outputs one or more candidates when a non-enrollee
inputs a query sample. In criminal investigations, for example, it is essential to decrease both
FNIR and FPIR.
Positive identification, however, typically outputs at most one candidate and is used for
the applications which provide service appropriate to the identified user, as described in
Section 1.1. In such cases, the identification error in the case where the enrollee inputs a
query sample can be divided into two types: accepting the enrollee as another enrollee, and
rejecting the enrollee as non-enrollee. Although both of the errors cause inconvenience since
the enrollee cannot use appropriate service, the former error further causes security problems
because the system incorrectly provides service appropriate to another enrollee.
Taking these matters into account, we newly define three kinds of error rates as perfor-
mance measures for positive identification systems.
EFRR (Enrollee False Reject Rate):
The error rate that the system incorrectly rejects an enrollee as a non-enrollee.
EFAR (Enrollee False Accept Rate):
The error rate that the system incorrectly accepts an enrollee as another enrollee.
NFAR (Non-Enrollee False Accept Rate):
The error rate that the system incorrectly accepts a non-enrollee as an enrollee.
Taking computer login systems for example, EFRR is the error rate that an enrollee fails
to login, EFAR is the error rate that an enrollee logins to another account, NFAR is the error
rate that a non-enrollee (i.e., an attacker) logins to someone’s account. High EFRR causes
inconvenience, high EFAR causes both inconvenience and security problems, and high NFAR
causes security problems. Figure 3.1 shows the three error rates in positive identification
(EFRR/EFAR/NFAR).
3.2.1 Relationship between Identification Errors and the Number of Inputs
In Section 1.1, we described that false accepts increase as the number of enrollees increases in
identification. We now derive the relationship between the three kinds of identification errors
and the number of enrollees. Here, to diﬀerentiate error probabilities from error rates, we de-
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fine FRP (False Reject Probability), FAP (False Accept Probability), EFRP (Enrollee FRP),
EFAP (Enrollee FAP), and NFAP (Non-enrollee FAP) as an error probability corresponding
to FRR, FAR, EFRR, EFAR, and NFAR, respectively.
Take FRP, FAP, FRR, and FAR for example. Let d ∈ {0, 1} be a variable which takes 1
or 0 if the final decision result is accept or reject, respectively. Let further W1 be the event
that a genuine user attempts verification against him/herself, and W0 be the event that an
impostor attempts verification against someone else. Then, FRP and FAP can be written as
follows:
FRP = P (d = 0|W1) (3.1)
FAP = P (d = 1|W0), (3.2)
where P () is a probability mass function. Since they are theoretical values, in practice FRR
and FAR are evaluated, instead of FRP and FAP, using a finite number of biometric samples
as follows:
FRR =
The number of false rejects
The total number of genuine attempts
(3.3)
FAR =
The number of false accepts
The total number of impostor attempts
. (3.4)
Similarly, EFRP/EFAP/NFAP is a theoretical value, while EFRR/EFAR/NFAR is the num-
ber of error rates divided by the total number of attempts. We use error probabilities (i.e.
FRP, FAP, EFRP, EFAP, NFAP) in a theoretical analysis, and error rates (i.e. FRR, FAR,
EFRR, EFAR, NFAR) in an experimental evaluation.
We now derive the relationship between EFRP/EFAP/NFAP and the number of enrollees
N . Let f() be a distribution of a genuine score (i.e. score between the same individual) and
g() be a distribution of an impostor score (i.e. score between the diﬀerent individuals). We
refer to f() and g() as a genuine distribution and impostor distribution, respectively. We first
consider a verification system which makes a decision by comparing a similarity score s to a
verification threshold sth (we assume that a similarity score s is continuous). Then, FRP and
FAP can be expressed as follows:
FRP =
Z sth
−∞
f(s)ds (3.5)
FAP =
Z ∞
sth
g(s)ds (3.6)
= 1−G(sth), (3.7)
where G() is a cumulative distribution function corresponding to g(). We then consider an
identification system which makes a decision as follows: if one or more similarity scores exceed
an identification threshold sth, identify as the enrollee whose score is the highest; otherwise,
reject. The probability that a genuine score falls below the threshold and the probability
that an impostor score exceeds the threshold can be expressed as FRP and FAP, respectively.
Thus, by assuming that all scores are independent, we can obtain the following approximation
if N × FAP  1:
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EFRP = FRP × (1− FAP )N−1 (3.8)
≈ FRP × [1− (N − 1)× FAP ] (3.9)
≈ FRP (3.10)
EFAP =
Z sth
−∞
f(s)
n
1− [G(sth)]N−1
o
ds+
Z ∞
sth
f(s)
n
1− [G(s)]N−1
o
ds (3.11)
=
Z sth
−∞
f(s)ds×
n
1− [1− (1−G(sth))]N−1
o
+
Z ∞
sth
f(s)
n
1− [1− (1−G(s))]N−1
o
ds (3.12)
≈
Z sth
−∞
f(s)ds× {1− [1− (N − 1)× (1−G(sth))]}
+
Z ∞
sth
f(s) {1− [1− (N − 1)× (1−G(s))]} ds (3.13)
= (N − 1)×

FRP × FAP +
Z ∞
sth
f(s) (1−G(s)) ds

(3.14)
NFAP = 1− (1− FAP )N (3.15)
≈ N × FAP. (3.16)
That is, EFAP and NFAP increase almost in proportion to the number of enrollees N .
3.3 MSPRT’s
This chapter aims at optimizing the trade-oﬀ between the identification error probabilities
(EFRP/EFAP/NFAP) and the number of inputs. MSPRT’s (Multi-hypothesis Sequential
Probability Ratio Tests) [30] play a key role in achieving our aim.
Assume that either of the hypotheses H0,H1, · · · ,HN (N ≥ 1) is true, and observed data
s1, s2, · · · , st are distributed according to the true hypothesis (st can be either a scalar or
a vector, and can be either continuous or discrete; in this dissertation, we assume that st
is a vector and continuous). We begin with a sequential test of binary hypotheses: a null
hypothesis H0 and an alternative hypothesis H1 (N = 1). After a set of data St = {sτ |1 ≤
τ ≤ t} is obtained, SPRT (Sequential Probability Ratio Test) [121] computes a likelihood
ratio which is given by
Zt =
p(St|H1)
p(St|H0) , (3.17)
where p() is a probability density function. Then, SPRT makes the following decision: if
Zt exceeds a threshold Ahigh, accept H1; if Zt falls below another threshold Alow (< Ahigh),
accept H0; otherwise, continue observing data. It is proved that this test minimizes the
average number of observations among all binary tests with the same error probabilities if
observed data s1, s2, · · · , st are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) [71, 122].
We now consider a sequential test of multiple hypotheses H0,H1, · · · , HN (N ≥ 2). The
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probability that the hypothesis Hi (0 ≤ i ≤ N) is incorrectly accepted is given by
αi =
X
j 6=i
P (Hj)αji, (3.18)
where P (Hj) is the prior probability that Hj is true, and αji is the probability of accepting
Hi when Hj is true. Let δ be a sequential test of multiple hypotheses, and consider a set of
tests whose αi does not exceed the required value αi (0 ≤ i ≤ N):
∆(α) = {δ : αi ≤ αi, 0 ≤ i ≤ N}, (3.19)
where α = (α0, α1, · · · , αN )1. Then, Dragalin et al. [30] proved that, in the asymptotic case
where αmax = max0≤i≤N αi goes to 0 (the number of observations t goes to∞), the following
tests (MSRPT’s) minimize the average number of observations among ∆(α):
MSPRT (Test δa):
After a set of data St = {sτ |1 ≤ τ ≤ t} is obtained, compute, for each hypothesis Hi
(0 ≤ i ≤ N), the posterior probability that Hi is true as follows:
P (Hi|St) = P (Hi)ZtiPN
n=0 P (Hn)Ztn
, (3.20)
where Zti is a likelihood ratio between Hi and H0 which is given by
Zti =
p(St|Hi)
p(St|H0) . (3.21)
If one or more P (Hi|St) exceed a threshold Ai, accept one of the corresponding hypotheses.
Otherwise, continue observing data.
MSPRT (Test δb):
After a set of data St = {sτ |1 ≤ τ ≤ t} is obtained, compute, for each hypothesis Hi
(0 ≤ i ≤ N), the following value:
Lti =
P (Hi)p(St|Hi)
max0≤n≤N,n 6=i P (Hn)p(St|Hn) . (3.22)
Lti is referred to as a generalized likelihood ratio between Hi and the remaining hypotheses.
If one or more Lti exceed a threshold Bi, accept one of the corresponding hypotheses.
Otherwise, continue observing data.
The thresholds Ai and Bi are set to be the following values:
Ai = log(P (Hi)/αi) (3.23)
Bi = log(N · P (Hi)/αi). (3.24)
Then, both of the tests satisfy the requirements of the identification error probabilities (i.e.
δa, δb ∈ ∆(α)), and minimize the average number of observations in the asymptotic case where
1More specifically, Dragalin et al. [30] considered more general case: they also introduced a loss function
W (j, i) ∈ [0,∞) in the case where Hi is accepted when Hj is true (W (i, i) = 0), and considered a set of tests
whose risk given by Ri =
∑
j 6=i P (Hj)W (j, i)αji do not exceed the required value Ri (0 ≤ i ≤ N). However,
in this dissertation we consider the zero-one loss function where W (j, i) = 1 (j 6= i), for simplicity.
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αmax (= max0≤i≤N αi) goes to 0 [30]. Note that this asymptotic optimality is proved not
only in the i.i.d. case but also in the non-i.i.d. case (i.e. the case where observed data are
not independent nor identically distributed). For more details, refer to [30].
3.4 Proposed Sequential Fusion Schemes in Identification
We now propose two sequential fusion schemes in biometric identification: the PPSI (Posterior
Probability-based Sequential Identification) scheme and the LRSI (Likelihood Ratio-based
Sequential Identification) scheme. The former is based on MSPRT (Test δa), while the latter
is a simpler scheme which can be carried out quickly.
3.4.1 Posterior Probability-based Sequential Identification Scheme
We first explain the overview of the PPSI (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Identifica-
tion) scheme. Let sti be a score for the i-th enrollee at the t-th input, and st be the following
N -dimensional score vector:
st = (st1, st2, · · · , stN ). (3.25)
We use the score vector st as observed data, and define the following hypotheses:
Hi: The user is the i-th enrollee (1 ≤ i ≤ N).
H0: The user is a non-enrollee.
Now we can apply MSPRT (Test δa) to biometric identification. After the claimant inputs
the t-th query sample, the PPSI scheme identifies him/her as follows:
1. Compute a score vector st = (st1, st2, · · · , stN ).
2. Compute the posterior probability P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) using a set of score vectors
St = {sτ |1 ≤ τ ≤ t} (we describe how to compute P (Hi|St) in detail in Section 3.4.2).
3. If one or more P (Hi|St) exceed a threshold A (= A0 = A1 = · · · = AN ), accept the
hypothesis Hi whose P (Hi|St) is the highest (if 1 ≤ i ≤ N , accept as the i-th enrollee;
if i = 0, reject). Otherwise, require another biometric input (if the number of inputs
has reached an upper limit T , reject).
Here we use an identification threshold A (= A0 = A1 = · · · = AN ) which is common to
all hypotheses. In Section 3.4.2, we also describe the reason for this. Figure 3.2 shows the
overview of the PPSI scheme.
3.4.2 Computation of Posterior Probabilities
We now explain how to compute P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) in detail. The PPSI scheme first
computes the likelihood ratio Zti = p(St|Hi)/p(St|H0) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) using a set of score
vectors St = {sτ = (sτ1, sτ2, · · · , sτN )|1 ≤ τ ≤ t} (see (3.21)), and then normalizes it to the
posterior probability P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) (see (3.20)).
We begin by explaining how to compute Zti (0 ≤ i ≤ N). As described in Section 2.1.1,
we focus on sequential fusion of multiple biometric traits (e.g. fingerprint, face and iris) or
multiple instances (e.g. index and middle fingers) where each modality is independent or
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Figure 3.2: Overview of the PPSI (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Identification) scheme.
weakly dependent [58]. Then we can reasonably assume that all scores are independent. We
further assume that the likelihood p(sti|Hj) (0 ≤ i, j ≤ N) can be written as follows:
p(sti|Hj) =
(
f (t)(sti) (if i = j)
g
(t)
i (sti) (if i 6= j),
(3.26)
where f (t)() is a distribution of a genuine score (i.e. genuine distribution), g(t)i () is a distribu-
tion of a score between the i-th enrollee and another person (referred to as an enrollee-specific
impostor distribution), and t is the input number (i.e. we model these score distributions for
each modality). These distributions are depicted in the upper right of Figure 3.3.
The reason we assume an impostor distribution for each enrollee is that it is diﬀerent from
enrollee to enrollee, to be exact (e.g. lambs have high similarity scores against many others).
To date, a number of studies have reported that the accuracy was improved by using enrollee-
specific impostor distributions [85]. On the other hand, we use a genuine distribution which
is common to all enrollees. A genuine distribution is also diﬀerent from enrollee to enrollee, to
be exact (e.g. goats have low similarity scores against themselves). Nevertheless, we assume
a genuine distribution common to all enrollees because generally very few genuine scores per
enrollee (e.g. 2 or 3 scores) are available as training samples. For example, Poh et al. [91]
showed that there were low correlation between the standard deviations of the enrollee-specific
genuine distributions in the training set and those in the evaluation set. This indicates the
diﬃculty of reliably estimating the enrollee-specific genuine distributions. Furthermore, if
each enrollee presents only one biometric sample during enrollment, there are no genuine
scores which can be obtained from the sample. Even in such a case, we can train f (t) using
genuine scores obtained from other biometric samples which are collected in advance (e.g.
biometric samples collected for performance evaluation). We also explain how to train f (t)
and g(t)i () later in detail.
Under the above assumptions, the likelihood ratio Zti = p(St|Hi)/p(St|H0) (0 ≤ i ≤ N)
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Figure 3.3: Computation of the posterior probability P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) in the PPSI scheme.
The genuine distribution f (t)() and the impostor distributions g(t)1 (), · · · , g(t)N () (or the likelihood ratio
functions f (t)()/g(t)1 (), · · · , f (t)()/g(t)N ()) are trained in advance, using genuine scores and impostor
scores, respectively.
is decomposed as follows:
Zti =
p(St|Hi)
p(St|H0)
=
Qt
τ=1 p(sτi|Hi)
Q
n6=i p(sτn|Hi)Qt
τ=1 p(sτi|H0)
Q
n6=i p(sτn|H0)
=
(Qt
τ=1 f
(τ)(sτi)/g
(τ)
i (sτi) (if i 6= 0)
1 (if i = 0),
(3.27)
which can be computed using the genuine distribution f (τ)() and the impostor distribution
g
(τ)
i (). These distributions are trained using genuine scores and impostor scores against the
i-th enrollee, respectively, both of which are obtained from templates in the database or
any other pre-collected biometric samples (e.g. biometric samples collected for performance
evaluation). For example, they can be trained by assuming the Gaussian distribution models
and using the maximum likelihood estimator. Alternatively, the likelihood ratio function
f (τ)()/g(τ)i (), from which Zti is derived (see equation (3.27)), can be directly trained. For
example, we can assume the logistic regression model [12] which estimates the log-likelihood
ratio function log f (τ)()/g(τ)i () as follows:
log f (τ)(sτi)/g
(τ)
i (sτi) = w
(τ)
i1 sτi + w
(τ)
i0 , (3.28)
where w(τ)i1 and w
(τ)
i0 are regression coeﬃcients. Since it does not estimate f
(τ)() and g(τ)i ()
but directly estimate log f (τ)()/g(τ)i () (i.e. it is not a generative model but a discriminative
model [12]), we can expect that it provides good performance. Indeed, some studies showed
the validity of the logistic regression model in biometrics [117, 118]. We also show it in our
experiment in Section 3.6.
After computing the likelihood ratio Zti (0 ≤ i ≤ N), the PPSI scheme normalizes it
to the posterior probability P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N). The important problem here is that
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we need to set the prior probability P (Hi) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) in advance (see (3.20)). Since it
is generally very diﬃcult to correctly estimate P (Hi) (i.e. it is very diﬃcult to know who
attempts authentication in advance), in this dissertation we assume that P (Hi) is uniform
(i.e. P (H0) = · · · = P (HN ) = 1/(N + 1)). This form of prior distribution is known as a
noninformative prior which is intended to have little influence on the posterior distribution
(i.e. to “let the data speak for themselves”) [12]. We also set the required identification error
probability αi to be uniform (i.e. α0 = α1 = · · · = αN ), for simplicity. Then, it follows from
(3.23) that we use the identification threshold A (= A0 = A1 = · · · = AN ) which is common
to all hypotheses, as described in Section 3.4.1.
To sum up, after a set of score vectors St = {sτ |1 ≤ τ ≤ t} is obtained, the PPSI scheme
computes the posterior probability P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) as follows:
1. Compute the likelihood ratio Zti = p(St|Hi)/p(St|H0) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) using (3.27).
2. Normalize Zti (0 ≤ i ≤ N) to the posterior probability P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) using
(3.20), where P (Hi) is uniform (i.e. P (H0) = · · · = P (HN ) = 1/(N + 1)).
Figure 3.3 shows the computation of the posterior probabilities in the PPSI scheme.
3.4.3 Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Identification Scheme
The LRSI (Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Identification) scheme does not normalize the
likelihood ratio Zti (0 ≤ i ≤ N) to the posterior probability P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N), but
compares Zti (1 ≤ i ≤ N) to a threshold B (> 1) which is common to all enrollees. Here,
since the non-enrollee’s likelihood ratio Zt0 is always 1 (see (3.27)), the LRSI scheme sets the
threshold B larger than 1 and does not compare Zt0 to B.
That is, after the claimant inputs the t-th query sample, the LRSI scheme identifies
him/her as follows:
1. Compute a score vector st = (st1, st2, · · · , stN ).
2. Compute the likelihood ratio Zti = p(St|Hi)/p(St|H0) (1 ≤ i ≤ N) from a set of score
vectors St = {sτ |1 ≤ τ ≤ t} using (3.27).
3. If one or more Zti exceed a threshold B, accept as the enrollee whose Zti is the highest.
Otherwise, require another biometric input (if the number of inputs has reached an
upper limit T , reject).
This scheme can be regarded as the extension of the SPRT-based sequential fusion scheme
[107] which was proposed in verification to the identification scenario (both of the schemes
compare a likelihood ratio against the hypothesis H0 to the threshold). Noda and Kawaguchi
[78] also proposed a technique which reduces the utterance length in speaker identification by
extending SPRT to multi-class classification. Their technique computes, for each enrollee, a
likelihood ratio against the hypothesisH0 using features as information sources, and compares
it to the threshold. The diﬀerence between the LRSI scheme and their technique is that the
former is a score level approach (and so is the SPRT-based sequential fusion scheme [107]),
while the latter is a feature level approach.
Note that the LRSI scheme can compare a log-likelihood ratio logZti (1 ≤ i ≤ N) to a
threshold logB, instead of comparing Zti to B. By taking the logarithm of both sides of
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(3.27), we can obtain the following equation:
logZti =
(
logZ(t−1)i + log f (t)(sti)/g
(t)
i (sti) (if i 6= 0)
0 (if i = 0).
(3.29)
Thus, logZti can be updated just by adding log f (t)(sti)/g
(t)
i (sti) to the previous log-likelihood
ratio logZ(t−1)i. In particular, if the logistic regression model is used to estimate log f (t)(sti)/
g
(t)
i (sti), the algorithm is further simplified and can be carried out very quickly because
log f (t)(sti)/g
(t)
i (sti) can be computed just by one multiplication and one addition (see (3.28)).
This is particularly helpful in the case of the biometric authentication system whose CPU
and memory resources are limited (e.g. physical access control device).
3.5 Optimality of the Proposed Schemes
Since the PPSI scheme uses MSPRT (Test δa) as described in the previous section, it can
minimize ANI (the average number of inputs) (we discuss the conditions to achieve the op-
timality in Section 3.5.3). In this section, we also prove the optimality of the LRSI scheme
with regard to ANI by proving the equivalence between this scheme and MSPRT (Test δb)
under some conditions, and discuss the conditions to achieve the optimality.
3.5.1 Properties of N-dimensional Score Distributions
Let p(t)i (0 ≤ i ≤ N) be a probability density distribution from which an N -dimensional score
vector st = (st1, st2, · · · , stN ) is generated in the case when the hypothesis Hi is true. We
refer to this distribution as an N -dimensional score distribution, which is a key to the proof
of the optimality of the LRSI scheme. Before proving the optimality of the LRSI scheme, we
show some properties of N -dimensional score distributions.
Assume that the following condition holds:
(i) All scores are independent, and scores between the same individual and scores between
the i-th enrollee and another person are generated from f (t)() and g(t)i (), respectively,
where t is the input number.
Then, p(t)i (0 ≤ i ≤ N) can be written as follows:
p
(t)
i (st) =
(
f (t)(sti) ·
QN
n=1,n6=i g
(t)
n (stn) (if i 6= 0)QN
n=1 g
(t)
n (stn) (if i = 0).
(3.30)
We begin by proving, under the condition (i), the following lemma which gives an information
geometric interpretation to the N -dimensional score distribution p(t)i :
Lemma 3.1. (Pythagorean theorem for N-dimensional score distributions) If the
condition (i) holds, then for any i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N} and i 6= j, we have
D(p(t)i ||p(t)j ) = D(p(t)i ||p(t)0 ) +D(p(t)0 ||p(t)j ), (3.31)
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between the N -dimensional score distributions and the KL divergences.
where D(p(t)i ||p(t)j ) is the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence [25] from p(t)i to p(t)j :
D(p(t)i ||p(t)j ) =
Z
p
(t)
i (st) log
p
(t)
i (st)
p
(t)
j (st)
dst. (3.32)
Proof. If i = 0 or j = 0, it is obvious that (3.31) holds since D(p(t)0 ||p(t)0 ) = 0. Otherwise
(i.e. if i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and i 6= j), we have
D(p(t)i ||p(t)j ) =
Z
p
(t)
i (st) log
p
(t)
i (st)
p
(t)
j (st)
dst (3.33)
=
Z Z
f (t)(sti)g
(t)
j (stj) log
f (t)(sti)g
(t)
j (stj)
g
(t)
i (sti)f (t)(stj)
dstidstj (3.34)
=
Z
f (t)(sti) log
f (t)(sti)
g
(t)
i (sti)
dsti +
Z
g
(t)
j (stj) log
g
(t)
j (stj)
f (t)(stj)
dstj (3.35)
=
Z
p
(t)
i (st) log
p
(t)
i (st)
p
(t)
0 (st)
dst +
Z
p
(t)
0 (st) log
p
(t)
0 (st)
p
(t)
j (st)
dst (3.36)
= D(p(t)i ||p(t)0 ) +D(p(t)0 ||p(t)j ). (3.37)
From (3.33) to (3.34) and (3.35) to (3.36), we used (3.30) and the fact that
R
g
(t)
k (stk)dstk = 1
for any k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and k 6= i, j.
The equation (3.31) is known as the Pythagorean theorem for divergences which holds
when the primal geodesic (e-geodesic) connecting p(t)i and p
(t)
0 is orthogonal at p
(t)
0 to the
dual geodesic (m-geodesic) connecting p(t)0 and p
(t)
j [3]. That is, what we proved here is
that this orthogonality holds for the N -dimensional score distributions. Figure 3.4 shows the
relationship between the N -dimensional score distributions and the KL divergences.
We further assume that the following condition holds:
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(ii) The KL divergence from f (t) to g(t)i takes the value Df→gi , and that from g
(t)
i to f
(t)
takes Dgi→f , both of which are independent of the modality:
Df→gi = D(f
(1)||g(1)i ) = · · · = D(f (T )||g(T )i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ N) (3.38)
Dgi→f = D(g
(1)
i ||f (1)) = · · · = D(g(T )i ||f (T )) (1 ≤ i ≤ N). (3.39)
Here we explain the meaning of this condition. The KL divergence has a meaning of a
distance measure between two probability distributions, and some studies proposed to use
the KL divergence between a genuine distribution and an impostor distribution as a metric of
identification performance [105, 108]. Thus, the condition (ii) means that the identification
accuracy with regard to the i-th enrollee is independent of the modality. Note that this may
be too restrictive, especially in the case of multiple biometric traits (e.g. fingerprint, face and
iris), as will be discussed in Section 3.5.3. We advance discussions under this ideal condition.
Under the condition (ii), we can prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. If the condition (i) and (ii) hold, then for any i, j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N} and i 6= j,
the KL divergence from p(t)i to p
(t)
j takes the value Dpi→pj independent of the modality:
Dpi→pj = D(p
(1)
i ||p(1)j ) = · · · = D(p(T )i ||p(T )j ). (3.40)
Proof. If i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and i 6= j, (3.35) can be further written as follows:
D(p(t)i ||p(t)j ) =
Z
f (t)(sti) log
f (t)(sti)
g
(t)
i (sti)
dsti +
Z
g
(t)
j (stj) log
g
(t)
j (stj)
f (t)(stj)
dstj (3.41)
= D(f (t)||g(t)i ) +D(g(t)j ||f (t)) (3.42)
= Df→gi +Dgj→f . (3.43)
From (3.42) to (3.43), we used (3.38) and (3.39). Thus, (3.40) holds in this case (Dpi→pj =
Df→gi +Dgj→f ). Similarly, if i = 0, we have
D(p(t)i ||p(t)j ) =
Z
g
(t)
j (stj) log
g
(t)
j (stj)
f (t)(stj)
dstj (3.44)
= D(g(t)j ||f (t)) (3.45)
= Dgj→f , (3.46)
and (3.40) holds (Dpi→pj = Dgj→f ). If j = 0, we have
D(p(t)i ||p(t)j ) =
Z
f (t)(sti) log
f (t)(sti)
g
(t)
i (sti)
dsti (3.47)
= D(f (t)||g(t)i ) (3.48)
= Df→gi , (3.49)
and (3.40) holds (Dpi→pj = Df→gi).
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Finally, we show the relationship between the log-likelihood ratio log p(St|Hi)/p(St|Hj)
and the KL divergence D(p(t)i ||p(t)j ), in the case where Hi is a true hypothesis (0 ≤ i, j ≤ N ,
i 6= j). We simply denote the log-likelihood ratio log p(t)i (st)/p(t)j (st) in this case by LLRt
and its variance by σ2t = V (LLRt), and assume the following condition about the finiteness
of the variances:
P∞
t=1 σ
2
t /t
2 <∞. Then, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 3.3. Assume that Hi is a true hypothesis, where i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N}. If the condition
(i) and (ii) hold, then for any j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N} and i 6= j, we have
1
t
log p(St|Hi)/p(St|Hj) a.s.−−→ Dpi→pj (t→∞), (3.50)
where Xt
a.s.−−→ X (t → ∞) represents that a sequence of random variables {Xt} converges to
X almost surely (i.e. almost sure convergence):
Pr( lim
t→∞Xt = X) = 1. (3.51)
Proof. If the condition (i) holds, the left side of (3.50) can be written as follows:
1
t
log p(St|Hi)/p(St|Hj) = 1
t
log
tY
τ=1
p
(τ)
i (sτ )
p
(τ)
j (sτ )
(3.52)
=
1
t
tX
τ=1
log
p
(τ)
i (sτ )
p
(τ)
j (sτ )
(3.53)
=
1
t
tX
τ=1
LLRτ . (3.54)
By Lemma 3.2, if (i) and (ii) hold, we have
Dpi→pj = D(p
(t)
i ||p(t)j ) =
Z
p
(t)
i (st) log
p
(t)
i (st)
p
(t)
j (st)
dst = E(LLRt). (3.55)
Thus, in this case, {LLRt} is a sequence of independent random variables with meanDpi→pj (=
E(LLRt)) and variance σ2t (= V (LLRt)) such that
P∞
t=1 σ
2
t /t
2 <∞. Then, by Kolmogorov’s
strong law of large numbers [59], we have
1
t
tX
τ=1
LLRτ
a.s.−−→ Dpi→pj (t→∞). (3.56)
By (3.54) and (3.56), (3.50) holds.
3.5.2 Proof of the Optimality of the LRSI Scheme
We now prove the optimality of the LRSI scheme using the properties of N -dimensional score
distributions (Lemma 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3). To prove the optimality, we further assume that the
following conditions hold:
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(iii) The LRSI scheme can perfectly estimate the likelihood ratio f (t)/g(t)i (or the log-
likelihood ratio log f (t)/g(t)i ) (1 ≤ t ≤ T , 1 ≤ i ≤ N).
(iv) The prior distribution P (Hi) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) is uniform.
Under the conditions, we prove that the LRSI scheme is equivalent to MSPRT (Test δb) which
sets the required identification error probabilities to be α1 = · · · = αN and α0 = 02, in the
asymptotic case where the number of inputs t goes to ∞ (the optimality of MSPRT’s is also
proved in this asymptotic case, as described in Section 3.3).
Under the condition (iv), the generalized likelihood ratio Lti (1 ≤ i ≤ N) used in MSPRT
(Test δb) (see (3.22)) can be written as follows:
Lti = min
0≤n≤N,n 6=i
p(St|Hi)
p(St|Hn) . (3.57)
We can also obtain B1 = B2 = · · · = BN and B0 = ∞ from (3.24), α1 = · · · = αN , α0 = 0,
and the assumption that P (Hi) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) is uniform.
On the other hand, under the conditions (i) and (iii), the LRSI scheme perfectly estimates
the likelihood ratio Zti between Hi and H0 (1 ≤ i ≤ N) which is given by
Zti =
p(St|Hi)
p(St|H0) , (3.58)
and compares it to the common threshold B.
Let i∗ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} be a hypothesis ID whose likelihood is the highest:
i∗ = argmax
1≤i≤N
p(St|Hi). (3.59)
Then, we can say that the LRSI scheme and MSPRT (Test δb) identify the claimant by
comparing Zti∗ and Lti∗ to the threshold, respectively. Thus, to prove that the LRSI scheme
is equivalent to MSPRT (Test δb), it suﬃces to prove that n which minimizes the likelihood
ratio p(St|Hi∗)/p(St|Hn) (0 ≤ n ≤ N , n 6= i∗) is n = 0. We prove this in the asymptotic case
where the number of inputs t goes to ∞:
Theorem 3.1. (Equivalence between the LRSI scheme and MSPRT (Test δb)) If
the conditions (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) hold, then
argmin
0≤n≤N,n 6=i∗
p(St|Hi∗)
p(St|Hn)
a.s.−−→ 0 (t→∞), (3.60)
and thus the LRSI scheme is equivalent to MSPRT (Test δb) for suﬃciently large t.
Proof. Let k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N} be a true hypothesis ID. We first prove this theorem in the case
where k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. In this case, since the likelihood of the true hypothesis p(St|Hk) is
the highest for suﬃciently large t, i∗ a.s.−−→ k (t→∞). Thus, we have
1
t
log
p(St|Hi∗)
p(St|Hn) → Dpk→pn (t→∞) (3.61)
= Dpk→p0 +Dp0→pn . (3.62)
2It follows from α0 = 0 and (3.24) that B0 = ∞. Thus, α0 = 0 means that the system does not actively
reject a claimant until the number of inputs exceeds an upper limit T . Although it causes an increase of the
number of inputs of non-enrollees (i.e. attackers), we consider this is not a problem as long as the number of
inputs of enrollees is small.
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In (3.61), we used i∗ a.s.−−→ k (t→∞) and Lemma 3.3. From (3.61) to (3.62), we used Lemma
3.1 and 3.2. It follows from the non-negativity of the KL divergence [25] that the value in
(3.62) is minimized in the case where n = 0.
We then prove this theorem in the case where k = 0. In this case, we have
1
t
log
p(St|Hi∗)
p(St|Hn) =
1
t
log
p(St|Hi∗)p(St|H0)
p(St|H0)p(St|Hn) (3.63)
= −1
t
log
p(St|H0)
p(St|Hi∗) +
1
t
log
p(St|H0)
p(St|Hn) (3.64)
→ −Dp0→pi∗ +Dp0→pn . (3.65)
From (3.64) to (3.65), we used Lemma 3.3. From the non-negativity of the KL divergence,
the value in (3.65) is minimized in the case where n = 0.
What we proved here is that the LRSI scheme is equivalent to MSPRT (Test δb) in the
asymptotic case where t→∞. Since MSPRT (Test δb) is optimal with regard to the trade-oﬀ
between the average number of observations and the identification error probabilities (i.e.
α0, · · · , αN ), the LRSI scheme is also optimal with regard to the trade-oﬀ between ANI and
the identification error probabilities (EFRP/EFAP/NFAP).
It should be noted that although Noda and Kawaguchi [78] proposed a feature level
approach which computes, for each enrollee, the likelihood ratio against the hypothesis H0 in
the same way as the LRSI scheme to reduce the utterance length in speaker identification, we
did not prove that their technique can minimize the average utterance length. This is because
we used some properties of not feature distributions but N -dimensional score distributions
(Lemma 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) in proving Theorem 3.1.
3.5.3 Conditions to Achieve the Optimality
In Section 3.5.2, we proved the optimality of the LRSI scheme under the following conditions:
(i) All scores are independent, and scores between the same individual and scores between
the i-th enrollee and another person are generated from f (t)() and g(t)i (), respectively,
where t is the input number.
(ii) The KL divergence from f (t) to g(t)i takes the value Df→gi , and that from g
(t)
i to f
(t)
takes Dgi→f , both of which are independent of the modality.
(iii) The LRSI scheme can perfectly estimate the likelihood ratio f (t)/g(t)i (or the log-
likelihood ratio log f (t)/g(t)i ) (1 ≤ t ≤ T , 1 ≤ i ≤ N).
(iv) The prior distribution P (Hi) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) is uniform.
(v) The identification error probabilities (EFRP/EFAP/NFAP) are suﬃciently small (the
number of inputs t is suﬃciently large).
The last condition follows from the fact that the asymptotic case where t→∞ is equivalent
to the asymptotic case where the required identification error probabilities go to 0 (αmax(=
max0≤i≤N αi) → 0). The condition (i), (iii), (iv), and (v) are the same for the optimality
of the PPSI scheme described in Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 since it also assumes (i) and (iv),
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estimates the likelihood ratio f (t)()/g(t)i () in (3.27), and MSPRT (Test δa) is also optimal in
the asymptotic case where t→∞.
Unfortunately, the above conditions are not satisfied in reality. We describe, for each
condition, this in detail below:
• Although we assume the enrollee-specific impostor distribution model, the condition (i)
is still not satisfied because impostor scores also vary depending on the claimant. For ex-
ample, there exist claimants who have high similarity scores against many enrollees, also
known as wolves. This indicates that an impostor score is not independently distributed
from each of the enrollee-specific impostor distributions. Similarly, genuine scores also
vary depending on the enrollee (e.g. there exist enrollees who have low similarity scores
against themselves, also known as goats).
• The condition (ii) is also not satisfied because the KL divergence, which is used as a
metric of identification performance [105, 108] (as described in Section 3.5.1), is diﬀerent
from modality to modality. Although it is not much diﬀerent in the case of multiple
instances (e.g. index and middle fingers), it can be significantly diﬀerent in the case of
multiple biometric traits (e.g. fingerprint, face and iris).
• It is obvious that the condition (iii) is not satisfied: it is impossible to perfectly estimate
f (t)/g
(t)
i or log f
(t)/g
(t)
i in general. In our experiment in Section 3.6, we used logistic
regression and confirmed that it worked very well though not perfect.
• It is also obvious that the condition (iv) is not satisfied: the prior distribution P (Hi)
(0 ≤ i ≤ N) can be non-uniform. As described in Section 3.4.2, since it is generally
very diﬃcult to correctly estimate P (Hi), we use a noninformative prior (i.e. P (H0) =
· · · = P (HN ) = 1/(N + 1)) which have little influence on the posterior distribution.
• Finally, since the number of inputs t is generally very small (e.g. 1, 2, or 3), the condition
(v) is not satisfied in such a case.
The optimality of our proposals is not proved without the conditions (i)-(v). Thus, we need
to show the eﬀectiveness of our proposals through experimental evaluation, which is described
in the next section.
3.6 Experimental Evaluation
3.6.1 Experimental Set-up
We evaluated our proposals using the NIST BSSR1 Set1 dataset [77] which contains scores
of faces, left index fingerprints, and right index fingerprints obtained from 517 subjects.
The reason we used this dataset is because they are freely available and relatively large-
scale (many other datasets contain fewer subjects [8, 66, 72, 86]). We also considered that
fingerprints and faces account for the highest and the second highest share in the world market,
respectively [69]. Although there were face scores obtained using two algorithms (“C” and
“G”), we adopted ones obtained using the algorithm C. Then we excluded one person who
has inappropriate scores (the values “-1”), and extracted 3× 516× 516 scores.
We randomly selected 200 enrollees (N = 200) and 200 non-enrollees from 516 subjects
and used the remaining 116 subjects for training the log-likelihood ratio log f (t)/g(t)i . Here,
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we assumed the logistic regression model and trained the regression coeﬃcients using the
BRLR (Bias-Reduced Logistic Regression) package for R [80]. For training data, we used
116 genuine scores from the training subjects and 116 impostor scores between the training
subjects and the i-th enrollee. We tried 10 ways of randomly selecting 200 enrollees and 200
non-enrollees, and carried out the experiment where each of the enrollees and non-enrollees
sequentially inputs his/her biometric samples. As for the input order, we tried all of 6 (= 3!)
ways. In this experiment, both the number of accesses by enrollees and that of attacks by
non-enrollees were 12000 (= 200× 10× 6).
For comparison, we evaluated the performance of the following schemes:
1. OR: the OR rule [14]. Since the OR rule was originally proposed in the verification
scenario, we extended it to the identification scenario as follows: if one or more scores
(which are normalized to the FAR values) fall below the threshold, identify as the
enrollee whose score is the lowest; otherwise, require another biometric input.
2. LRSI: the LRSI scheme described in Section 3.4.3. That is, after the t-th query sample
is input, it computes the log-likelihood logZti (1 ≤ i ≤ N) using a set of score vectors
St = {sτ |1 ≤ τ ≤ t}, and compares the maximum of logZti to the threshold.
3. PPSI: the PPSI scheme described in Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. That is, after the t-th
query sample is input, it computes the posterior probability P (Hi|St) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) using
a set of score vectors St = {sτ |1 ≤ τ ≤ t}, and compares the maximum of P (Hi|St) to
the threshold. We assumed that the prior probability P (Hi) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) is uniform.
Both of the LRSI scheme and the PPSI scheme described above estimated the log-likelihood
ratio log f (t)/g(t)i using the logistic regression model. To demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the
logistic regression model, we also evaluated the performances of the two schemes in the case
where we assumed the Gaussian distribution models as f (t) and g(t)i . In this case, we estimated
f (t) using 116 genuine scores from the training subjects, and g(t)i using 116 impostor scores
between the training subjects and the i-th enrollee. We adopted the maximum likelihood
estimator as an estimation method.
Similarly, to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the enrollee-specific impostor distribution
model, we also evaluated the performances of the LRSI scheme and the PPSI scheme in the
case where we used the impostor distribution common to all enrollees g(t), and estimated the
log-likelihood ratio log f (t)/g(t) using the logistic regression model. In this case, we used 116
genuine scores and 116× 115 impostor scores from the training subjects as training data.
3.6.2 Experimental Results
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between ANI (the average number of inputs) and EFAR/
NFAR. Here we fixed EFRR of all the schemes to be 2[%] by changing the identification
threshold at the last input from the one until the second last input3. In this figure, “Com-
mon”, “Specific”, “Gaussian”, and “Logistic” represent the case where we used an impostor
distribution common to all enrollees, enrollee-specific impostor distributions, the Gaussian
3A variant of SPRT which forcibly outputs accept/reject at the T -th observation using a threshold diﬀerent
from the ones until the (T − 1)-th observation is referred to as the truncated SPRT [121]. By changing the last
threshold, we can control the trade-oﬀ between EFRR and EFAR/NFAR without aﬀecting ANI.
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between the average number of inputs and EFAR/NFAR.
distribution model, and the logistic regression model, respectively. In LRSI (Specific, Lo-
gistic), PPSI (Specific, Gaussian), PPSI (Common, Logistic), and PPSI (Specific, Logistic),
EFAR was 0% when ANI was more than about 1.3.
It was found from Figure 3.5 that our proposals (the LRSI scheme and the PPSI scheme)
significantly outperformed the OR rule with regard to both ANI and EFAR/NFAR, demon-
strating that our proposals are really eﬀective. It was also found that the enrollee-specific
impostor distributions (Specific, Logistic) provided the better performance than the impos-
tor distibution common to all enrollees (Common, Logistic). Similarly, the logistic regression
model (Specific, Logistic) outperformed the Gaussian distribution model (Specific, Gaussian).
To show the validity of the logistic regression model, we show in Figure 3.6 a frequency
distribution of genuine/impostor scores and the logarithm of their ratio in the faces and left
fingerprints (we omitted the result of the right fingerprints because it was similar to that of
the left fingerprints). Here we computed the genuine frequency distributions and impostor
frequency distributions using 516 genuine scores and 516× 515 impostor scores, respectively.
It can be seen that the frequency distributions of the left fingerprints have complex shapes,
while there is a close-to-linear relationship between the logarithm of their ratio and a score.
The logistic regression model does not have to estimate the genuine/impostor distribution
39
(a) Face
0
10
20
30
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Score
F
re
q
u
e
n
cy
 [
%
]
Genuine
Impostor
Score
-4
0
4
8
0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
L
o
g
-l
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 R
at
io
(b) Left fingerprint
0
30
60
90
0 50 100 150 200
Score
F
re
q
u
en
cy
 [
%
]
Genuine
Impostor
250
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
0 10 20 30 40 50
L
o
g
-l
ik
el
ih
o
o
d
 R
at
io
Score
Figure 3.6: Frequency distribution of genuine/impostor scores and the logarithm of their ratio.
itself, but models the logarithm of their ratio as a linear function of a score. This is the
reason that the logistic regression model provided better identification performance.
We also obtained an interesting result from Figure 3.5 that the PPSI scheme outperformed
the LRSI scheme in almost all cases. We consider this is because there existed wolves who
have high similarity scores against many enrollees in this dataset (i.e. the condition (i) in
Section 3.5.3 was not satisfied), and the security against wolves was improved by normalizing
likelihood ratios to posterior probabilities. Since wolves have high similarity scores against
many enrollees, they also have high likelihood ratios against them. However, they have low
posterior probabilities against them because the summation of posterior probabilities is 1.
For example, even if high likelihood ratios are equally obtained against M (2 ≤ M ≤ N)
enrollees, posterior probabilities against them are about 1/M . Thus, if the identification
threshold is set to be more than 0.5, the identification error does not happen in this case. In
[A5, C5], we also showed that the maximum of the claimant-specific FAR (i.e. FAR caused
by the most threatening wolf) was significantly reduced by normalizing likelihood ratios to
posterior probabilities through experimental evaluation.
In addition to the performance shown in Figure 3.5, we evaluated the performance of the
uni-modal biometric system which identifies claimants using only the first query sample. The
result was poor: [EFAR, NFAR]=[7.6%, 89%]. The performance was significantly improved
by applying our proposals: when ANI was fixed to be 1.4, EFAR/NFAR in the OR rule,
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LRSI (Specific, Logistic), and PPSI (Specific, Logistic) were [1.1%, 38%], [0%, 0.10%],
and [0%, 0.083%], respectively. We finally evaluated the performance of the Bayes decision
rule-based parallel fusion scheme in identification [76] which compares posterior probabilities
to a threshold after the claimant inputs all query samples (described in Section 2.1.3). The
result was [EFAR, NFAR] = [0%, 0.050%]. The PPSI scheme reduced ANI from 3 to 1.47
without increasing the above error rates. That is, more than half of the query samples were
not required in the PPSI scheme.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed the LRSI scheme and PPSI scheme as sequential fusion schemes
in biometric identification. We clarified the optimal property of these schemes and showed
their eﬀectiveness through experimental evaluation.
In Section 3.5.3, we discussed the conditions to achieve the optimality of the LRSI scheme
and PPSI scheme. The proof of the optimality without the conditions (i), (ii), (iii), (iv),
and (v), or developing such sequential fusion schemes is one of our major future work. For
example, the optimality of SPRT is proved even if the number of observations t is small
[71, 122]. This may be helpful in proving the optimality of our schemes without the condition
(v).
It should also be noted that the “optimality” in this chapter means the optimality with
regard to the trade-oﬀ between ANI (the average number of inputs) and the identification
error probabilities (EFRP/EFAP/NFAP). In Chapter 4 and 5, we make an attempt to further
optimize the response time. In Chapter 6, we attempt to optimize the trade-oﬀ between
security against wolves and lambs and convenience in terms of the number of inputs and false
rejects.
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4.1 Introduction
Metric space indexing methods (also known as metric access methods, or distance-based
indexing methods) have been developed in the area of similarity search [23, 82]. They reduce
the number of score computations at query time, using the index which is constructed based
on scores. Since score computations are generally expensive, they can find a set of objects in
the database whose distance (or similarity) to the query object is less than (or more than)
the threshold (i.e. answer to the range query) or the k-nearest neighbor objects (i.e. answer
to the k-NN query), faster than the sequential scan which computes scores for all the objects.
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Since they can be applied as long as a score measure (i.e. a measure of distances or similarities
between objects) is defined, they have a variety of applications which retrieve complex data
such as audio, images, videos, documents, and biometrics.
Although a considerable number of metric space indexing methods have been proposed as
described in Section 2.2.2, we focus on pseudo-score based indexing schemes [4, 6, 22, 32] which
fall under the category of approximate indexing schemes. They compute, for each object in
the database, a pseudo-score which is easily computed and highly relevant to a score, and
compute scores in order of the pseudo-score. By stopping searching at some halting point, they
reduce the number of score computations. However, since they do not search the remaining
objects, they may fail to search an object in the correct answer. In this dissertation, we refer
to the errors in which the system fails to search an object in the correct answer as retrieval
errors1. They can control, by adjusting the halting point, the trade-oﬀ between the number
of score computations required and retrieval errors.
The permutation-based indexing scheme [4, 22], one of the pseudo-score based schemes,
is known as one of the most successful metric space indexing schemes. At indexing time,
this scheme first selects some objects (referred to as pivots) from the database. Then, it
computes, for each of the remaining objects (referred to as non-pivots), a permutation where
the pivot IDs are written in ascending (or descending) order of distances (or similarities) to
the object. At query time, it computes the rank correlation between the permutation of the
query object and that of the object in the database as a pseudo-score. It was shown that this
scheme outperformed other schemes with regard to the trade-oﬀ between the number of score
computations and retrieval errors, in some cases by a wide margin.
Another example of pseudo-score based schemes is the distance regression-based indexing
scheme proposed by Edsberg and Hetland [32] which outperformed the permutation-based
scheme in some cases, and did not in other cases in their experiment. At indexing time,
this scheme computes the regression coeﬃcients in a linear regression model. At query time,
it computes, for each object, using the distances between the query object and all pivots,
either of the following as a pseudo-score: the estimate of the distance to the query object or
the probability of being in the answer to the range query. In this dissertation, we refer to
the former as a distance-based pseudo-score and the latter as a probability-based pseudo-score.
The distance regression-based scheme computes distance-based pseudo-scores by assuming the
linear regression model, and computes probability-based pseudo-scores by further assuming
that the estimation errors are normally distributed.
Probability-based pseudo-scores make it possible to compare the objects in descending
order of the probability of being in the answer to the range query. Thus, they minimize,
for any given halting point, the expected number of retrieval errors if the probability is
correctly estimated. In other words, they can optimize the trade-oﬀ between the number of
score computations and retrieval errors. However, they performed worse than the distance-
based pseudo-scores in their experiment, which indicates the further assumption about the
estimation errors may not be appropriate.
1The performance of information retrieval systems is often evaluated using two measures: recall and preci-
sion. The recall is the ratio tp / (tp + fn), where tp and fn are the number of true positives and false negatives,
respectively. The precision is the ratio tp / (tp + fp), where fp is the number of false positives. Then, the
retrieval error rate can be expressed as 1− recall. Note that the precision of metric space indexing schemes is
always 1 in range queries which we focus on in this chapter since there is no false positives.
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4.1.1 Our Contributions
The motivation of our work is based on the fact that (1) some pseudo-score based schemes
provide a very good trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations and retrieval errors
and (2) probability-based pseudo-scores can provide an optimal trade-oﬀ in range queries if
the probabilities are correctly estimated. Taking these matters into account, we focus on range
queries in similarity search, and attempt to develop metric space indexing schemes which have
an optimal property with regard to the above trade-oﬀ, and outperform the state-of-the-art
metric space indexing schemes such as the permutation-based indexing scheme [4, 22]. The
main contributions are as follows:
1. We firstly propose the PPS (Posterior Probability-based Search) scheme which normal-
izes pseudo-scores to the posterior probabilities of being in the answer to the range
query, and uses them as probability-based pseudo-scores to search non-pivots. The dif-
ference of our scheme from the approach taken by Edsberg and Hetland [32] is general
applicability: since our scheme normalizes pseudo-scores to probability-based ones, it
can be applied to any pseudo-score based scheme to enhance its performance. We also
clarify the optimal property of the PPS scheme with regard to the number of score
computations and retrieval errors.
2. We secondly propose an algorithm which computes the probability-based pseudo-scores
using the object-specific parameters in logistic regression [12], and learns the parameters
using MAP (Maximum a Posteriori) estimation [12]. This is a simple way to correctly
estimate the probability-based pseudo-scores.
3. We thirdly propose a technique which speeds up learning the parameters using pseudo-
scores. This technique significantly reduces the time to learn the parameters while
keeping the trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations and retrieval errors.
4. We finally apply our scheme to the two state-of-the-art schemes: the standard pivot-
based indexing scheme [22] and the permutation-based indexing scheme [4, 22], and
evaluate them using various kinds of datasets from the Metric Space Library [37]. The
results show that our scheme outperforms the conventional schemes, with regard to both
the number of score computations and the CPU time, in all the datasets.
4.1.2 Organization of This Chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce related work on pseudo-score
based schemes. We first provide the framework of pseudo-score based indexing algorithms,
and then explain the algorithm of the standard pivot-based scheme [22] and that of the
permutation-based scheme [4, 22]. We also review other pseudo-score based schemes. In
Section 4.3, we propose the PPS scheme. We first explain the search algorithm of our scheme,
clarifying its optimality with regard to the trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations
and retrieval errors. We then explain the learning algorithm and the technique which speeds
up learning the parameters. In Section 4.4, we show the experimental results using various
kinds of datasets, and discuss the results. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 4.5.
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Table 4.1: Basic Notations Used in This Chapter.
Symbol Description
X universe of objects
q query object q ∈ X
O set of objects in the database O = {oi|1 ≤ i ≤ N} ⊂ X
Opiv set of pivots Opiv = {oi|1 ≤ i ≤ K}
Onon set of non-pivots Onon = {oi|K + 1 ≤ i ≤ N}
Spiv set of scores for pivots Spiv = {s(q, oi)|oi ∈ Opiv}
S˜non set of pseudo-scores for non-pivots S˜non = {s˜(q, oi)|oi ∈ Onon}
N number of objects in the database
K number of pivots
M number of score computations at query time (K ≤M ≤ N)
s score function s : X× X→ R
s˜ pseudo-score function s˜ : X× X→ R
4.2 Pseudo-score Based Indexing Schemes
4.2.1 Pseudo-score Based Indexing Framework
Pseudo-score based indexing schemes are approximate indexing schemes which reduce the
number of score computations using pseudo-scores, which are easily computed and highly
relevant to scores, as a clue. Their examples include the standard pivot-based indexing
scheme [22], the permutation-based indexing scheme [4, 22], the distance regression-based
indexing scheme [32], and BoostMAP [6]. Although they are independently proposed, we
provide a generalized framework of pseudo-score based indexing schemes to describe them in
a unified point of view.
We now explain the pseudo-score based indexing framework using the notations shown in
Table 4.1. Let X be a universe of objects, q ∈ X be a query object, and O = {oi|1 ≤ i ≤
N} ⊂ X be a finite set of objects in the database. Let further s : X × X → R be a score
function, and s˜ : X× X → R be a pseudo-score function. Pseudo-scores are either positively
or negatively correlated with scores.
To begin with, they construct an index I in advance, which is used to compute pseudo-
scores at query time, as follows:
[Indexing Algorithm]
1. Select K (< N) objects from O (at random [22], for example). The selected objects
are referred to as pivots, and the remaining objects are referred to as non-pivots. We
assume that Opiv = {oi|1 ≤ i ≤ K} is a set of pivots and Onon = {oi|K + 1 ≤ i ≤ N} is
a set of non-pivots, without loss of generality.
2. Compute a score s(oi, oj) for each pivot oi ∈ Opiv and each non-pivot oj ∈ Onon. Let
Spnp = {s(oi, oj)|oi ∈ Opiv, oj ∈ Onon} be a set of scores between pivots and non-pivots
(K(N −K) scores in total).
3. Construct an index I using Spnp, and store it in the database (the example of I is
described later).
At query time, they carry out the search as follows:
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[Search Algorithm]
1. Compute a score s(q, oi) for each pivot oi ∈ Opiv. Let Spiv = {s(q, oi)|oi ∈ Opiv} be a
set of scores for pivots (K scores in total).
2. Compute a pseudo-score s˜(q, oi) for each non-pivot oi ∈ Onon using Spiv and I (the
example of s˜(q, oi) is described later). Let S˜non = {s˜(q, oi)|oi ∈ Onon} be a set of
pseudo-scores for non-pivots (N −K pseudo-scores in total).
3. Compute scores forM−K (K ≤M ≤ N) non-pivots in ascending (or descending) order
of pseudo-scores, where M represents the number of score computations at query time.
4. Output the answer of range queries (or k-NN queries).
The crucial point here is that they reduce the number of score computations at query time
from N to M (K ≤ M ≤ N) by searching M −K non-pivots in ascending (or descending)
order of pseudo-scores, and stopping searching after that. Since pseudo-scores are designed to
be highly relevant to scores, they can eﬀectively narrow down the search by sorting non-pivots
by pseudo-score. They can control the trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations
and retrieval errors by changing the value of M .
4.2.2 Standard Pivot-based Indexing Scheme
The standard pivot-based indexing scheme [22] is the most basic type of pseudo-score based
scheme. We now explain the algorithm of this scheme by clarifying the index I and the
pseudo-score s˜(q, oi) in the above framework.
Let Φ : X→ RK be a score vector function which maps the object x ∈ X to a score vector
(s(x, o1), · · · , s(x, oK)) which is composed of scores for pivots. In the step 3 of the indexing
algorithm, this scheme simply stores a set of scores Spnp in the database as an index. The
index can then be expressed as a set of score vectors I = {Φ(oi)|oi ∈ Onon}. In the step
2 of the search algorithm, it first generates a score vector Φ(q) by lining up scores in Spiv,
and then computes, for each non-pivot oi ∈ Onon, the Lp norm between Φ(q) and Φ(oi) as a
pseudo-score:
s˜(q, oi) = Lp(Φ(q),Φ(oi)) (4.1)
=
0@ KX
j=1
(s(q, oj)− s(oi, oj))p
1A1/p . (4.2)
This scheme can be regarded as a modification of LAESA (Linear Approximating and Elimi-
nating Search Algorithm) [73] to use the general Lp norm instead of L∞ in the approximating
step and to skip the elimination step using the triangle inequality.
Figure 4.1 shows the example of the standard pivot-based indexing scheme in the case
where K = 4, N = 10, and the L1 norm is used as a distance measure between two score
vectors.
4.2.3 Permutation-based Indexing Scheme
The permutation-based indexing scheme was independently proposed by Cha´vez et al. [22]
and Amato and Savino [4]. It computes a permutation, where the pivot IDs are written
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Figure 4.1: Example of the standard pivot-based indexing scheme and the permutation-based indexing
scheme (K = 4, N = 10). The former scheme computes a score vector for each non-pivot as an index
in advance. At query time, it first computes a score for each pivot, and then computes scores for M
(≤ N −K = 6) non-pivots in ascending order of pseudo-scores (in this case, in an order of o6, o9, o10,
· · · ). The latter scheme uses permutations instead of score vectors.
in ascending (or descending) order of distances (or similarities), and computes a distance
between two permutations as a pseudo-score.
That is, in the step 3 of the indexing algorithm, this scheme computes, for each non-pivot
oi ∈ Onon, a permutation Πoi using Spnp (i.e. I = {Πoi |oi ∈ Onon}). In the step 2 of the search
algorithm, it first computes a permutation Πq for the query object q ∈ X using Spiv, and then
computes, for each non-pivot oi ∈ Onon, a distance between Πq and Πoi as a pseudo-score.
As a distance measure between two permutations, the rank correlation such as Spearman’s
Footrule, Spearman’s Rho, and Kendall Tau can be used [22]. For example, if Spearman’s
Rho is used, a pseudo-score can be expressed as follows [22]:
s˜(q, oi) = Sρ(Πq,Πoi) (4.3)
=
KX
j=1
(Π−1q (j)−Π−1oi (j))2, (4.4)
where Π−1(j) denotes the position of oj in Π. For example, if Πq = o2, o4, o3, o1 and Πoi =
o1, o4, o2, o3, then Sρ(Πq,Πoi) = (4− 1)2 + (1− 3)2 + (3− 4)2 + (2− 2)2 = 14.
We also show in Figure 4.1 the example of the permutation-based indexing scheme in the
case where Spearman’s Rho is used as a distance measure between two permutations. In both
the standard pivot-based scheme and the permutation-based scheme, the index size can be
expressed as O(N) if the number of pivots K is fixed. This is an advantage over the indexing
schemes such as AESA (Approximating and Eliminating Search Algorithm) [119], its variant
proposed by Maeda et al. [65], and iAESA (improved AESA) [35] which require the index
size of O(N2).
It was shown that the permutation-based indexing scheme outperformed other schemes
in some cases by a wide margin [22, 4], and since then a number of researches have been
made on searching in permutation spaces: Figueroa et al. [35] proposed iAESA (improved
AESA) which uses Spearman’s Footrule instead of L1 to choose pivots in AESA [119], and
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reported it outperformed AESA with regard to response time; The extra CPU time in the
permutation-based scheme due to computing all pseudo-scores and sorting them was reduced
by using another indexing scheme [36]; PP-Index (Permutation Prefix Index) [33] and M-
Index (Metric Index) [79] were proposed as permutation-based tree structures; The number
of existing permutations out of the K! unrestricted permutations was examined in [102].
4.2.4 Other Pseudo-score Based Indexing Schemes
The distance regression-based indexing scheme, proposed by Edsberg and Hetland [32], is
another example of pseudo-score based schemes. This scheme uses distances as scores. At
indexing time, it computes, for each non-pivot oi ∈ Onon, K+1 regression coeﬃcients in linear
regression (N(K +1) coeﬃcients in total), using Spnp and other objects used for training. At
query time, it first computes Φ(q), and then computes, for each non-pivot oi ∈ Onon, either the
estimate of s(q, oi) (i.e. distance-based pseudo-score) or P (s(q, oi) ≤ r) (i.e. probability-based
pseudo-score) as a pseudo-score, where r represents a threshold in range queries. s(q, oi) is
estimated from Φ(q) by assuming the linear regression model, and P (s(q, oi) ≤ r) is estimated
by further assuming the estimation errors are normally distributed. This scheme outperformed
the permutation-based scheme in some cases, and did not in other cases in their experiment.
BoostMAP [6] is a pseudo-score based scheme using the AdaBoost method. This scheme
first constructs a number of one-dimensional (1D) embeddings which are divided into two
types: one embeds an object as the distance to a single pivot, and the other embeds an
object as the projection onto the line between two pivots. Each embedding is treated as a
weak classifier which predicts for any three objects o1, o2, o3 ∈ X whether o1 is closer to o2
or to o3. AdaBoost is then applied to combine the weak classifiers into a strong classifier.
Finally, a pseudo-score is computed as a weighted L1 distance between two multi-dimensional
embeddings, where the weights are determined in the training phase.
4.3 Posterior Probability-based Search Scheme
We propose the PPS (Posterior Probability-based Search) scheme which can be applied to any
pseudo-score based scheme reviewed in Section 4.2. We first explain the search algorithm of
our scheme, clarifying its optimality in Section 4.3.1. Then, we explain the learning algorithm
in Section 4.3.2, and propose a technique which speeds up learning in Section 4.3.3. We note
that we use distances as scores until the end of Section 4.3. The same argument applies to the
case where similarities are used as scores. We also assume that both scores and pseudo-scores
are continuous (the discussion below can be easily extended to the discrete case).
4.3.1 Search Algorithm
Pseudo-score based scheme obtains a set of pseudo-scores S˜non = {s˜(q, oi)|oi ∈ Onon} after
computing scores for pivots. Let us fix objects in a database, pivots, and a pseudo-score based
scheme to be used (S˜non is determined only depending on q ∈ X). Then, it would be natural
to consider that if it searches non-pivots in descending order of the posterior probability of
being in the answer to the range query P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|S˜non), it can minimize the expected
number of retrieval errors. We formalize this intuition as the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1. Consider a search scheme which searches non-pivots in descending order of
P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|S˜non). If the posterior probability P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|S˜non) can be perfectly estimated
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for any S˜non, then the above search scheme minimizes, for anyM (K ≤M ≤ N), the expected
number of retrieval errors among all search schemes which search non-pivots using S˜non as a
clue.
Proof. Let ni ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} (1 ≤ i ≤ N −M) be an object ID which is not searched
after computing scores for K pivots and M −K non-pivots (ni is determined depending on
a search scheme and S˜non). Then, the expected number of retrieval errors can be written as
follows: Z N−MX
i=1
P (s(q, oni) ≤ r|S˜non)p(S˜non)dS˜non, (4.5)
where P () and p() are a probability mass function and probability density function, respec-
tively. This value is minimized, for any M (K ≤ M ≤ N), in the case where we search
non-pivots in descending order of P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|S˜non), if P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|S˜non) can be perfectly
estimated for any S˜non.
This proposition states that the optimal trade-oﬀ between the number of score compu-
tations and retrieval errors can be achieved by searching non-pivots in descending order of
P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|S˜non). We propose the PPS (Posterior Probability-based Search) scheme which
is based on this idea. The PPS scheme normalizes pseudo-scores to the posterior probabilities
of being in the answer to the range query, and searches non-pivots in descending order of
them. However, this scheme does not compute P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|S˜non) but approximates it by
P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|s˜(q, oi)). There are two reasons for this: (1) the pseudo-score s˜(q, oi) is the
best clue to the probability P (s(q, oi) ≤ r); (2) P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|s˜(q, oi)) can be easily computed
using logistic regression [12], which is to be hereinafter described.
The posterior probability P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|s˜(q, oi)) can be written using Bayes’ theorem as
follows:
P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|s˜(q, oi)) (4.6)
=
p(s˜(q, oi)|s(q, oi) ≤ r)P (s(q, oi) ≤ r)
p(s˜(q, oi))
(4.7)
= σ(ai), (4.8)
where σ is a logistic sigmoid function which is defined as
σ(ai) =
1
1 + exp(−ai) (4.9)
and ai is given by
ai = ln
p(s˜(q, oi)|s(q, oi) ≤ r)P (s(q, oi) ≤ r)
p(s˜(q, oi)|s(q, oi) > r)P (s(q, oi) > r) . (4.10)
Since σ is a monotonically increasing function, we only have to compute ai and sort the
objects in descending order of ai instead of P (s(q, oi) ≤ r|s˜(q, oi)). In other words, we can
use ai as a probability-based pseudo-score.
Here we assume the logistic regression model [12] to quickly compute ai. We use a pa-
rameter vector wi = (wi1, wi0)T ∈ R2 for each non-pivot oi ∈ Onon which is determined in
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Figure 4.2: Overview of the computation of the probability-based pseudo-score in our scheme. After
s˜(q, oi) is computed using a pseudo-score based scheme, our scheme computes the probability-based
pseudo-score ai as ai = wiT s˜qi, where wi = (wi1, wi0)T and s˜qi = (s˜(q, oi), 1)T . Since the ordering is
not changed by the monotonically increasing function σ, our scheme does not compute P (s(q, oi) ≤
r|s˜(q, oi)) itself.
advance (see Section 4.3.2 for details). Then, ai can be computed using logistic regression as
follows:
ai = wiT s˜qi, (4.11)
where s˜qi = (s˜(q, oi), 1)T . If we use the parameter vector w = (w1, w0)T which is common
to all objects instead of wi, ai is equivalent to the original pseudo-score s˜(q, oi) because
the ordering is not changed by a single linear transformation. By using the object-specific
parameter vector wi which is more strict, our scheme can more correctly estimate ai and
provide a better trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations and retrieval errors.
Figure 4.2 shows the overview of the computation of ai in our scheme. The computation
of ai requires just one multiplication and one addition. Our scheme requires an additional
storage of 2(N −K) parameters.
Combining the above argument with the search algorithm in Section 4.2.1, the proposed
search algorithm can be written as follows:
[Search Algorithm]
1. Compute a set of scores for pivots Spiv = {s(q, oi)|oi ∈ Opiv} (K scores in total).
2. Compute a set of pseudo-scores for non-pivots S˜non = {s˜(q, oi)|oi ∈ Onon} (N − K
pseudo-scores in total).
3. Compute a set of probability-based pseudo-scores {ai = wi1s˜(q, oi) + wi0|oi ∈ Onon}.
4. Compute scores forM−K (K ≤M ≤ N) non-pivots in descending order of probability-
based pseudo-scores ai.
5. Output the answer of range queries.
The step 1 and 2 can be carried out using any pseudo-score based scheme. The step 3
and 4 are carried out using the PPS scheme.
4.3.2 Learning Algorithm
We now explain the algorithm for determining, for each object oi ∈ Onon, a parameter vector
wi. We first prepare N ′ objects u1, · · · , uN ′ ∈ X to determine wi. In this dissertation, we
refer to these objects as training objects. They can be any objects other than oi ∈ Onon and
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Figure 4.3: Overview of the determination of the object-specific regression parameter wi using MAP
estimation. P (s(uj , oi) ≤ r|s˜(uj , oi)) can be modeled as σ(wiT s˜ji), and lji ∈ {1, 0} serves as a correct
answer as to whether s(uj , oi) ≤ r or not. Since r is often set to be very small, it often happens that
there are a small number of similar training objects and ML estimation suﬀers from the over-fitting
problem. MAP estimation avoids this problem by introducing the prior distribution p(wi).
pivots. For example, if we use all non-pivots except oi ∈ Onon as training objects, the number
of training objects is N ′ = N −K − 1.
Then we compute, for each training object uj (1 ≤ j ≤ N ′), a score s(uj , oi) and a pseudo-
score s˜(uj , oi). Let S˜i = {s˜(uj , oi)|1 ≤ j ≤ N ′} be a set of pseudo-scores and Li = {lji|1 ≤
j ≤ N ′} a set of labels, where lji takes the following values:
lji =
(
1 (if s(uj , oi) ≤ r)
0 (if s(uj , oi) > r).
(4.12)
We use {S˜i,Li} as a training dataset and determinewi using MAP (Maximum a Posteriori)
estimation [12]. This method estimates wMAPi that maximizes the posterior probability
p(wi|S˜i,Li), which is written using Bayes’ theorem as follows:
wMAPi = arg max
wi
p(wi|S˜i,Li) (4.13)
= arg max
wi
p(S˜i,Li|wi)p(wi). (4.14)
Here, we refer to the training object uj whose distance to oi is less than or equal to r (i.e.
lji = 1) as a similar training object. Since the search radius r is often set to be very small so
that less than tens or hundreds of objects are found in a correct answer, it often happens that
there are a small number of similar training objects, and consequently a training dataset is
linearly separable. ML (Maximum Likelihood) estimation, which selects the parameter vector
wMLi that maximizes p(S˜i,Li|wi), suﬀers from the over-fitting problem for such a training
dataset. MAP estimation avoids such a problem by introducing a prior distribution of the
parameter vector p(wi) in (4.14).
Figure 4.3 shows the overview of the determination of wi using MAP estimation. Here,
P (s(uj , oi) ≤ r|s˜(uj , oi)) is modeled as σ(wiT s˜ji), where s˜ji = (s˜(uj , oi), 1)T (see (4.8) and
(4.11)), and lji ∈ {1, 0} serves as a correct answer as to whether s(uj , oi) ≤ r or not.
Since S˜i and wi can be regarded as independent unless Li is obtained, (4.14) is further
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written as follows:
wMAPi = arg max
wi
P (Li|S˜i,wi)p(S˜i|wi)p(wi) (4.15)
= arg max
wi
P (Li|S˜i,wi)p(S˜i)p(wi) (4.16)
= arg max
wi
P (Li|S˜i,wi)p(wi). (4.17)
In other words, wMAPi is a parameter vector which minimizes the following function:
E(wi) = − lnP (Li|S˜i,wi)p(wi). (4.18)
Since {s˜(uj , oi), lji} (1 ≤ j ≤ N ′) can be regarded as mutually independent, and lji ∈ Li
takes 1 if s(uj , oi) ≤ r and 0 otherwise, P (Li|S˜i,wi) is written as follows:
P (Li|S˜i,wi) =
N ′Y
j=1
P (lji|s˜(uj , oi),wi) (4.19)
=
N ′Y
j=1
y
lji
ji (1− yji)1−lji , (4.20)
where yji is given by
yji = P (s(uj , oi) ≤ r|s˜(uj , oi),wi) (4.21)
= σ(wiT s˜ji). (4.22)
As for p(wi) in (4.18), we assume a 2D Gaussian distribution model with mean vector
0 = (0, 0)T and diagonal covariance matrix αI (α > 0), for simplicity. That is,
p(wi) = N (wi|0, αI). (4.23)
This setting reduces the values of the components of wMAPi in (4.17) to avoid the over-fitting
problem in the same way as shrinkage methods [12]. The parameter α, which is common
to all objects, is called a hyper-parameter and can be determined using the empirical Bayes
method [12] (for details of determining α using the empirical Bayes method, refer to [A4]).
Since the logistic sigmoid function in (4.22) is nonlinear, there is no closed-form solution
to (4.18), (4.20), (4.22) and (4.23). Instead, we use the Newton-Raphson method [12], which
iteratively updates the parameter vectors wi according to the following formula:
wi(new) = wi(old) − (∇∇E(wi(old)))−1∇E(wi(old)), (4.24)
where
∇E(wi(old)) = (αI)−1wi(old) +
N ′X
j=1
(y(old)ji − lji)˜sji (4.25)
and
∇∇E(wi(old)) = (αI)−1 +
N ′X
j=1
y
(old)
ji (1− y(old)ji )˜sjis˜Tji . (4.26)
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Algorithm 1 LearnParameters(S˜i, Li, Λ, τmax, θth)
Input: S˜i = {s˜(uj , oi) ∈ R|1 ≤ j ≤ N ′}: set of pseudo-scores,
Li = {lji ∈ {0, 1}|1 ≤ j ≤ N ′}: set of labels,
Λ = {λj ∈ R|1 ≤ j ≤ N ′}: set of weight parameters,
τmax ∈ N: maximum number of iterations,
θth ∈ R: convergence threshold
Output: wi = (wi1, wi0)T ∈ R2: parameter vector
1: for j ← 0 to N ′ do
2: s˜ji ← (s˜(uj , oi), 1)T
3: end for
4: wi ← (0, 0)T
5: for τ ← 0 to τmax do
6: for j ← 0 to N ′ do
7: yji ← σ(wiT s˜ji)
8: end for
9: ∇E(wi)← (αI)−1wi +
PN ′
j=1 λj(yji − lji)˜sji
10: ∇∇E(wi)← (αI)−1 +
PN ′
j=1 λjyji(1− yji)˜sjis˜Tji
11: (δ1, δ0)T ← (∇∇E(wi))−1∇E(wi)
12: wi ← wi − (δ1, δ0)T
13: if (|δ1/wi1| < θth and |δ0/wi0| < θth) then
14: break
15: end if
16: end for
17: Report wi
Algorithm 1 shows the learning algorithm, where λj ∈ R is a weight parameter which
represents the number of uj (i.e. we allow more than one training object which are exactly
the same). Although it is natural to set λj = 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ N ′), the diﬀerent values are used
in Section 4.3.3. The parameter vector wi is updated until the number of iterations reaches
the maximum number τmax or wi converges (i.e. |δ1/wi1| < θth and |δ0/wi0| < θth, where
θth is a convergence threshold). In our experiment in Section 4.4, we set τmax = 100 and
θth = 0.0001, and confirmed that wi converged until τ reached τmax in all cases.
4.3.3 Speeding up Learning Using Pseudo-scores
The drawback of our scheme is a high computational cost in determining the parameter
vectors. For each non-pivot oi ∈ Onon, we have to compute N ′ pseudo-scores and N ′ scores to
obtain S˜i and Li, respectively. Furthermore, the iterative update process in Algorithm 1 takes
O(N ′) time for each non-pivot. That is, we have to compute O(NN ′) pseudo-scores, O(NN ′)
scores, and carry out the iterative update process which takes O(NN ′) time in total (e.g. if
N ′ = N −K − 1, each of them takes O(N2) time). Especially, O(NN ′) score computations
and O(NN ′) iterative update process may take too much time if the number of training
objects N ′ is very large. If N ′ is small, however, shortage of similar training objects becomes
a serious problem. The search radius r is often set to be very small so that less than tens or
hundreds of objects are captured from N objects. Thus, if N ′ is much smaller than N , it can
happen that there is no similar training objects at all, which makes the parameter vectors wi
quite diﬃcult to be correctly determined even if we use MAP estimation.
To solve this problem, we propose a technique which reduces the number of training
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objects while keeping similar training objects as much as possible using pseudo-scores. For
each non-pivot oi ∈ Onon, we select N ′′(< N ′) training objects and make a set {S˜i,Li,Λ}
used in Algorithm 1 according to the following steps:
1. Compute N ′ pseudo-scores s˜(uj , oi) (1 ≤ j ≤ N ′).
2. Find the N ′′1 smallest (or largest) pseudo-scores and select the corresponding training
objects. We assume that they are u1, · · · , uN ′′1 without loss of generality.
3. Select N ′′2 training objects at random from the remaining N ′−N ′′1 training objects. We
assume that they are uN ′′1 +1, · · · , uN ′′ without loss of generality (N ′′ = N ′′1 +N ′′2 < N ′).
4. Compute N ′′ scores s(uj , oi) (1 ≤ j ≤ N ′′) and obtain the corresponding labels lji
(1 ≤ j ≤ N ′′).
5. Make the set {S˜i,Li,Λ} used in Algorithm 1 as follows:
S˜i = {s˜(uj , oi)|1 ≤ j ≤ N ′′} (4.27)
Li = {lji ∈ {0, 1}|1 ≤ j ≤ N ′′} (4.28)
Λ = {λj |1 ≤ j ≤ N ′′}, (4.29)
where
λj =
(
1 (if 1 ≤ j ≤ N ′′1 )
(N ′ −N ′′1 )/N ′′2 (if N ′1 + 1 ≤ j ≤ N ′′).
(4.30)
In step 2, we can select the training objects u1, · · · , uN ′′1 which are highly likely similar to
the non-pivot oi because pseudo-scores are designed to be highly relevant to scores. However,
these training objects may make the parameter vectors wi incorrectly determined because
the probability that a query object q falls close to oi (i.e. P (s(q, oi) ≤ r) in (4.10)) is biased
towards much higher than the actual value. To eliminate this bias, we select N ′′2 training
objects randomly from the remaining N ′ − N ′′1 training objects in step 3, and set λj as in
(4.30) in step 5.
By using this technique, the score computations and the iterative update process are
reduced from O(NN ′) time to O(NN ′′) time (N ′′ < N ′). However, we still have to compute
NN ′ pseudo-scores, which takes O(NN ′) time. In addition, this technique requires the time
to find the N ′′1 smallest (or largest) pseudo-scores from N ′ pseudo-scores in step 2 for every
non-pivot, which takes on average O(NN ′) time in total using the quickselect algorithm [42].
In Section 4.4, we measured the learning time using various kinds of datasets in order to
evaluate our speed-up technique.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation
4.4.1 Experimental Set-up
Datasets
We evaluated our scheme using two kinds of synthetic datasets and two kinds of real-life
datasets obtained from the Metric Space Library [37]. As synthetic datasets, we used (I)
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vectors generated from a uniform distribution and (II) vectors generated from a mixture of
Gaussian distributions. As real-life datasets, we used (III) documents (short news articles) and
(IV) genes (DNA sequences of Listeria monocytogenes). We used them as real-life datasets
because the score computations were very expensive and the metric space indexing methods
played a big role in reducing the CPU time at query time. For the same reason, we set the
dimensionality of the synthetic vectors to be as much as 1024 dimensions. Although this
experiment was reported in [A4], we also evaluated our scheme using images and dictionaries
in [B3], and showed that our scheme outperformed the standard pivot-based scheme [22] and
the permutation-based scheme [4, 22] with regard to the number of score computations in
both the datasets.
In the following, we describe the details of each dataset:
Uniform Distribution A set of 10000 vectors uniformly distributed in the unit cube of
1024-dimensional Euclidean space (N = 10000). In this dataset, we also carried out the
experiment in the case where we increased the number of objects from 10000 to 100000
(N = 100000) as a scalability analysis. We used another 1000 vectors as range query
objects.
Mixture of Gaussians A set of 10000 vectors generated from a mixture of 1024-dimensional
Gaussian distributions which has 32 clusters (components) (N = 10000). Objects are
uniformly assigned to the clusters, whose centers are uniformly distributed in [0, 1).
The variance inside the clusters was 0.01. We used another 1000 vectors as range query
objects.
Documents A set of 24276 short news articles extracted from Wall Street Journal from
TREC-3 dataset [40] (N = 24276). Each document is represented as a vector whose
element is proportional to the weight of a vocabulary word in that document. Since
the number of vocabulary words is very large (hundreds of thousands), the vectors are
in a very high-dimensional space. We used the angle between two vectors as a distance
measure (the cosine of this angle is heavily used as a distance measure in the vector
space model). We used another 1000 articles as range query objects.
Genes A set of 2000 DNA sequences of Listeria monocytogenes randomly extracted from
the Metric Space Library [37] (N = 2000). The length of the sequences is as much as
898 characters on average. We used the edit distance as a distance measure between
two genes. We used another 100 sequences as range query objects.
Methods
We applied our scheme to the standard pivot-based scheme [22] described in Section 4.2.2 and
the permutation-based scheme [4, 22] described in Section 4.2.3. We selected these schemes as
pseudo-score based schemes not only because they are state-of-the-art schemes, but because
they were easy to implement and did not need much time to build the indexes. We evaluated
the performance of the following schemes for comparison:
1. PIΦ: the standard pivot-based scheme [22] described in Section 4.2.2 (PI denotes a
pseudo-score based indexing scheme). We used L1 as a distance measure between two
distance vectors. The memory size required in this scheme was 4K [bytes/non-pivot],
where K is the number of pivots.
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Table 4.2: Parameter settings in our experiment (Uni.: Uniform distribution; Gau.: Mixture of Gaus-
sians; Doc.: Documents; Gen.: Genes). x denotes the average number of objects in the correct answer.
Dataset K N N ′ N ′′ x
Uni.(a) 16 10000 9983 2000 10
Uni.(b) 64 10000 9935 2000 10
Uni.(c) 16 100000 99983 2000 100
Uni.(d) 16 100000 99983 2000 10
Gau.(a) 16 10000 9983 2000 10
Gau.(b) 64 10000 9935 2000 10
Doc. 16 24276 24259 2000 9
Gen. 16 2000 1983 200 2
2. PIΦ-PPS: our scheme applied to the standard pivot-based scheme. We selected N ′′
(N ′′1 = N ′′2 = N ′′/2) training objects from all non-pivots except oi ∈ Onon (N ′ =
N −K − 1) to determine wi, using our speed-up technique described in Section 4.3.3.
We set the number of pivots K to be equal to that in PIΦ. The memory size required
was 4K + 8 [bytes/non-pivot] (additional memory size was 8 [bytes/non-pivot] (= 2
parameters × 4 bytes)).
3. PIΦ-PPS*: identical to PIΦ-PPS except that it uses all non-pivots except oi ∈ Onon
as training objects (N ′ = N −K − 1) to determine wi.
4. PIΠ: the permutation-based scheme [4, 22] described in Section 4.2.3. We used Spear-
man’s Rho as a distance measure between two permutations. The memory size required
was Kdlog2(K)e/8 [bytes/non-pivot].
5. PIΠ-PPS: our scheme applied to the permutation-based scheme. We selectedN ′′ (N ′′1 =
N ′′2 = N ′′/2) training objects from all non-pivots except oi ∈ Onon (N ′ = N −K − 1)
to determine wi. We set K to be equal to that in PIΠ. The memory size required was
Kdlog2(K)e/8 + 8 [bytes/non-pivot] (additional memory size was 8 [bytes/non-pivot]).
6. PIΠ-PPS*: identical to PIΠ-PPS except that it uses all non-pivots except oi ∈ Onon
as training objects (N ′ = N −K − 1) to determine wi.
Table 4.2 shows the parameter settings in our experiment, where x denotes the average
number of objects in the correct answer over the query objects (we controlled the search
radius so that x would be the value in Table 4.2). Although Cha´vez et al. [22] set K = 32,
64, 128, or 256 and evaluated the performance of the standard pivot-based scheme and the
permutation-based scheme, we set K to be very small (K = 16) to make the extra CPU time
required to compute pseudo-scores very small. In the synthetic datasets, we also evaluated
the performance in the case where K = 64, for comparison (Uni.(b) and Gau.(b)).
As a way of selecting pivots, we adopted the random selection method which randomly
selects pivots from the objects in the database. The reason for this is that Cha´vez et al. [22]
reported that the random selection method provided the performance comparable or better
than other selection methods in the permutation-based scheme. Note that we used the same
pivots for all the 6 schemes described above, in spite of the fact that our scheme required
additional memory size of 8 [bytes/non-pivot]. The reason for this is because we would like
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to investigate how much the number of score computations and the CPU time were reduced
at query time just by applying our scheme. Additional memory size of 8 [bytes/non-pivot]
can also be regarded as very small in most cases in practice.
As shown in Table 4.2, Uni.(c) and Uni.(d) are datasets for scalability analysis, assuming
that the number of objects in Uni.(a) was increased from 10000 to 100000. Here we considered
two scenarios: (1) Uni.(c) is corresponding to the case where we did not change the search
radius from that of Uni.(a) (on average 0.1[%] (= x/N × 100[%]) of the objects was included
in the correct answer); (2) Uni.(d) is corresponding to the case where we changed the search
radius so that the average number of objects in the correct answer x would not be changed
from that of Uni.(a) (x = 10).
After building the indexes and learning the parameter vector wi for each object oi ∈ Onon
using MAP estimation, we tested the range query objects.
Performances
We first evaluated the trade-oﬀ between the percentage of score computations required and
the percentage of the correct answer retrieved (i.e. 100 - retrieval error rate [%]). Here we
did not include pivots in both of them because our interest was to compare the performance
of the diﬀerent pseudo-score functions themselves. We then evaluated the total CPU time
(including computing scores for pivots, computing pseudo-scores, sorting pseudo-scores, and
computing scores for non-pivots) at query time, on an Intel Core2 Duo CPU E7500 (2.93
GHz) with 1.93GB RAM. Here we also evaluated the CPU time required in the sequential
scan which merely computes scores for all the objects in the database, for comparison. We
further evaluated the time to build the indexes and to learn the parameter vectors.
4.4.2 Experimental Results
Figure 4.4 shows the trade-oﬀ between the percentage of score computations and the per-
centage of the correct answer retrieved. In Table 4.3, we also give the percentage of score
computations required to retrieve 90% of the correct answer in each dataset (i.e. retrieval error
rate = 10%), where y denotes the average number of similar training objects per non-pivot.
Table 4.4 shows the results of measuring the CPU time at query time, where tcpu, text,
tscr denote the CPU time required to retrieve 90% of the correct answer, the extra CPU
time, and the time to compute a score, respectively (all of the three are the average values).
Since text in the dataset of genes was less than 1 [ms] in every scheme and was much smaller
than tcpu, we did not measure the value of text itself in the dataset. From this table, we can
simply calculate the CPU time to retrieve β% (0 ≤ β ≤ 100) of the objects in the database
as text + βNtscr/100 [ms].
As for the building time and learning time, Table 4.5 shows the time to build the index and
learn the parameter vectors in PIΠ-PPS and PIΠ-PPS* (since PIΦ-PPS and PIΦ-PPS*
had similar results, we do not show them here).
Summary of results
Although a number of findings can be obtained from Figure 4.4, Table 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, we
summarize the main findings as follows:
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Figure 4.4: Trade-oﬀ between the percentage of score computations and the percentage of the correct
answer retrieved (Uni.(a): K = 16, N = 10000, x = 10; Uni.(b): K = 64, N = 10000, x = 10; Uni.(c):
K = 16, N = 100000, x = 100; Uni.(d): K = 16, N = 100000, x = 10; Gau.(a): K = 16, N = 10000,
x = 10; Gau.(b): K = 64, N = 10000, x = 10; Doc.: K = 16, N = 24276, x = 9; Gen.: K = 16,
N = 2000, x = 2).
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Table 4.5: Building and learning time in PIΠ-PPS and PIΠ-PPS* [s]. (Bld.: time to build an index;
Lrn.(1): time to determine a hyper-parameter; Lrn.(2): time to compute pseudo-scores; Lrn.(3):
time to select training objects; Lrn.(4): time to compute scores; Lrn.(5): time to iteratively update
parameter vectors in Algorithm 1; Total: total time to build an index and learn parameters; w/o *,
w/ *: performance of PIΠ-PPS, PIΠ-PPS*)
Dataset Bld. Lrn.(1) Lrn.(2) Lrn.(3) Lrn.(4) Lrn.(5) Total
Uni.(a) (N ′′ = 2000) 0.2 2 3 3 27 59 94
Uni.(a)* (N ′ = 9983) 0.2 2 3 - 119 240 364
Uni.(b) (N ′′ = 2000) 0.8 2 11 3 26 47 90
Uni.(b)* (N ′ = 9935) 0.8 2 11 - 118 226 358
Uni.(c) (N ′′ = 2000) 2 23 292 358 289 641 1605
Uni.(c)* (N ′ = 99983) 2 23 264 - 11935 23370 35594
Uni.(d) (N ′′ = 2000) 2 28 296 353 287 977 1943
Uni.(d)* (N ′ = 99983) 2 28 259 - 11923 33244 45456
Gau.(a) (N ′′ = 2000) 0.2 3 3 3 26 64 99
Gau.(a)* (N ′ = 9983) 0.2 3 3 - 119 316 441
Gau.(b) (N ′′ = 2000) 0.8 3 10 3 26 65 108
Gau.(b)* (N ′ = 9935) 0.8 3 11 - 117 320 452
Doc. (N ′′ = 2000) 15 14 18 21 1484 186 1738
Doc.* (N ′ = 24276) 15 15 15 - 18100 2106 20251
Gen. (N ′′ = 200) 89 65 0.1 0.2 1690 2 1846
Gen.* (N ′ = 2000) 89 65 0.1 - 12663 18 12835
1. Our scheme outperformed the standard pivot-based scheme and the permutation-based
scheme, with regard to both the number of score computations and the CPU time, in
all the datasets (Figure 4.4, Table 4.3, and Table 4.4).
2. Our scheme significantly outperformed the sequential scan with regard to the CPU time,
in the case of the real-life datasets (Doc., and Gen. in Table 4.4).
3. The fewer pivots (K = 16) provided the smaller CPU time in many cases, compared to
the larger pivots (K = 64) (Uni.(a), Uni.(b), Gau.(a), and Gau.(b) in Table 4.4).
4. The extra CPU time in our scheme diﬀered only slightly from that in the conventional
schemes (Table 4.4).
5. The extra CPU time accounted for much of the total CPU time in some cases (e.g.
Gau.(a) and Gau.(b) in Table 4.4).
6. Our speed-up technique significantly reduced the time to compute scores and to itera-
tively update parameter vectors in Algorithm 1 (Lrn.(4) and Lrn.(5) in Table 4.5).
7. Our speed-up technique required the time to compute pseudo-scores and to select train-
ing objects, both of which increased in proportion to NN ′ (Lrn.(2) and Lrn.(3) in Table
4.5).
8. Our speed-up technique did not significantly aﬀect the performance in Gau.(a), Gau.(b),
Doc., and Gen., while it adversely aﬀected the performance in Uni.(d) (Figure 4.4, Table
4.3, and Table 4.4).
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In the next subsection, we discuss these findings in detail.
4.4.3 Discussion
Score Computations
Our scheme outperformed the conventional schemes in all the datasets, with regard to the
number of score computations (see Figure 4.4 and Table 4.3). Especially, in the case of the
documents and genes, our scheme reduced the percentage of score computations required to
retrieve 90% of the correct answer to one-third of the percentage in the permutation-based
scheme. We consider this is relevant to the validity of the model assumption. That is, from
a theoretical perspective, we can say that our scheme works very well iﬀ (a) the probability-
based pseudo-score ai can be correctly modeled as a linear function of the pseudo-score s˜(q, oi)
and (b) the parameter vector wi is diﬀerent for each object oi ∈ Onon.
It should also be noted that the permutation-based scheme performed almost the same as
or worse than the standard pivot-based scheme with regard to the number of score compu-
tations, in the case where K = 16 pivots (i.e. Uni.(a), Uni.(c), Uni.(d), Gau.(a), Doc., and
Gen.). On the other hand, we confirmed in [B3] that the permutation-based scheme outper-
formed the standard pivot-based scheme in the case where K = 128 pivots or 256 pivots. We
consider the reason the permutation-based scheme performed worse in this experiment is that
the number of pivots K was very small and the permutations did not have discriminative
power compared to the score vectors.
CPU Time
Our scheme also outperformed the conventional schemes in all the datasets with regard to the
CPU time (see Table 4.4). In the case of the real-life datasets (i.e. Doc. and Gen.), the CPU
time in our scheme was much smaller than that in the sequential scan (less than one-thirtieth).
This is because the score computations were very expensive in those datasets, as described in
Section 4.4.1, and our scheme significantly reduced the number of score computations required
(see Table 4.3). It was also found that the fewer pivots provided the smaller CPU time in
many cases (see Uni.(a), Uni.(b), Gau.(a), and Gau.(b) in Table 4.4). This is because the
fewer pivots resulted in the decrease of the extra CPU time, while they did not result in
a significant increase of score computations (see Uni.(a), Uni.(b), Gau.(a), and Gau.(b) in
Table 4.3). Since the number of score computations was very small in the real-life datasets
(see Doc. and Gen. in Table 4.3), the significant increase of pivots would also result in the
higher CPU time in those datasets.
As for the extra CPU time, our scheme performed almost the same with the conventional
schemes. This is because the computation of one probability-based pseudo-score only requires
one multiplication and one addition if we use the logistic regression model, as described in
Section 4.3.1. However, the extra CPU time required to compute pseudo-scores and to sort
them accounted for much of the total CPU time in some cases (e.g. Gau.(a) and Gau.(b) in
Table 4.4). To further reduce the total CPU time in such cases, we need to reduce the extra
CPU time using, for example, another indexing scheme [36].
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The Speed-up Technique and the Learning Time
Our speed-up technique significantly reduced the time to compute scores and to iteratively
update parameter vectors in Algorithm 1 (see Lrn.(4) and Lrn.(5) in Table 4.5). This was
especially eﬀective in the real-life datasets (i.e. Doc. and Gen.) where the score computations
were very expensive, and in the very large datasets (i.e. Uni.(c) and Uni.(d)) where the
iterative update process required much time. However, our speed-up technique required the
time to compute pseudo-scores and to select training objects, and both of them increased in
proportion to NN ′, as described in Section 4.3.3.
While significantly reducing the learning time, our speed-up technique did not significantly
aﬀect the performance in the vectors from a mixture of Gaussians, documents, and genes (see
Gau.(a), Gau.(b), Doc., and Gen. in Figure 4.4, Table 4.3, and Table 4.4). The reason for this
is that the performance of PIΦ and PIΠ were very good with regard to score computations (it
can be seen from Figure 4.4 that they retrieved most of the correct answer in less than 10%
of score computations), and consequently many or most of the similar training objects were
selected (see Table 4.3). On the other hand, our speed-up technique adversely aﬀected the
performance when our scheme was applied to the permutation-based scheme in Uni.(d). This
is because the search radius was set to be very small so that the average number of objects
in the correct answer would not be changed as described in Section 4.4.1, and consequently
most of the similar training objects were not selected (see Uni.(d) in Table 4.3).
As a conclusion, we can say that we should not make the search radius smaller as we
add objects into the existing database in our scheme in range queries. There are two reasons
for this: (1) if the search radius changes, we have to learn the parameter vector wi for each
object oi ∈ Onon again to adapt to the new search radius; (2) as the search radius is set to
be smaller, the number of similar training objects is reduced, and hence the number of score
computations and the CPU time at query time is increased. Thus, it would be desirable to
fix the search radius, in the same way as Uni.(c). Then, since the number of objects in the
correct answer increases as we add objects into the existing database, it may be better to
output objects in the correct answer in ascending order of distances to the query object if
there are too many objects in the correct answer. That is, we consider one solution would be
the combination of the range query and the k-NN query.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we focused on range queries and proposed the PPS scheme which can be
applied to any pseudo-score based indexing scheme. We described the algorithm of the PPS
scheme, clarifying its optimal property with regard to the trade-oﬀ between the number of
score computations and retrieval errors. We applied our scheme to the two state-of-the-art
schemes: the standard pivot-based scheme and the permutation-based scheme, and evaluated
the performance using vectors from a uniform distribution, vectors from a mixture of Gaussian
distributions, documents, and genes. The results showed that our scheme outperformed the
conventional schemes with regard to both the number of score computations and the CPU
time, in all the datasets. In [B3], we also evaluated our scheme using images and dictionaries,
and showed that our scheme outperformed the above schemes with regard to the number
of score computations. We consider they are very successful results because our scheme
outperformed the conventional schemes including the permutation-based indexing scheme,
which is followed by a number of studies [33, 35, 36, 79, 102], in so many datasets.
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The drawback of our scheme in range queries is a high computational cost in learning
the parameter vectors (our speed-up still requires the time to compute pseudo-scores and to
select training objects, both of which is O(NN ′)). However, we explain that the problem of
the learning time does not occur in biometric identification in the next chapter.
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Towards Optimal Sequential
Indexing and Fusion in Biometric
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5.1 Introduction
In Section 2.2.2, we introduced metric space indexing methods which reduce the number of
score computations at query time using the index which is constructed based on scores. We
now consider applying them to biometric identification to reduce response time. Although
exact indexing schemes guarantee to return the correct answer, they are not useful when
features are in a high dimensional space (e.g. Daugman [27] used 2048-bit iriscodes) or score
measures do not satisfy the triangle-inequality. Approximate indexing schemes can reduce
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the number of score computations even in such cases. However, they can fail to compute a
genuine score, and consequently they can incorrectly reject an enrollee as a non-enrollee. In
this chapter, we refer to the errors in which the system does not compute a genuine score as
retrieval errors (i.e. a correct answer in this chapter is a set of genuine templates)1. There is
a trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations and retrieval errors, and the increase
of retrieval errors causes the increase of false rejects.
Some existing work proposed a metric space indexing method for biometric identification,
all of which are approximate indexing schemes [10, 39, 65]. For example, Maeda et al. [65]
proposed a metric space indexing scheme which uses an N × N score matrix which is com-
posed of scores between all pairs of N templates as an index. After the claimant inputs a
query sample, it computes a score for the first template, and searches remaining templates as
follows: (1) Generate a vector composed of scores between the query sample and the searched
templates, and compute the correlation between the vector and each row of the matrix; (2)
Compute a score for the template whose correlation is the highest and go back to (1). This
scheme can be regarded as a modification of AESA (Approximating and Eliminating Search
Algorithm) [119] to skip the elimination step based on the triangle inequality.
Glenn and Potts [10] proposed another indexing scheme which uses K (< N) pivots which
are randomly selected from N templates in the database. They used a score vector composed
of scores for K pivots as a feature vector for clustering templates. Gyaourova and Ross
[39] proposed an indexing scheme which is similar to the standard pivot-based scheme [22]
described in Section 4.2.2. This scheme uses a distance between two score vectors (composed
of scores for pivots) as a pseudo-score, and outputs all non-pivots whose pseudo-score is within
a certain threshold. They also proposed a technique which concatenates score vectors from
multiple modalities to improve the trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations and
retrieval errors.
However, no studies combined metric space indexing and sequential fusion to reduce iden-
tification errors, the number of inputs, and response time in biometric identification at the
same time, to the best of our knowledge. This chapter aims at optimizing all of them.
5.1.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we make an attempt to optimize the trade-oﬀ between identification errors,
the number of inputs, and response time, by combining metric space indexing and sequential
fusion. The main contributions are as follows:
1. We firstly propose a sequential indexing and fusion framework in biometric identification
which is constructed from the following three schemes:
(I) a pseudo-score based indexing scheme (described in Section 4.2) [4, 6, 22, 32];
(II) a sequential search scheme which searches non-pivots using pseudo-scores and
scores as a clue each time a query sample is input;
(III) a sequential fusion scheme in identification which handles missing scores (such as
the OR rule [14], the LRSI scheme and PPSI scheme proposed in Chapter 3).
1In Chapter 4, we referred to the errors in which the system does not compute a score for an object whose
distance to the query object is less than the threshold as retrieval errors, since we focused on range queries.
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This framework clarifies the generality of our approach: we can use any existing scheme
as (I) or (III). At the same time, it also clarifies the novelty of our work: (II) is a new
scheme which is necessary to construct our framework.
2. We secondly propose the PPSS (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Search) scheme
as (II). This scheme is a modification of the PPS (Posterior Probability-based Search)
scheme proposed in Chapter 4 to use not only pseudo-scores at the current input but
past pseudo-scores and scores to compote posterior probabilities. We discuss the opti-
mal property of this scheme with regard to the trade-oﬀ between the number of score
computations and retrieval errors. We also explain that this scheme does not have a
problem of the learning time.
3. We thirdly propose a technique which optimizes the number of pivots with regard to
retrieval errors.
4. We finally evaluate our proposals using a large-scale multi-modal dataset (N = 1800
enrollees; one face and two fingerprints) obtained by combining the NIST BSSR1 Set3
dataset [77] and the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [21]. The results show that our pro-
posals reduce the number of score computations to 10[%] while keeping the identification
error rates (EFRR/EFAR/NFAR) and ANI (the average number of inputs) of the PPSI
scheme proposed in Section 3.4.1.
5.1.2 Organization of This Chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we propose our sequential indexing and
fusion framework, and explain the example of (I) a pseudo-score based indexing scheme and
(III) a sequential fusion scheme. In Section 5.3, we propose the PPSS (Posterior Probability-
based Sequential Search) scheme as (II). We first describe the search algorithm, and explain
that this scheme does not have a problem of the learning time. We then discuss the optimality
of this scheme with regard to the trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations and
retrieval errors. In Section 5.4, we propose a technique which optimizes the number of pivots.
In Section 5.5, we show the experimental results using a large-scale multi-modal dataset. In
Section 5.6, we briefly describe parallel indexing and fusion proposed in [A2, B2], a combi-
nation of a metric space indexing scheme and a parallel fusion scheme, and compare it with
sequential indexing and fusion. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 5.7.
5.2 Sequential Indexing and Fusion Framework
We propose a sequential indexing and fusion framework which can be constructed from (I) a
pseudo-score based indexing scheme [4, 6, 22, 32], (II) a sequential search scheme, and (III)
a sequential fusion scheme in identification which handles missing scores (e.g. the OR rule
[14], the LRSI scheme, and the PPSI scheme). We can use any existing scheme as (I) or (III),
while (II) is a new scheme which is necessary to construct our framework.
We now explain our framework using the notations shown in Table 5.1. Suppose that
the claimant sequentially inputs a diﬀerent biometric trait (e.g. fingerprint, face, and iris)
or instance (e.g. index and middle fingerprints). Let X be a universe of biometric samples,
Q = {qt|1 ≤ t ≤ T} ⊂ X be a set of query samples, where qt is a query sample at the t-th
input, and O = {oti|1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} ⊂ X be a finite set of templates, where oti is
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Table 5.1: Basic Notations Used in This Chapter.
Symbol Description
X universe of biometric samples
Q set of query samples Q = {qt|1 ≤ t ≤ T} ⊂ X
O set of templates O = {oti|1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ i ≤ N} ⊂ X
Otpiv set of pivots at the t-th input Otpiv ⊂ O
Otnon set of non-pivots at the t-th input Otnon = O\Otpiv
Stpiv set of scores for Kt pivots at the t-th input Stpiv = {sti = s(qt, oti)|oti ∈ Otpiv}
S˜tnon set of pseudo-scores for N − Kt non-pivots at the t-th input S˜tnon = {s˜ti =
s˜(qt, oti)|oti ∈ Otnon}
Stnon set of scores for M t −Kt (≤ N −Kt) non-pivots at the t-th input
N number of enrollees
T number of modalities
Kt number of pivots at the t-th input
M t number of score computations at the t-th input (Kt ≤M t ≤ N)
s score function s : X× X→ R
s˜ pseudo-score function s˜ : X× X→ R
sti score between q
t and oti (s
t
i := s(q
t, oti))
s˜ti pseudo-score between q
t and oti (s˜
t
i := s˜(q
t, oti))
a template of the i-th enrollee at the t-th input. Let further s : X × X → R be a score
function, and s˜ : X× X → R be a pseudo-score function, in the same way as Chapter 4. We
also assume that scores and pseudo-scores are continuous (the discussion below can be easily
extended to the discrete case). We further use the following simple notations: sti := s(q
t, oti),
s˜ti := s˜(q
t, oti).
To begin with, our framework constructs, for each modality, an index It in the same way
as Section 4.2.1 as follows:
[Indexing Algorithm]
1. Select Kt (< N) pivots from N templates ot1, · · · , otN (at random [22], for example).
Note that the number of pivots Kt can be diﬀerent from modality to modality. Let Otpiv
be a set of pivots, and Otnon be a set of non-pivots, respectively.
2. Compute a score s(oti, o
t
j) for each pivot o
t
i ∈ Otpiv and each non-pivot otj ∈ Otnon. Let
Stpnp = {s(oti, otj)|oti ∈ Otpiv, otj ∈ Otnon} be a set of scores between pivots and non-pivots
(K(N −K) scores in total).
3. Construct an index It using Stpnp, and store it in the database (the example of It is
described in Section 5.2.1).
Then, after the claimant inputs the t-th query sample, our framework carries out the
one-to-many matching process and the identification process as follows (1 ≤ t ≤ T ):
[Authentication Algorithm (t-th input)]
1. Compute a score sti = s(q
t, oti) for each pivot o
t
i ∈ Otpiv. Let Stpiv = {sti = s(qt, oti)|oti ∈
Otpiv} be a set of scores for pivots (Kt scores in total).
2. Compute a pseudo-score s˜ti = s˜(q
t, oti) for each non-pivot o
t
i ∈ Otnon using Stpiv and It
(the example of s˜ti is described in Section 5.2.1). Let S˜tnon = {s˜ti = s˜(qt, oti)|oti ∈ Otnon}
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Figure 5.1: Flowchart of the authentication process in the sequential indexing and fusion framework
((I): pseudo-score based indexing scheme, (II): sequential search scheme, (III): sequential fusion scheme
in identification which handles missing scores).
be a set of pseudo-scores for non-pivots (N −Kt pseudo-scores in total).
3. Narrow down N −Kt non-pivots to M t −Kt (Kt ≤ M t ≤ N) non-pivots using a set
of pseudo-scores and scores Wt = {S1piv, · · · ,Stpiv, S˜1non, · · · , S˜tnon,S1non, · · · ,St−1non}, and
compute a set of scores for the non-pivots Stnon, where M t (= Kt + (M t −Kt)) is the
number of score computations at the t-th input (the search algorithm is described in
Section 5.3).
4. Identify the claimant using a set of scores Sttot = {S1piv, · · · ,Stpiv,S1non, · · · ,Stnon}
(
Pt
τ=1M
τ scores in total;
Pt
τ=1(N −M τ ) scores are missing). The identification re-
sult is either of the following: 〈accept (enrollee ID)〉, 〈reject〉, or 〈require another query
sample〉. If the result is the last one, t← t+ 1 and go back to the step 1 (the example
of the decision algorithm is described in Section 5.2.2).
Figure 5.1 shows the flowchart of the authentication process in our framework. The step
1 and 2 are carried out using (I) a pseudo-score based indexing scheme, the step 3 is carried
out using (II) a sequential search scheme, and the step 4 is carried out using (III) a sequential
fusion scheme. Our framework improves the response time by reducing the number of score
computations at the t-th input from N to M t (≤ N) using (II), and improves identification
accuracy by combining scores from t modalities using (III). M t is set, for example, to satisfy
the requirement for the response time at the t-th input.
We emphasize that the novel component in our framework is (II) a sequential search
scheme. As described in Chapter 4, the PPS (Posterior Probability-based Search) scheme
searches non-pivots using pseudo-scores. On the other hand, the sequential search scheme
searches non-pivots using not only pseudo-scores at the t-th input S˜tnon but the past pseudo-
scores S1non, · · · ,St−1non and scores S1piv, · · · ,Stpiv,S1non, · · · ,St−1non, which are available only in
multi-biometrics. We demonstrate that these information sources significantly reduces re-
trieval errors, and hence identification errors, in our experiment in Section 5.5.
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5.2.1 Example of a Pseudo-score Based Indexing Scheme
We clarify an index It and a pseudo-score s˜ti computed using (I) a pseudo-score based indexing
scheme in our framework. In our experiment in Section 5.5, we used the permutation-based
scheme [4, 22] which uses Spearman’s Rho as a pseudo-score (described in Section 4.2.3) since
it attracted much attention as a very successful scheme [33, 35, 36, 79, 102]. In this case, the
index It and the pseudo-score s˜ti are expressed as It = {Πoti |oti ∈ Otnon} and s˜ti = Sρ(Πqt ,Πoti),
respectively, where Π is a permutation.
Instead of the above schemes, we can use any other pseudo-score based indexing scheme
such as the standard pivot-based scheme [22], the distance regression-based indexing scheme
[32] and BoostMAP [6], all of which are described in Section 4.2.4.
5.2.2 Example of a Sequential Fusion Scheme
We also clarity the decision algorithm using (III) a sequential fusion scheme in identification
which handles missing scores. In our experiment in Section 5.5, we used the PPSI (Posterior
Probability-based Sequential Identification) scheme described in Section 3.4.1 since it provided
the best performance in our experiment in Section 3.6. Let Hi (0 ≤ i ≤ N) be the following
hypothesis as well as Section 3.4.1:
Hi : The claimant is the i-th enrollee. (1 ≤ i ≤ N)
H0: The claimant is a non-enrollee.
Then, the PPSI scheme computes the posterior probability P (Hi|Sttot) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) using a
set of scores Sttot = {S1piv, · · · ,Stpiv,S1non, · · · ,Stnon}, and makes a decision as follows: if the
maximum posterior probability exceeds the threshold, accept the corresponding hypothesis
Hi and output the corresponding enrollee ID (if i = 0, reject); otherwise, require another
query sample (if t = T , reject).
The posterior probability P (Hi|Sttot) (0 ≤ i ≤ N) can be written, in the same way as
Section 3.4.1, as follows:
P (Hi|Sttot) =
exp(Z ′ti)P (Hi)PN
n=0 exp(Z ′
t
n)P (Hn)
, (5.1)
where Z ′ti is the log-likelihood ratio which is given by
Z ′ti = log
p(Sttot|Hi)
p(Sttot|H0)
(5.2)
(p() is a probability density function). Here we assume that all scores are independent, and
that genuine scores and impostor scores at the t-th input are generated from f t() and gt(),
respectively (although we modeled the enrollee-specific impostor distribution in Section 3.4.1,
we assume the impostor distribution common to all enrollees gt(), for simplicity). Then, Z ′ti
can be decomposed as follows:
Z ′ti =
tX
τ=1
z′τi , (5.3)
where
z′τi =
(
log f τ (sτi )/g
τ (sτi ) (if i 6= 0 and sτi has been computed)
0 (otherwise)
(5.4)
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The important point here is that missing scores are handled by setting the corresponding
log-likelihood ratios to be 0, which is also described in [76].
In our experiment in Section 5.5, we used the logistic regression model [117] to estimate
log f τ (sτi )/g
τ (sτi ) as follows:
log f τ (sτi )/g
τ (sτi ) = w
τ
1s
τ
i + w
τ
0 (5.5)
(wτ1 , w
τ
0 : regression coeﬃcients). Then, we assumed that the prior probability P (Hi) in (5.1)
is uniform (i.e. we used a noninformative prior [12]), and computed the posterior probability
P (Hi|Sttot) using (5.1), (5.3), (5.4), and (5.5).
Instead of the PPSI scheme, we can use other sequential fusion schemes such as the LRSI
(Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Identification) scheme (described in Section 3.4.3) and
the OR rule [14]. The LRSI scheme handles missing scores by setting the corresponding
log-likelihood ratios to be 0, in the same way as the PPSI scheme. The OR rule handles
them by comparing the maximum score among those which have been computed to the
threshold. Although we may use other recently proposed parallel fusion schemes in verification
which handle missing scores [28, 34, 92], they need to be extended to sequential fusion in
identification.
5.3 Posterior Probability-based Sequential Search Scheme
5.3.1 Search Algorithm
A sequential search scheme narrows down N − Kt non-pivots to M t − Kt (Kt ≤ M t ≤
N) non-pivots using a set of pseudo-scores and scores Wt = {S1piv, · · · ,Stpiv, S˜1non, · · · , S˜tnon,
S1non, · · · ,St−1non}, and computes a set of scores for the non-pivots Stnon. Then, it would be nat-
ural to consider, in the same way as Chapter 4, that if the search scheme searches non-pivots
in descending order of the posterior probability of being a genuine template, it can mini-
mize retrieval errors. We propose the PPSS (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Search)
scheme based on this idea (we discuss its optimality in Section 5.3.3).
In the following, we explain the algorithm of the PPSS scheme. The posterior probability
that Hi (0 ≤ i ≤ N) is true after computing Wt can be written, using Bayes’ theorem, as
follows:
P (Hi|Wt) = exp(Y
t
i )P (Hi)PN
n=0 exp(Y tn)P (Hn)
, (5.6)
where Y ti is the log-likelihood ratio which is given by
Y ti = log
p(Wt|Hi)
p(Wt|H0) . (5.7)
It follows from (5.6) that if the prior probability P (Hi) (1 ≤ i ≤ N) is uniform, non-pivots
sorted by posterior probability P (Hi|Wt) are the same with those sorted by log-likelihood
ratio Y ti . Thus, we only have to compute Y
t
i instead of P (Hi|Wt) in such a case.
Here we assume that all pseudo-scores are independent, and that genuine pseudo-scores
and impostor pseudo-scores at the t-th input are generated from f˜ t(), and g˜t(), respectively,
in the same way as Section 3.4.1. However, it should be noted that pseudo-scores are not
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independent of scores since they are designed to be highly relevant to scores. Thus, in the
case where both a score and a pseudo-score have been computed for the same template, we
assume that the two variables are generated from fˆ t() in the case of the genuine template,
and from gˆt() in the case of the impostor template. That is, we assume the following:
p(s˜ti|Hj) =
(
f˜ t(s˜ti) (if i = j)
g˜t(s˜ti) (if i 6= j)
(5.8)
p(sti, s˜
t
i|Hj) =
(
fˆ t(sti, s˜
t
i) (if i = j)
gˆt(sti, s˜
t
i) (if i 6= j).
(5.9)
Then, the log-likelihood ratio Y ti in (5.7) can be decomposed as follows:
Y ti =
tX
τ=1
yτi , (5.10)
where
yτi =
8><>:
log f τ (sτi )/g
τ (sτi ) (if o
τ
i ∈ Oτpiv)
log f˜ τ (s˜τi )/g˜
τ (s˜τi ) (if o
τ
i ∈ Oτnon and sτi is missing)
log fˆ τ (sτi , s˜
τ
i )/gˆ
τ (sτi , s˜
τ
i ) (if o
τ
i ∈ Oτnon and sτi has been computed)
(5.11)
(recall that sτi = s(q
τ , oτi ) and s˜
τ
i = s˜(q
τ , oτi )).
In our experiment in Section 5.5, we estimated log f˜ τ (s˜τi )/g˜
τ (s˜τi ) and log fˆ
τ (sτi , s˜
τ
i )/ gˆ
τ (sτi , s˜
τ
i )
using the logistic regression models in the same way as (5.5), as follows:
log f˜ τ (s˜τi )/g˜
τ (s˜τi ) = w˜
τ
1 s˜
τ
i + w˜
τ
0 (5.12)
log fˆ τ (sτi , s˜
τ
i )/gˆ
τ (sτi , s˜
τ
i ) = wˆ
τ
1s
τ
i + wˆ
τ
2 s˜
τ
i + wˆ
τ
0 (5.13)
(w˜τ1 , w˜
τ
0 , wˆ
τ
1 , wˆ
τ
2 , wˆ
τ
0 : regression parameters), and verified the validity of these models.
To sum up, if we assume that the prior probability P (Hi) (1 ≤ i ≤ N) is uniform and use
logistic regression, the algorithm of the PPSS scheme can be written as follows:
1. Compute, for each oti ∈ Otnon, the log-likelihood ratio Y ti using (5.5), (5.10), (5.11),
(5.12), and (5.13);
2. Compute scores for M t −Kt (≤ N −Kt) non-pivots in descending order of Y ti .
It follows from (5.5), (5.10), (5.11), (5.12), and (5.13) that each time a score or a pseudo-
score is computed, we can update the corresponding log-likelihood ratio Y ti by only a few
additions and multiplications. Since the computation of a score or a pseudo-score generally
requires much more operations (e.g. it follows from (4.4) that the computation of s˜τi =
Sρ(Πqτ ,Πoτi ) requires K
τ additions and Kτ multiplications), the time to update Y ti is very
small, compared to the computation of a score or a pseudo-score. In [A2], we also confirmed
this in the experiment (refer to [A2] for details).
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5.3.2 Learning Time
In Chapter 4, we proposed the PPS scheme for range queries, and described that it requires
a high computational cost in learning the parameters in logistic regression. The cause of this
problem is that there are a very small number of similar training objects in training objects,
as described in Section 4.3.3. The PPS scheme requires a large number of training objects to
avoid shortage of similar training objects.
On the other hand, the PPSS scheme does not have a problem of the learning time. The
reason for this is that the correct answer in biometric identification is diﬀerent from that in
range queries: the former is a set of genuine templates, while the latter is a set of objects
whose distance is less than the threshold. Indeed, the regression coeﬃcients (wτ1 , w
τ
0) in (5.5)
are trained using genuine scores and impostor scores prepared in advance. Similarly, the
coeﬃcients (w˜τ1 , w˜
τ
0) in (5.12) are trained using genuine pseudo-scores and impostor pseudo-
scores. The coeﬃcients (wˆτ1 , wˆ
τ
2 , wˆ
τ
0) in (5.13) are trained using genuine training samples and
impostor training samples, where the training sample is a set of the score and pseudo-score
obtained from the same user pair. Thus, all of them can be trained using biometric samples
from the same individual and those from the diﬀerent individuals. It does not need to prepare
a large number of biometric samples to obtain genuine scores or pseudo-scores.
In our experiment in Section 5.5, we also confirmed that the time to learn the regression
coeﬃcients (wτ1 , w
τ
0 , w˜
τ
1 , w˜
τ
0 , wˆ
τ
1 , wˆ
τ
2 , wˆ
τ
0) was very small.
5.3.3 Optimality of the PPSS Scheme
We now discuss the optimality of the PPSS scheme with regard to the trade-oﬀ between the
number of score computations and retrieval errors. Let us fix templates, pivots, a pseudo-
score based indexing scheme and a sequential fusion scheme to be used, and assume that it
is allowed to change a sequential search scheme at each biometric input (i.e. we can use a
certain sequential search scheme at the first input, and then use a diﬀerent scheme at the
second input, and so on). We also refer to the probability that a retrieval error occurs at the
t-th input as the retrieval error probability at the t-th input. Then, we can prove the following
proposition:
Proposition 5.1. Fix a sequential search scheme at each input from the first to the (t−1)-th
input. Then, if the posterior probability P (Hi|Wt) can be perfectly estimated for any Wt, the
PPSS scheme minimizes, for any M t (Kt ≤ M t ≤ N), the retrieval error probability at the
t-th input among all sequential search schemes used at the t-th input.
Proof. Let nti ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} (1 ≤ i ≤ N −M t) be an enrollee ID whose corresponding
score at the t-th input is missing after computing scores for Kt pivots andM t−Kt non-pivots
(nti is determined depending on a sequential search scheme at the t-th input and Wt; Wt is
determined depending on q1, · · · , qt ∈ X since we fix templates, pivots, an indexing scheme,
a fusion scheme, and a search scheme at each input from the first to the (t − 1)-th input).
Then, the retrieval error probability at the t-th input can be written as follows:
Z N−MtX
i=1
P (Hnti |W
t)p(Wt)dWt. (5.14)
This value is minimized, for any M t (Kt ≤M t ≤ N), in the case where we search non-pivots
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in descending order of P (Hi|Wt), if P (Hi|Wt) can be perfectly estimated for any Wt.
This proposition states that if we fix a sequential search scheme at each input from the
first to the (t − 1)-th input, then the PPSS scheme can minimize, for any number of score
computations, the retrieval error probability at the t-th input (i.e. optimizes the trade-oﬀ
between the number of score computations and retrieval errors at the t-th input). However, it
should be noted that we just proved the optimality of the PPSS scheme in a limited sense. For
example, we can say that the PPSS scheme minimizes the retrieval error probability at the
first input. We can also say that this scheme minimizes the retrieval error probability at the
t-th input, under the condition that we use a certain, fixed search scheme (or schemes) until
the (t − 1)-th input. However, we cannot say that continuing to use the PPSS scheme from
the first to the t-th input is equivalent to or better than continuing to use any other sequential
search schemes from the first to the t-th input, because the schemes until the (t− 1)-th input
are diﬀerent (and hence the prior distributions of Wt are diﬀerent) in this case.
5.4 Optimization of the Number of Pivots
In Section 5.3, we proposed the PPSS scheme to minimize, for any number of score com-
putations, the retrieval error probability under the condition that the number of pivots Kt
(0 ≤ t ≤ T ) is fixed. However, the number of pivots Kt can also significantly aﬀect the re-
trieval error probability. For example, since Kt in the permutation-based scheme represents
the length of permutations, it seems that the correlation between pseudo-scores and scores
increases with an increase of Kt. However, since the number of score computations for non-
pivots M t − Kt decreases with an increase of Kt, we can expect that as Kt increases, the
retrieval error probability decreases until some point and then increases after that. In this
section, we propose a technique which optimizes the number of pivots Kt with regard to the
retrieval error probability.
The proposed technique estimates, for each modality, the retrieval error probability Rterr
in the PPSS scheme in the case where Kt is fixed (0 < Kt ≤M t), and selects Kt whose Rterr
is minimized. That is, it computes Kt∗ which can be expressed as follows:
Kt∗ = arg min
0<Kt≤Mt
Rterr. (5.15)
We now explain how to estimate Rterr. Here we assume that pseudo-scores are positively
correlated with distances and the prior probability P (Hi) (1 ≤ i ≤ N) is uniform. We
first explain the case of the first input (t = 1). After computing a set of pseudo-scores for
non-pivots S˜1non = {s˜1i = s˜(q1, o1i )|o1i ∈ O1non}, the log-likelihood ratio Y 1i of the non-pivot
o1i ∈ O1non can be written, using (5.10) and (5.11), as follows:
Y 1i = log f˜
τ (s˜1i )/g˜
τ (s˜1i ). (5.16)
If the log-likelihood ratio function log f˜ τ ()/g˜τ () is monotonically decreasing, non-pivots sorted
in descending order of Y 1i are the same with those sorted in ascending order of pseudo-scores.
Thus, the PPSS scheme fails to compute a genuine score in the case where a genuine template
is included in the N −K1 non-pivots, and more than or equal to M1−K1 out of N −K1− 1
impostor pseudo-scores are smaller than the genuine pseudo-score.
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Figure 5.2: Relationship between the pseudo-score distributions and the retrieval error probability at
the first input.
Let G˜1() be a cumulative distribution function of an impostor pseudo-score (i.e. G˜1(s˜) =R s˜
−∞ g˜
1(s˜0)ds˜0), and s˜∗ be a pseudo-score which satisfies the following equation:
G˜1(s˜∗) =
M1 −K1
N −K1 − 1 . (5.17)
Then, it follows from the asymptotic equipartition property (AEP) [25] that the proportion
of the number of impostor pseudo-scores which are smaller than s˜∗ converges to G˜1(s˜∗)(=
(M1 − K1)/(N − K1 − 1)) in probability as N → ∞. Thus, for N suﬃciently large, if
the genuine template is included in the N −K1 non-pivots and the genuine pseudo-score is
more than s˜∗, the search fails with probability near 1. Otherwise, the search succeeds with
probability near 1. Thus, the retrieval error probability Rterr can be approximated as follows:
R1err ≈
N −K1
N
(1− F˜ 1(s˜∗)) (5.18)
=
N −K1
N

1− F˜ 1

G˜1 −1

M1 −K1
N −K1 − 1

, (5.19)
where F˜ 1() is a cumulative distribution function of a genuine pseudo-score (i.e. F˜ 1(s˜) =R s˜
−∞ f˜
1(s˜0)ds˜0). From (5.19), we can simply estimate R1err using the genuine pseudo-score
distribution f˜1 and the impostor pseudo-score distribution g˜1 which are trained in advance.
Figure 5.2 shows the relationship between the pseudo-score distributions and the retrieval
error probability at the first input.
As for the second input or later (t ≥ 2), since the log-likelihood ratio Y ti of the non-pivot
oti ∈ Otnon is more complicated than (5.16), it is more diﬃcult to estimate the retrieval error
probability Rterr. Thus, for simplicity, we estimate R
t
err at the second input or later using
(5.19) as well. We demonstrate its eﬀectiveness through experimental evaluation in Section
5.5.
5.5 Experimental Evaluation
We carried out an experiment to evaluate the performance of our proposals. Unlike the
metric space indexing datasets such as the Metric Space Library [37], there are very few
publicly available biometric datasets which contains thousands or tens of thousands subjects.
Gyaourova and Ross [39] created a chimeric multi-modal dataset containing 870 subjects by
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combining the FERET face database [84] and the WVU fingerprint database [26], and treating
all 4 diﬀerent fingers from one subject as ones from diﬀerent subjects. In this chapter, we
combined the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [77] and the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [21] and
created a larger chimeric multi-modal dataset (2000 subjects; one face and two fingerprints).
This is the largest level of multi-modal datasets which contain fingerprints and faces (which
account for the highest and the second highest share in the world market [69], respectively),
and can be obtained for free, to the best of our knowledge.
5.5.1 Experimental Set-up
Datasets
The NIST BSSR1 Set3 [77] contains face scores from 3000 subjects (each subject contributed
one template and two query samples) using two algorithms (“C” and “G”). We adopted the
algorithm “C” and excluded 8 subjects who have inappropriate scores (the values “-1”). Then,
we extracted a set of 2992× 2992× 2 scores (there were no scores between templates). Since
there were no scores between templates which were necessary to construct the index, we used
scores between the 1st query samples (i.e. query samples at the first input) and templates to
construct the index instead (i.e. we assumed that the 1st query samples were obtained before
authentication, as well as templates).
The CASIA-FingerprintV5 [21] contains 20000 fingerprint images (left and right thumb/
index/middle/ring finger) from 500 subjects (each subject contributed 5 samples per finger).
We made 2000 chimeric subjects by grouping the same type of finger of both hands (two
fingers) together, and assuming that each set of two fingers was obtained from a diﬀerent
subject. Then, we assumed that the 1st samples (i.e. samples at the first input) as templates
and the remaining samples as query samples, and computed 2000 × 2000 × 2 × 5 scores
(including scores between templates) using SourceAFIS Version 1.4 [104].
We combined the above two score datasets, and used 1800 subjects for enrollees (N =
1800), 100 subjects for non-enrollees, and the remaining subjects for training the regression
coeﬃcients (we describe the training method later in detail). Here, we randomly chose 10
ways of combining the above two datasets and dividing subjects into enrollees, non-enrollees,
and those for training. In each case, we carried out the experiment where each of the enrollees
and non-enrollees sequentially inputs his/her query sample (T = 3). As for the input order,
considering that faces can be obtained from a distance (i.e. remote biometrics [113]), we
tried the following two ways: “face → left fingerprint → right fingerprint” and “face →
right fingerprint → left fingerprint.” Here we used the 2nd query samples for faces and
each of the 4 query samples for fingerprints. The number of genuine attempts was 144000(=
1800× 10× 2× 4), and that of impostor attempts was 8000(= 100× 10× 2× 4).
Authentication Methods
In our experiment, we evaluated the performance of the following schemes:
1. PPSI: the PPSI (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Identification) scheme (de-
scribed in Section 5.2.2). Each time a query sample is input, it first computes scores
for all templates (N = 1800 scores in total). Then it computes, for each hypothesis Hi,
the posterior probability that Hi is true using all tN scores (t: the number of inputs),
and compares it to the threshold (0 ≤ i ≤ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T ).
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2. PIΠ-PPSI: a simple combination of the permutation-based scheme PIΠ (described in
Section 5.2.1) and the PPSI scheme (described in Section 5.2.2). That is, each time a
query sample is input, it first computes scores for Kt pivots, and scores for M t − Kt
non-pivots in ascending order of pseudo-scores defined by Spearman’s Rho (M t scores
in total). Then, it compares the posterior probability P (Hi|Sttot) to the threshold (0 ≤
i ≤ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T ).
3. PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI: our proposal in this chapter which uses the permutation-based
scheme PIΠ, the PPSS (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Search) scheme (de-
scribed in Section 5.3), and the PPSI scheme. That is, each time a query sample is
input, it first computes scores for Kt pivots, and scores for M t − Kt non-pivots in
descending order of the log-likelihood ratio Y ti , assuming that P (Hi) is uniform (M
t
scores in total). Then, it compares P (Hi|Sttot) to the threshold (0 ≤ i ≤ N , 1 ≤ t ≤ T ).
We determined, for each modality, the number of pivots Kt using the optimization tech-
nique described in Section 5.4. Here we used multiples of 20 as a candidate for Kt. Then
we randomly selected pivots in the same way as [22]. However, since the way of randomly
selecting pivots can aﬀect the performance, we tried 10 ways of randomly selecting pivots
and evaluated the average and standard deviation of the retrieval error rate (i.e. the er-
ror rate that the system does not compute a genuine score) and identification error rates
(EFRR/EFAR/NFAR). As for the number of score computations M t, since the matching
speed of the algorithm “C” in the NIST BSSR1 Set3 [77] is unknown, we set M t for all
modalities to the same value M (=M1 =M2 =M3), and changed it to various values.
Training Methods
We estimated the posterior probability P (Hi|Sttot) and the log-likelihood ratio Y ti using the
logistic regression models, as described in Section 5.2.2 and 5.3.1, respectively. We trained
the regression coeﬃcients using the BRLR (Bias-Reduced Logistic Regression) package for R
[80]. For training data in the NIST BSSR1 Set3, we used the 1002× 1002 score matrix and
1002 × 1002 pseudo-score matrix obtained from the 2nd query samples of 1002 (= 2992 −
1800−100) subjects for training. As for the CASIA-FingerprintV5, we used the 100×100×4
score matrices and 100× 100× 4 pseudo-score matrices obtained from the 4 query samples of
100 (= 2000− 1800− 100) subjects for training.
We also need to estimate pseudo-score distributions to automatically determine the num-
ber of pivots Kt, as described in Section 5.4. We used the histogram of genuine pseudo-scores
and that of impostor pseudo-scores obtained from the above pseudo-score matrices as a gen-
uine pseudo-score distribution and impostor pseudo-score distribution, respectively.
5.5.2 Experimental Results
Results of the Comparison Experiments
Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between the number of score computations M and the
retrieval error rate in the case where the enrollees input all the 3 query samples. Here, the
dots and error bars represent the average and ±2· standard deviation, respectively, in the case
where we tried 10 ways of randomly selecting pivots (we omitted the error bars of PIΠ-PPSI
because the standard deviations of PIΠ-PPSI were very small compared to the averages).
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Figure 5.3: Relationship between the number of score computations and the retrieval error rate (dot:
average, error bar: ±2· standard deviation).
It was found from Figure 5.3 that PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI significantly outperformed PIΠ-
PPSI. For example, the retrieval error rates of PIΠ-PPSI and PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI in the
case where M = 180 (one tenth of N = 1800) were 41.9[%] and 0.37[%], respectively. We
consider this was because the PPSS scheme searched non-pivots using not only the current
pseudo-scores but the past pseudo-scores and scores, as described in Section 5.2. We also
show that the log-likelihood ratio Y ti was correctly estimated using the logistic regression
models later.
Figure 5.4 shows the relationship between ANI (the average number of inputs) and
EFAR/NFAR in the case where the identification threshold at the 3rd input was changed
to fix EFRR to be 5[%] (in PIΠ-PPSI and PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI, we tried two cases: M = 90
(one twentieth of N = 1800) and M = 180 (one tenth of N = 1800)). Here, in the same
way as Figure 5.3, the dots and error bars represent the average and ±2· standard deviation,
respectively (we omitted the error bars in the case where EFAR and NFAR were more than
0.1[%] and 1[%], respectively, because the standard deviations were very small; there were also
no error bars in PPSI because it did not select pivots but computed scores for all templates).
The standard deviations were large in the area where the identification error rates were very
small (in the area where the error bars reached the lower end, twice the standard deviations
were larger than the averages), because the number of errors was very small.
It was found from Figure 5.4 that the identification error rates of PIΠ-PPSI were very
high. This was because the retrieval error rate was very high as shown in Figure 5.3. On the
other hand, the identification error rates of PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI were much smaller, and were
close to those of PPSI in the case where M = 180. That is, our proposal in this chapter
successfully reduced the number of score computations in the PPSI scheme to 10[%] without
significantly aﬀecting the identification performance. Interestingly, it was also found that
NFAR of PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI was smaller than that of PPSI when the average number of
inputs was less than 1.8. We consider this was because the PPSS scheme computed almost all
genuine scores (retrieval error rate = 0.37[%]) while reducing scores for impostor templates
which can cause false accepts.
Although we also evaluated the identification performance of the unimodal biometric
system which computes scores for all templates (N = 1800 scores in total) and compares
the maximum score to the threshold, the result was poor: [EFAR, NFAR] of the faces,
left fingerprints, and right fingerprints was [14[%], 77[%]], [11[%], 83[%]], and [11[%], 80[%]],
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respectively. Thus, multi-modal fusion was necessary to improve the accuracy. When the
average number of inputs was fixed to 1.8, for example, our proposal successfully reduced
[EFAR, NFAR] to [0.0020[%], 0.034[%]] while reducing the number of score computations to
10[%].
Validation of the Regression Models
To explain more clearly the reason that PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI significantly outperformed PIΠ-
PPSI, we investigated the validity of the logistic regression models used in the PPSS scheme.
Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between scores (or pseudo-scores) and log-likelihood
ratios in the faces and the left fingerprints (we omitted the result of the right fingerprints
which was similar to that of the left fingerprints). Here we chose the first way of randomly
selecting pivots (out of 10 ways), and set the number of pivots to be 100. A dot represents
the logarithm of the ratio between the genuine histogram and impostor histogram. Here,
the genuine histogram was obtained from the last query sample of each enrollee and non-
enrollee and the corresponding template (1900 genuine scores or pseudo-scores) and impostor
histogram was obtained from the above query sample and the randomly selected impostor
template (1900 impostor scores or pseudo-scores). A straight line represents the regression
line using the estimated regression coeﬃcients (wt1, w
t
0, w˜
t
1, w˜
t
0). From Figure 5.5, it can
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Figure 5.5: Relationship between scores (or pseudo-scores) and log-likelihood ratios (left: score, right:
pseudo-score, dot: logarithm of the ratio between the genuine histogram and impostor histogram,
straight line: estimated regression line).
be seen that the log-likelihood ratios (log f t()/gt() and log f˜ t()/g˜t()) are correctly estimated
using the logistic regression models.
Figure 5.6 shows the two dimensional genuine/impostor distributions obtained using the
above scores and pseudo-scores, where a straight line represents the contour line of a log-
likelihood ratio obtained using the estimated regression coeﬃcients (wˆt1, wˆ
t
2, wˆ
t
0) and “L” is
the estimated value of a log-likelihood ratio. It can be seen that there is a correlation between
scores and pseudo-scores, and the log-likelihood ratio log fˆ t()/gˆt() is correctly estimated using
the logistic regression model. The correlation coeﬃcients of the genuine distribution and the
impostor distribution were −0.15 and −0.46 in the faces, respectively, and −0.53 and −0.29
in the left fingerprints, respectively.
To sum up, we consider the reason that PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI significantly outperformed
PIΠ-PPSI was because the PPSS scheme (1) used not only the current pseudo-scores but
the past pseudo-scores and scores, and (2) correctly estimated the log-likelihood ratios using
the logistic regression models.
Eﬀectiveness of the Pivot Number Optimization Technique
In Section 5.5.2, we determined, for each modality, the number of pivots Kt using the op-
timization technique described in Section 5.4. To investigate its eﬀectiveness, we finally
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evaluated the retrieval error rate of PIΠ-PPSS-PPSI in the case where we set Kt for all
modalities to the same value K (= K1 = K2 = K3), and changed it to various values.
Figure 5.7 shows the relationship between the number of pivots K and the retrieval error
rate, where the number of score computations wasM = 180 (the dots and error bars represent
the average and ±2· standard deviation, respectively, in the case where we tried 10 ways of
randomly selecting pivots). The right edge represents the retrieval error rate in the case where
we used the optimization technique (retrieval error rate = 0.37[%]). It was found that as K
increased, the retrieval error rate decreased until some point (K = 120) and then increased
after that (as described in Section 5.4). Interestingly, the optimization technique achieved
almost the same performance with the case where the number of pivots was fixed to K = 120.
Although the number of pivots which was automatically determined was changed depending
on the way of dividing subjects and the way of selecting pivots, the determined number was
80, 100, or 120 in most cases, in any of faces, left fingerprints, and right fingerprints. Although
the proposed optimization technique roughly estimates the retrieval error probability Rterr as
described in Section 5.4, these results demonstrate that it can nonetheless determine the
almost optimal number of pivots with regard to retrieval errors.
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Figure 5.8: Flowchart of the authentication process in the parallel indexing and fusion framework ((I):
pseudo-score based indexing scheme, (II)′: parallel search scheme, (III)′: parallel fusion scheme in
identification which handles missing scores).
5.6 Parallel Indexing and Fusion
We have so far proposed sequential indexing and fusion for biometric identification, and
showed its eﬀectiveness through experimental evaluation. In [A2, B2], we also proposed
parallel indexing and fusion which identifies a claimant after he/she inputs all query samples.
In this section, we briefly describe this.
Here we proposed a parallel indexing and fusion framework which is constructed from
(I) a pseudo-score based indexing scheme [4, 6, 22, 32], (II)′ a parallel search scheme which
searches non-pivots using pseudo-scores and scores as a clue after all query samples are input,
and (III)′ a parallel fusion scheme in identification which handles missing scores [76]. In this
framework, (I) computes, for each modality, scores for K (< N) pivots and pseudo-scores for
N − K non-pivots. Then, (II)′ computes scores for M ′ (≤ T (N − K)) non-pivots. Finally,
(III)′ identifies a claimant using TK +M ′ scores (i.e. TK scores for pivots and M ′ scores
for non-pivots; TN − (TK +M ′) scores are missing). Figure 5.8 shows the flowchart of the
authentication process.
As (II)′ a parallel search scheme, we proposed a scheme which selects non-pivots as follows:
(1) Compute, for each enrollee, the posterior probability of being identical to the claimant
using pseudo-scores and scores; (2) Compute a score for a non-pivot of the enrollee whose
posterior probability is the highest and go back to (1). In this dissertation, we refer to this
scheme as the PPPS (Posterior Probability-based Parallel Search) scheme to distinguish it
from the PPSS scheme.
Since parallel indexing and fusion always requires the claimant to input all query samples,
it can cause inconvenience (and this is the reason we have so far focused on sequential indexing
and fusion). However, we consider the PPPS scheme has an advantage over the PPSS scheme
with regard to retrieval errors. The PPSS scheme searches non-pivots at the t-th input using
pseudo-scores and scores at each input from the 1st to the t-th input. In other words, it
cannot use pseudo-scores after the (t + 1)-th input. On the other hand, the PPPS scheme
uses all pseudo-scores since it searches non-pivots after the claimant inputs all query samples.
Thus, we consider that the PPPS scheme can achieve the lower retrieval error rate than the
PPSS scheme.
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In [A2], we also proposed a technique which identifies the claimant using (III)′ a parallel
fusion scheme on the way of searching non-pivots using (II)′ a parallel search scheme. Instead
of always computing scores for predetermined number of non-pivots, this technique stops
searching if it finds out who the claimant is with enough confidence. By doing so, we can
reduce the average number of score computations without significantly aﬀecting identification
accuracy.
In [A2], we evaluated the performance of our proposals (the PPPS scheme and the above
technique) using the NIST BSSR1 Set3 [77], assuming the multiple matchers scenario (i.e.
fusion of the algorithm “C” and “G”). The results showed that they significantly improved
identification accuracy and reduced the average number of score computations to less than
twentieth, compared to the unimodal biometrics. Since the claimant only has to input one
query sample, we consider that parallel indexing and fusion is eﬀective especially in the
multiple matchers scenario.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we first proposed a sequential indexing and fusion framework which can be
constructed from (I) a pseudo-score based indexing scheme, (II) a sequential search scheme,
and (III) a sequential fusion scheme in identification which handles missing scores. Then
we proposed the PPSS scheme as (II), and clarified its optimal property with regard to
the trade-oﬀ between the number of score computations and retrieval errors. We further
proposed a technique which optimizes the number of pivots with regard to retrieval errors.
The experimental results using a large-scale chimeric multi-modal dataset (N = 1800; one
face and two fingerprints) showed that our proposals successfully reduced the number of
score computations required in the PPSI scheme (described in Section 3.4.1) to 10[%] while
keeping the identification error rates (EFRR/EFAR/NFAR) and ANI of the PPSI scheme.
Here we did not measure the response time since the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [77] used in
the experiment was a score dataset. In [A2, B2], we also measured the response time and
showed the eﬀectiveness of our proposals.
Recall that the PPSI scheme proposed in Section 3.4.1 has an optimal property with regard
to the trade-oﬀ between identification errors and the number of inputs. We only proved the
optimality of the PPSS scheme with regard to the trade-oﬀ between the number of score
computations and retrieval errors in a limited sense (see Section 5.3.3), and the conditions
to achieve the optimality of the PPSI scheme are not satisfied in reality (see Section 3.5.3).
Nevertheless, we believe that these schemes have made a significant progress towards the
optimization of the trade-oﬀ between identification errors, the number of inputs, and response
time. The optimization of the number of pivots also contributes to this progress.
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6.1 Introduction
As described in Section 2.3, the accuracy in biometric authentication is diﬀerent from user to
user, and Doddington et al. [29] classified users in speaker recognition as follows:
• Sheep: those who are easily recognized (default users);
• Goats: those who are particularly diﬃcult to recognize;
• Lambs: those who are particularly easy to imitate;
• Wolves: those who are particularly successful at imitating others.
Among the above animals, wolves and lambs are particularly problematic because they can
cause false accepts against many others and compromise the security of the system. As it is
often said that the overall security of the system is determined by the weakest link in the chain
[5], the overall security of the biometric system can also be determined by these animals.
To have security against wolves and lambs, we have to reduce false accepts caused by
them. To reduce the false accepts, we can raise a threshold for a similarity (or lower a
threshold for a distance), or use multi-modal biometric fusion schemes which combine multiple
sources of information (e.g. fingerprint, face and voice; index and middle fingers). However,
such solutions can increase false rejects or the number of inputs, and consequently make the
system inconvenient. That is, there is a trade-oﬀ between security against wolves and lambs
and convenience in biometrics. Although we introduced the previous countermeasures against
wolves and lambs in Section 2.3.1, they do not intend to optimize this trade-oﬀ.
6.1.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we aim at optimizing the trade-oﬀ between security against wolves and lambs
and convenience in biometrics. Here we consider the verification mode to simplify the problem.
We first introduce a taxonomy of wolves and lambs to clarify our target, and define security
measures for the animals to enable security evaluation. We then propose a sequential fusion
scheme which intends to optimize the above trade-oﬀ. Finally, we propose an input order
decision scheme to further reduce the number of biometric inputs. More specifically, the
contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We firstly introduce a taxonomy which classifies wolves into three categories (zero-
eﬀort wolves, non-adaptive spoofing wolves, and adaptive spoofing wolves) and lambs
into two categories (zero-eﬀort lambs and spoofing lambs). This taxonomy clarifies the
definition of wolves and lambs, and our target as well. We also define LAP (Lamb Accept
Probability), the maximum of the enrollee-specific FAP (False Accept Probability), as
a security measure for lambs in the same way as WAP (Wolf Attack Probability) [116],
the maximum of the claimant-specific FAP, to enable security evaluation.
• We secondly propose the MLRSV (Minimum Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Verifi-
cation) scheme as a sequential fusion scheme which has an optimal property with regard
to security against wolves and lambs and convenience. We prove that this scheme keeps
WAP and LAP less than a desired value except in the case of adaptive spoofing wolves,
if log-likelihood ratios are perfectly estimated. We also prove that this scheme can min-
imize ANI (the average number of inputs) and FRP (False Reject Probability) under
some conditions.
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• We thirdly propose an input order decision scheme based on the KL (Kullback-Leibler)
divergence [25]. This scheme further reduces ANI of the MLRSV scheme in the case
where the KL divergence diﬀers from one modality to another by maximizing the ex-
pectation of a genuine log-likelihood ratio at any number of biometric inputs.
• We finally evaluate our schemes using a virtual multi-modal (one face and eight fin-
gerprints) dataset obtained by combining the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [77] and the
CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [21]. The results demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of our
proposals.
6.1.2 Organization of This Chapter
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce a taxonomy of wolves and
lambs, and security measures for the animals. In Section 6.3, we propose the MLRSV scheme,
and proves its optimal property with regard to security against wolves and lambs, false rejects,
and the number of inputs. In Section 6.5, we propose the input order decision scheme using
the KL divergence. In Section 6.6, we show the experimental results. Finally, we conclude
this chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 Wolves and Lambs
6.2.1 Taxonomy of Wolves and Lambs
Recall that there are two diﬀerent ways of biometric authentication: verification and iden-
tification. In verification, a claimant claims an identity along with a query sample, and the
system computes a score between the query sample and a template corresponding to the
claimed identity, making a decision whether the claimant is genuine or not. In identification,
a claimant only inputs a query sample, and the system computes scores between the query
sample and all templates in the database (i.e. one-to-many matching), making a decision
who the claimant is. In both cases, since wolves and lambs have high similarity scores against
many others, they cause a number of false accepts in the most basic type of biometric system
which makes a decision by comparing a score (or scores) to the threshold.
As described in Section 1.1, wolves and lambs are more problematic in identification.
Wolves can cause many false accepts even if they do not intend to impersonate others. Then,
since they know that they have such threatening biometrics, they may even be encouraged
to actively attack many databases to impersonate others. Lambs can also be a threat in
identification because they can make the system identify many claimants as them, and lose
the availability of the system.
To clarify our target, we introduce a taxonomy which classifies wolves as follows:
• Zero-eﬀort wolves: These wolves are those who (happen to) have their own biometrics
similar to many others, and impersonate many enrollees by attempting a zero-eﬀort at-
tack [53]. That is, they directly input their own query sample as if they were attempting
successful authentication against themselves. Although Doddington et al. [29] statis-
tically tested the existence of claimants whose voice has high similarity scores against
many enrollees, they fall into this category. They are very powerful in that they cannot
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be blocked using anti-spoofing measures (e.g. liveness detection; supervising the au-
thentication process) [100] because they do not spoof the system. They can be a threat
even in the modalities which are very diﬃcult to spoof (e.g. iris, retina [58]).
• Spoofing wolves: These wolves are those who make particular eﬀort (e.g. change
their biometrics; input an artifact [70]) to impersonate many enrollees, and are further
divided into the following sub-categories:
– Non-adaptive spoofing wolves: These wolves are non-adaptive in the sense
that they input the same query sample against all enrollees. For example, they
input an artifact, called a universal wolf sample [116], which has extremely high
similarity scores against all templates.
– Adaptive spoofing wolves: These wolves are adaptive in the sense that they
change the query sample depending on the enrollee. For example, they change
their voice depending on the enrollee to imitate him/her. We note that this kind
of attack is limited to the modality such as voice where the attackers can easily
know the query sample of each enrollee, and change their biometrics (or create an
artifact) to imitate it.
Similarly, our taxonomy classifies lambs as follows:
• Zero-eﬀort lambs: These lambs are those who (happen to) have their own biometrics
similar to many others, and enroll their own template without particular eﬀort. They
cannot be blocked using anti-spoofing measures, and can be a vulnerability (or threat
in identification) in the modalities which are very diﬃcult to spoof.
• Spoofing lambs: These lambs are those who make particular eﬀort to enroll the
template similar to many others. However, they are non-adaptive in the sense that they
cannot change the template after the enrollment (as described in Section 2.3, we assume
a general biometric authentication system without template update mechanism [90]).
Among them, adaptive spoofing wolves cannot be blocked using our proposals, as described
in detail in Section 6.4.5, and are outside the scope of this dissertation.
6.2.2 Security Measures for Wolves and Lambs
We also define security measures for wolves and lambs. Some statistical tests on scores were
used to demonstrate the existence of the animals defined by themselves [29, 124], and some
score-based measures to quantify recognizability of a user or the extent of the biometric zoo
were studied in [88, 89]. However, these tests and measures are not designed to directly
evaluate security against wolves and lambs. To evaluate security against wolves and lambs,
we should take into account false accepts caused by them, instead of the statistics on scores.
Thus we start with FRR and FAR, the most commonly used error rates in verification, and
FRP (False Reject Probability) and FAP (False Accept Probability), the error probabilities
corresponding to FRR and FAR. Let d ∈ {0, 1} be a variable which takes 1 or 0 if the final
decision result is accept or reject, respectively. Let furtherW1 be the event that a genuine user
attempts verification against him/herself, and W0 be the event that an impostor attempts
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verification against someone else. Then, as described in Section 3.2.1, FRP and FAP can be
written as follows:
FRP = P (d = 0|W1) (6.1)
FAP = P (d = 1|W0), (6.2)
where P () is a probability mass function, and FRR and FAR can be written as follows:
FRR =
The number of false rejects
The total number of genuine attempts
(6.3)
FAR =
The number of false accepts
The total number of impostor attempts
. (6.4)
Since FRR and FAR are the average error rates taken over all biometric samples, they do not
measure the performance for a particular user.
Taking this into account, we define performance measures for a particular user. Let V be
a finite set of claimants, E be a finite set of enrollees. Let furtherWe,e be the event that e ∈ E
attempts verification against him/herself, Wv,∗ be the event that v ∈ V attempts an impostor
attack against someone else, W∗,e be the event that someone else attempts an impostor attack
against e ∈ E. Then, we can define the following three error probabilities:
FRPe = P (d = 0|We,e) (6.5)
FAPv,∗ = P (d = 1|Wv,∗) (6.6)
FAP∗,e = P (d = 1|W∗,e). (6.7)
They are the enrollee-specific FRP, the claimant-specific FAP, and the enrollee-specific FAP,
respectively. Goats cause high FRPe, wolves cause high FAPv,∗, and lambs cause high
FAP∗,e. We also define the corresponding three error rates:
FRRe =
The number of false rejects caused by e
The total number of genuine attempts of e
(6.8)
FARv,∗ =
The number of false accepts caused by v
The total number of impostor attempts of v
(6.9)
FAR∗,e =
The number of false accepts caused by e
The total number of impostor attempts of e
. (6.10)
Une et al. [116] defined WAP (Wolf Attack Probability) as a security measure for wolves,
which can be expressed as follows:
WAP = max
v∈V
FAPv,∗. (6.11)
That is, WAP is the false accept probability caused by the most threatening wolf. Similarly,
we define LAP (Lamb Accept Probability), a security measure for lambs, as follows:
LAP = max
e∈E
FAP∗,e. (6.12)
LAP is the false accept probability caused by the most vulnerable lamb. We further define
WAR (Wolf Attack Rate) and LAR (Lamb Accept Rate) as the error rate corresponding to
WAP and LAP, respectively:
WAR = max
v∈V
FARv,∗ (6.13)
LAR = max
e∈E
FAR∗,e. (6.14)
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Figure 6.1: Three kinds of false accept probabilities in verification (FAP/WAP/ LAP). WAP and LAP
are the maximum of the claimant-specific FAP and the enrollee-specific FAP, respectively.
We use error probabilities such as FRP, FAP, WAP and LAP in a theoretical analysis, and
error rates such as FRR, FAR, WAR, LAR in an experimental evaluation. Figure 6.1 shows
the three kinds of false accept probabilities in verification (FAP/WAP/LAP).
As described in Section 3.2, in identification FAR can be divided into EFAR (Enrollee
FAR) and NFAR (Non-enrollee FAR), the false accept rate caused by enrollees and non-
enrollees, respectively. Thus, security measures for wolves and lambs in identification can be
more complicated, and are not defined in this dissertation.
6.3 Minimum Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Verification
Scheme
Our first proposal is the MLRSV (Minimum Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Verification)
scheme, a sequential fusion scheme in verification. This scheme is a modification of the LRSV
(Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Verification) scheme [107] to have security against wolves
and lambs by computing the minimum of two log-likelihood ratios obtained using two kinds
of user-specific impostor distributions. After describing its algorithm, we clarify its security
and optimality from a theoretical point of view.
6.3.1 Assumptions about Scores
Before describing the algorithm of the MLRSV scheme, we make some assumptions about
scores. First of all, we focus on sequential fusion of multiple biometric traits (e.g. fingerprint,
face and iris) or multiple instances (e.g. index and middle fingers) as described in Section
2.1.1, and assume that all scores are independent.
Let s(t) ∈ R be a score between the t-th query sample and the corresponding template
(in this paper, we assume that s(t) is continuous; the discussion below can be easily extended
to the discrete case). In addition to the independence of scores, we assume, in the same way
as Section 3.4.2, that genuine scores are generated from a genuine distribution f (t) which is
common to all enrollees:
f (t)(s(t)) = p(s(t)|We,e), (6.15)
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where p() is a probability density function. The reason we assume a genuine distribution
common to all enrollees is that (1) generally very few genuine scores per enrollee (e.g. 2
or 3 scores) are available as training samples, and (2) we cannot train the enrollee-specific
genuine distributions if each enrollee presents only one biometric sample during enrollment,
as described in Section 3.4.2. f (t) is trained using genuine scores from templates enrolled in
the database or any other biometric samples which are collected in advance.
We further define the following two impostor distributions:
g(t)v (s
(t)) = p(s(t)|Wv,∗) (6.16)
g(t)e (s
(t)) = p(s(t)|W∗,e). (6.17)
That is, g(t)v is a claimant-specific impostor distribution, and g
(t)
e is an enrollee-specific im-
postor distribution. Suppose v ∈ V attempts verification against e ∈ E. Then, g(t)v is trained
using scores between a query sample of v ∈ V and biometric samples other than the template
of e ∈ E. We refer to the biometric samples used for estimating g(t)v as dummy-templates. For
example, we can use all or part of templates of other enrollees in the database as dummy-
templates. We can also use any other biometric samples which are collected separately from
the templates (e.g. biometric samples collected for performance evaluation). Similarly, g(t)e is
trained using scores between a template of e ∈ E and dummy-templates. Note that f (t) and
g
(t)
e are trained before authentication (e.g. right after enrollment), while g
(t)
v is trained after
v ∈ V inputs the t-th query sample.
As will be described in detail in Section 6.3.2, f (t), g(t)v and g
(t)
e are used for estimating
the following two kinds of log-likelihood ratios:
Z(t)v = log
f (t)(s(t))
g
(t)
v (s(t))
(6.18)
Z(t)e = log
f (t)(s(t))
g
(t)
e (s(t))
. (6.19)
Thus, it is also possible to directly train Z(t)v and Z
(t)
e , instead of training f (t), g
(t)
v , and g
(t)
e
(in this case, Z(t)e is trained before authentication, and Z
(t)
v is trained after v ∈ V inputs the
t-th query sample). For example, we can use logistic regression [12] which models Z(t)v and
Z
(t)
e as follows:
Z(t)v = w1
(t)
v s
(t) + w0(t)v (6.20)
Z(t)e = w1
(t)
e s
(t) + w0(t)e , (6.21)
where w1
(t)
v , w0
(t)
v , w1
(t)
e , and w0
(t)
e are regression coeﬃcients. We also show the validity of
this model in our experiments in Section 6.6.
6.3.2 Algorithm
We now describe the algorithm of the MLRSV scheme. Suppose the claimant v ∈ V attempts
verification against the enrollee e ∈ E. Let r(t) = (r(t)1 , · · · , r(t)N ) be a sequence of scores
between the t-th query sample of v ∈ V and N dummy-templates. r(t) is just used to train
g
(t)
v (or Z
(t)
v ). Let further st = (s(1), · · · , s(t)) be a sequence of scores between the query
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Figure 6.2: Overview of the MLRSV scheme in the case where the score distributions f (t), g(t)e , and
g
(t)
v are trained. f (t) and g
(t)
e are trained in advance, while g
(t)
v is trained using r(t) = (r
(t)
1 , · · · , r(t)N ).
After computing s(t), Z(t)tot is updated and compared to A. Here, two examples are given: one results
in acceptance at the second input; the other results in rejection (T = 3).
samples of v ∈ V and the templates of e ∈ E, and Hi (i = 0, 1) be the following hypotheses:
H1: The claimant is a genuine user.
H0: The claimant is an impostor.
Then, since we assume that all scores are independent, the log-likelihood ratio after obtaining
st can be written as follows:
log
p(st|H1)
p(st|H0) =
tX
τ=1
log
p(s(τ)|H1)
p(s(τ)|H0)
. (6.22)
The MLRSV scheme estimates the two kinds of log-likelihood ratios Z(τ)v and Z
(τ)
e using the
two kinds of impostor distributions g(τ)v and g
(τ)
e (see (6.18) and (6.19)), and adopts the min-
imum value of them (i.e. the one which causes less false accepts) as log p(s(τ)|H1)/p(s(τ)|H0).
That is, the MLRSV scheme computes Z(t)tot after obtaining s
t as follows:
Z
(t)
tot =
tX
τ=1
Z
(τ)
min, (6.23)
where
Z
(τ)
min = min
n
Z(τ)v , Z
(τ)
e
o
. (6.24)
Then, it compares Z(t)tot to a verification threshold A, and makes the following decision: If Z
(t)
tot
is greater than or equal to A, accept the hypothesis H1 (i.e. accept the claimant); Otherwise
if the number of inputs t reaches the maximum value T (i.e. the number of modalities), accept
the hypothesis H0 (i.e. reject the claimant); Otherwise, require another biometric input.
To sum up, the algorithm of the MLRSV scheme is as follows:
[The MLRSV Algorithm]
1. t← 1, Z(0)tot ← 0;
2. Compute r(t) = (r(t)1 , · · · , r(t)N ), and train g(t)v (or Z(t)v );
3. Compute s(t);
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4. Z(t)v ← log f
(t)(s(t))
g
(t)
v (s(t))
, Z(t)e ← log f
(t)(s(t))
g
(t)
e (s(t))
;
5. Z(t)min ← min
n
Z
(t)
v , Z
(t)
e
o
, Z(t)tot ← Z(t−1)tot + Z(t)min;
6. If Z(t)tot ≥ A, accept the claimant; Otherwise if t = T , reject the claimant; Otherwise,
t← t+ 1 and go to 2).
Figure 6.2 shows the overview of the MLRSV scheme.
6.4 Theoretical Properties of the MLRSV scheme
We now show some theoretical properties of the MLRSV scheme. We first briefly explain the
outline of them. Let δ be a sequential fusion algorithm, andWAP (δ) be WAP of δ. We apply
the same rule to other performance measures such as LAP, FRP, and FAP. Let further δ0 be
the MLRSV algorithm. In this paper, we prove the following three properties of the MLRSV
scheme:
• Security against wolves and lambs: The MLRSV scheme can keep the false ac-
cept probability caused by any claimant and any enrollee, except for adaptive spoofing
wolves, less than a desired value: WAP (δ0) ≤ α and LAP (δ0) ≤ α, where α is a
required WAP and LAP (Theorem 6.1).
• Optimality with regard to FRP: The MLRSV scheme can minimize, for any en-
rollee e ∈ E, the false reject probability among all sequential fusion schemes with the
same false accept probability: FRPe(δ0) ≤ FRPe(δ) for any δ such that FAP∗,e(δ) =
FAPe(δ0) (Theorem 6.2).
• Asymptotic optimality with regard to ANI: The MLRSV scheme can minimize,
for any enrollee e ∈ E, ANI among all sequential fusion schemes in the asymptotic
setting where both the false accept probability and the false reject probability (FAP∗,e
and FRPe) are suﬃciently small (Theorem 6.3).
The first property guarantees the security of the MLRSV scheme in terms of false accepts,
while the second one guarantees the optimality with regard to false rejects. We can signifi-
cantly reduce both false accepts and false rejects by setting the maximum number of inputs
(i.e. the number of modalities) T very large. Then, the third property guarantees that ANI
of this scheme can achieve almost the minimum value.
In the rest of this section, we formally describe these theoretical properties. Table 6.1
shows the notations used there.
6.4.1 Proof of the Security against Wolves and Lambs
The MLRSV scheme models both the claimant-specific impostor distribution g(t)v and the
enrollee-specific impostor distribution g(t)e , and adopts the one which causes less false accepts
(i.e. the minimum value of Z(t)v and Z
(t)
e ). By this means, it achieves security against any
claimant and any enrollee except for adaptive spoofing wolves, if Z(t)v and Z
(t)
e are perfectly
estimated:
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Table 6.1: Notations used in describing theoretical properties of the MLRSV scheme.
Symbol Description
δ a sequential fusion algorithm
δ0 the MLRSV algorithm
V a set of claimants
E a set of enrollees
FRPe FRP (False Reject Probability) of e ∈ E (see (6.5))
FAPv,∗ FAP (False Accept Probability) of v ∈ V (see (6.6))
FAP∗,e FAP (False Accept Probability) of e ∈ E (see (6.7))
WAP WAP (Wolf Attack Probability) (see (6.11))
LAP LAP (Lamb Accept Probability) (see (6.12))
ANIe ANI (the average number of inputs) of e ∈ E
f (t) a genuine distribution common to all enrollees (see
(6.15))
g
(t)
v an impostor distribution of v ∈ V (see (6.16))
g
(t)
e an impostor distribution of e ∈ E (see (6.17))
Z
(t)
v /Z
(t)
e two kinds of log-likelihood ratios (see (6.18) and (6.19))
A a verification threshold of the MLRSV scheme
T the maximum number of inputs (the number of modal-
ities)
α a required WAP and LAP
β a required FRPe
∆(α, β) a set of sequential fusion algorithms whose FAP∗,e and
FRPe do not exceed α and β, respectively (see (6.48))
Theorem 6.1. (Security of the MLRSV scheme against wolves and lambs) If (i) the
log-likelihood ratios Z(t)v and Z
(t)
e (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) are perfectly estimated in the MLRSV algorithm
δ0, then we have FAPv,∗(δ0) ≤ α and FAP∗,e(δ0) ≤ α for any v ∈ V and e ∈ E, and hence
we have WAP (δ0) ≤ α and LAP (δ0) ≤ α (except in the case of adaptive spoofing wolves),
where α = e−A and A is a verification threshold.
Proof. We prove that if the condition (i) holds, we have FAPv,∗(δ0) ≤ e−A for any v ∈ V .
We can prove that we have FAP∗,e(δ0) ≤ e−A for any e ∈ E in a similar way by interchanging
v ∈ V and e ∈ E.
Suppose the claimant v ∈ V attempts an impostor attack against each enrollee e(6= v) ∈ E
in the set E. Let Z(t)vtot =
Pt
τ=1 Z
(τ)
v , and Stv be a set of score sequences s
t = (s(1), · · · , s(t))
such that Z(1)vtot, · · · , Z(t−1)vtot < A and Z(t)vtot ≥ A. That is, Stv is a set of st such that the attack
of v ∈ V results in success at the t-th input, in the case where only g(t)v is used as an impostor
distribution model. Note that Stv is independent of e ∈ E because we assume that v ∈ V is
non-adaptive and g(t)v (and hence Z
(t)
vtot) is independent of e ∈ E.
Since the MLRSV algorithm δ0 models both g
(t)
v and g
(t)
e , and adopts the one which causes
less false accepts (i.e. the minimum value of Z(t)v and Z
(t)
e ), it is not always true that the
attack results in success (i.e. Z(t)tot ≥ A) in such a score sequence. Thus, FAPv,∗ in (6.6) can
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be bounded as follows:
FAPv,∗(δ0) ≤
TX
t=1
Z
Stv
p(st|Wv,∗)dst (6.25)
If (i) holds, Z(t)v can be written, using (6.15), (6.16) and (6.18), as
Z(t)v = log
p(s(t)|We,e)
p(s(t)|Wv,∗)
. (6.26)
Thus, for any st ∈ Stv, we can derive the following inequality:
p(st|We,e)
p(st|Wv,∗) =
Qt
τ=1 p(s
(τ)|We,e)Qt
τ=1 p(s(τ)|Wv,∗)
(6.27)
= exp
"
tX
τ=1
Z(τ)v
#
(6.28)
= exp
h
Z
(t)
vtot
i
(6.29)
≥ eA. (6.30)
Using (6.25) and (6.30), we have
FAPv,∗(δ0) ≤ e−A ·
"
TX
t=1
Z
Stv
p(st|We,e)dst
#
(6.31)
≤ e−A. (6.32)
The last inequality follows from the fact that the probability that either of Z(1)vtot, · · · , Z(T−1)vtot
or Z(T )vtot exceeds (or reaches) A is less than or equal to 1.
It should be noted that this theorem holds irrespective of the input order (i.e. irrespective
of which modality to start with). The optimality of the MLRSV scheme (Lemma 6.1 and
Theorem 6.3) also holds irrespective of the input order. However, we assume that the input
order is fixed in proving the optimality of the MLRSV scheme with regard to FRP (Theorem
6.2).
6.4.2 Proof of the Optimality with Regard to FRP
We then prove the optimality of the MLRSV scheme with regard to FRP. Here we assume
that the input order is fixed as mentioned above. Then, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 6.2. (Optimality of the MLRSV scheme with regard to FRP) If (i) the
log-likelihood ratios Z(t)v and Z
(t)
e (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) are perfectly estimated in the MLRSV algo-
rithm δ0, then we have FRPe(δ0) ≤ FRPe(δ) for any sequential fusion algorithm δ such that
FAP∗,e(δ) = FAP∗,e(δ0).
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Proof. Suppose e ∈ E attempts verification against him/herself. Let Ct0 and Ct be a set of
score sequences st such that the verification attempt results in reject (i.e. d = 0) at the t-th
input in δ0 and δ, respectively. Then, we have
FRPe(δ)− FRPe(δ0) (6.33)
=
TX
t=1
Z
Ct
p(st|We,e)dst −
TX
t=1
Z
Ct0
p(st|We,e)dst. (6.34)
=
TX
t=1
Z
Ct∩C¯t0
p(st|We,e)dst −
TX
t=1
Z
Ct0∩C¯t
p(st|We,e)dst. (6.35)
In (6.35), we excluded the common set Ct ∩Ct0 from both terms.
If (i) holds, Z(t)e can be written, using (6.15), (6.17) and (6.19), as follows:
Z(t)e = log
p(s(t)|We,e)
p(s(t)|W∗,e)
. (6.36)
Furthermore, since e ∈ E attempts verification against him/herself, g(t)v is equal to g(t)e , and
hence Z(t)min = Z
(t)
v = Z
(t)
e . Thus, for any st ∈ Ct0, we can derive the following inequality:
p(st|We,e)
p(st|W∗,e) =
Qt
τ=1 p(s
(τ)|We,e)Qt
τ=1 p(s(τ)|W∗,e)
(6.37)
= exp
"
tX
τ=1
Z(τ)e
#
(6.38)
= exp
h
Z
(t)
tot
i
(6.39)
< eA. (6.40)
Note that this inequality holds for any sequential fusion algorithm δ, as long as we fix the
input order. Conversely, for any st ∈ C¯t0 (i.e. any score sequence which results in acceptance
at the t-th input in the MLRSV algorithm δ0), we have
p(st|We,e)
p(st|W∗,e) = exp
h
Z
(t)
tot
i
≥ eA. (6.41)
By (6.35), (6.40), and (6.41), if FAP∗,e(δ) = FAP∗,e(δ0), then
FRPe(δ)− FRPe(δ0) (6.42)
≥ eA ·
"
TX
t=1
Z
Ct∩C¯t0
p(st|W∗,e)dst −
TX
t=1
Z
Ct0∩C¯t
p(st|W∗,e)dst
#
(6.43)
= eA ·
"
TX
t=1
Z
Ct
p(st|W∗,e)dst −
TX
t=1
Z
Ct0
p(st|W∗,e)dst
#
(6.44)
= eA · [(1− FAP∗,e(δ))− (1− FAP∗,e(δ0))] (6.45)
= eA · [FAP∗,e(δ0)− FAP∗,e(δ)] (6.46)
= 0. (6.47)
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In (6.44), we added the common set Ct ∩Ct0 to both terms.
This theorem means that the MLRSV scheme can achieve, for any e ∈ E, the minimum
FRPe among all sequential fusion schemes with the same FAP∗,e. In other words, the MLRSV
scheme can provide an optimal trade-oﬀ between FRP∗,e and FAPe.
6.4.3 Lower bound for ANI
We finally prove the optimality of the MLRSV scheme with regard to ANI in the asymptotic
setting where the identification error probabilities (both the false accept probability and the
false reject probability) are suﬃciently small. To prove this optimality, we first show the lower
bound for ANI of a sequential fusion algorithm δ.
Let ∆(α, β) the following set of sequential fusion algorithms:
∆(α, β) = {δ : FAP∗,e(δ) ≤ α, FRPe(δ) ≤ β}, (6.48)
where β is a required FRPe. The MLRSV algorithm δ0 satisfies this requirement by setting
the threshold A = logα−1 (so that FAP∗,e ≤ α; see Theorem 1), and the number of modalities
T suﬃciently large (so that FRPe(δ0) ≤ β).
Let ANIe be ANI of e ∈ E. Then, the following lemma gives the lower bound for ANIe
of any δ ∈ ∆(α, β):
Lemma 6.1. (Lower bound for ANI) If (ii) the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence between
f (t) and g(t)e takes a value De independently of the modality, then
inf
δ∈∆(α,β)
ANIe(δ) ≥ logα
−1
De
as max(α, β)→ 0, (6.49)
where infδ∈∆(α,β)X is the infimum of X over δ ∈ ∆(α, β).
Proof. Suppose e ∈ E attempts verification against him/herself in any sequential fusion
algorithm δ ∈ ∆(α, β). The KL divergence D(f (t)||g(t)e ) between f (t) and g(t)e is written as
follows [25]:
D(f (t)||g(t)e ) =
Z
f (t)(s(t)) log
f (t)(s(t))
g
(t)
e (s(t))
ds(t). (6.50)
If the condition (ii) holds, (6.50) can be also written as follows:
De = D(f (t)||g(t)e ) (6.51)
=
Z
f (t)(s(t)) log
f (t)(s(t))
g
(t)
e (s(t))
ds(t) (6.52)
= E
h
Z(t)e
i
. (6.53)
Here we introduce a random variable t∗ which represents the number of biometric inputs
required to terminate the verification process. Then, ANIe(δ) can be expressed as
ANIe(δ) = E[t∗]. (6.54)
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Since Z(t)e (1 ≤ t ≤ t∗) is independently distributed with mean De (see (6.53)), E[Z(1)e + · · ·+
Z
(t∗e)
e ] is decomposed as follows,
E
h
Z(1)e + · · ·+ Z(t
∗)
e
i
= De · E [t∗] . (6.55)
This equation is known as Wald’s identity (or Wald’s equation) [13, 120]. Using (6.54) and
(6.55), we have
ANIe(δ) =
E
h
Z
(1)
e + · · ·Z(t
∗)
e
i
De
(6.56)
=
E
hPt∗
τ=1 log f
(τ)(s(τ))/g(τ)e (s(τ))
i
De
(6.57)
=
E
h
− logQt∗τ=1 g(τ)e (s(τ))/f (τ)(s(τ))i
De
(6.58)
≥
− logE
hQt∗
τ=1 g
(τ)
e (s(τ))/f (τ)(s(τ))
i
De
. (6.59)
The last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality [25].
Let Ct be a set of score sequences st such that the verification attempt results in reject
(i.e. d = 0) at the t-th input in δ (in the same way as the proof of Theorem 6.2). As
max(α, β)→ 0, the probability that the genuine attempts of e ∈ E result in acceptance goes
to 1. Then, the expectation in (6.59) is taken over the set C¯1 ∪ · · · ∪ C¯T and can be written,
using (6.7) and (6.17), as follows:
E
Yt∗
τ=1
g(τ)e (s
(τ))/f (τ)(s(τ))

(6.60)
→
TX
t=1
Z
C¯t
Yt
τ=1
f (τ)(s(τ)) · g(τ)e (s(τ))/f (τ)(s(τ))dst (6.61)
=
TX
t=1
Z
C¯t
p(st|W∗,e)dst (6.62)
= FAP∗,e(δ) (6.63)
≤ α. (6.64)
It follows from (6.59) and (6.64) that
inf
δ∈∆(α,β)
ANIe(δ) ≥ logα
−1
De
as max(α, β)→ 0. (6.65)
Here we explain the meaning of this lemma. The KL divergence D(f (t)||g(t)e ) between f (t)
and g(t)e has a meaning of a distance measure between f (t) and g
(t)
e . If this takes the value De
independently of the modality (i.e. if the condition (ii) holds), then ANIe of any sequential
fusion scheme is lower bounded by the right side of (6.49) in the asymptotic case where the
identification error probabilities are suﬃciently small (i.e. max(α, β)→ 0).
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6.4.4 Proof of the Optimality with Regard to ANI
From Lemma 6.1, to prove that the MLRSV scheme is optimal with regard to ANI, it suﬃces
to show that ANIe of the MLRSV algorithm δ0 can achieve the right side of (6.49). We prove
that this is indeed the case:
Theorem 6.3. (Asymptotic optimality of the MLRSV scheme with regard to ANI)
If (i) the log-likelihood ratios Z(t)v and Z
(t)
e (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) are perfectly estimated in the MLRSV
algorithm δ0, and (ii) the KL divergence between f (t) and g
(t)
e takes a value De independently
of the modality, then
ANIe(δ0) ∼ logα
−1
De
as max(α, β)→ 0, (6.66)
where X ∼ Y as r → 0 means that limr→0(X/Y ) = 1 [30].
Proof. Suppose e ∈ E attempts verification against him/herself in the MLRSV algorithm
δ0. Let t∗ be a random variable which represents the number of biometric inputs required to
terminate the verification process (in the same way as the proof of Lemma 6.1). Then, if (ii)
holds, ANIe(δ0) can be expressed, in the same way as (6.56), as
ANIe(δ0) =
E
h
Z
(1)
e + · · ·Z(t
∗)
e
i
De
. (6.67)
Since e ∈ E attempts verification against him/herself, if (i) holds, then g(t)v is equal to g(t)e ,
and hence Z(t)min = Z
(t)
v = Z
(t)
e . Thus, ANIe(δ0) in (6.67) can be further written as follows:
ANIe(δ0) =
E
h
Z
(1)
min + · · ·Z(t
∗)
min
i
De
(6.68)
=
E
h
Z
(t∗)
tot
i
De
. (6.69)
As max(α, β)→ 0, the probability that the genuine attempts of e ∈ E result in acceptance
goes to 1. At the same time, since A (= logα−1) goes to infinity while the expected gain of
the minimum log-likelihood ratio E[Z(t)min] (= E[Z
(t)
e ]) at each input is fixed to De (see (6.53)),
the excess of Z(t
∗)
tot over the threshold A becomes negligible compared to A. Thus, we have
E
h
Z
(t∗)
tot
i
∼ A (6.70)
= logα−1 (6.71)
as max(α, β)→ 0. It follows from (6.69) and (6.71) that
ANIe(δ0) ∼ logα
−1
De
as max(α, β)→ 0. (6.72)
This theorem means that the MLRSV scheme achieves, for any e ∈ E, the minimum
ANIe (i.e. the right side of (6.49)) among all sequential fusion schemes in the asymptotic
case where the identification error probabilities are suﬃciently small (i.e. max(α, β)→ 0).
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6.4.5 Limitations
We have so far clarified the theoretical properties of security and optimality of the MLRSV
scheme. However, this scheme has some limitations. Firstly, we excluded adaptive spoofing
wolves in Theorem 6.1. Suppose there is an adaptive spoofing wolf who can perfectly imitate
the voice of others. If this wolf attempts an impostor attack against each enrollee e ∈ E by
presenting the voice which has high similarity score only against e ∈ E, there is no way to
block such an attack and consequently WAP reaches 100[%]. We need to adopt a modality
which is very diﬃcult to spoof (e.g. iris and retina), to prevent such an attack.
Secondly, the condition (i), which is common to Theorem 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, does not
hold in general. That is, it is generally impossible to perfectly estimate the log-likelihood
ratios Z(t)v (= log f (t)/g
(t)
v ) and Z
(t)
e (= log f (t)/g
(t)
e ). In our experiments in Section 6.6, we
use the logistic regression model which directly estimates log f (t)/g(t)v and log f (t)/g
(t)
e as a
linear function of a score (see (6.20) and (6.21)), and show that it works very well though not
perfect.
Thirdly, Lemma 6.1 and Theorem 6.3 only guarantee the optimality of the MLRSV scheme
with regard to ANI of e ∈ E in the asymptotic setting where FAP∗,e and FRPe are suﬃciently
small (i.e. A and T are suﬃciently large). It remains unsettled whether it is optimal in the
case where FAP∗,e and FRPe are not small.
Last but not least, the condition (ii) in Lemma 6.1 and Theorem 6.3 also does not hold in
general. As mentioned above, the KL divergence is a distance measure between two proba-
bility distributions, and some studies proposed to use the KL divergence between the genuine
distribution and the impostor distribution as a metric of identification performance [105, 108].
Thus, it is natural to consider that the KL divergence D(f (t)||g(t)e ) diﬀers from one modality
to another, especially in the case of multiple biometric traits (e.g. fingerprint, face and iris)
[96]. In Section 6.5, we propose an input order decision scheme using the KL divergence as
an improvement of the MLRSV scheme in the case where (ii) does not hold.
6.5 Input Order Decision Scheme Using the Kullback-Leibler
Divergence
6.5.1 Algorithm
Our second proposal is an input order decision scheme based on the KL divergence, which
further reduces ANI of the MLRSV scheme in the case where the KL divergence diﬀers from
one modality to another (i.e. when the condition (ii) in Lemma 6.1 and Theorem 6.3 does
not hold).
This scheme decides, for each enrollee e ∈ E, the input order using the KL divergence.
Let D(t)e the KL divergence between f (t) and g
(t)
e . After e ∈ E enrolls his/her templates, this
scheme decides the input order (the order of modalities) as follows:
1. Compute the KL divergence D(t)e for each modality (1 ≤ t ≤ T );
2. Sort the modalities in descending order of D(t)e .
Then, when the claimant claims his/her identity as e ∈ E, this scheme requires or recommends
him/her to sequentially input a query sample according to the above order. Alternatively, it
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can present the above order to e ∈ E right after e ∈ E enrolls his/her templates, because f (t)
and g(t)e can be estimated right after the enrollment (as described in Section 6.3.1), and so
can the KL divergence D(t)e .
Suppose e ∈ E attempts verification against him/herself by sequentially inputting his/her
query sample according to the above order. The KL divergence D(t)e can be written, using
(6.19) and (6.50), as follows:
D(t)e = D(f
(t)||g(t)e ) (6.73)
=
Z
f (t)(s(t)) log
f (t)(s(t))
g
(t)
e (s(t))
ds(t) (6.74)
= E
h
Z(t)e
i
. (6.75)
That is, D(t)e can be regarded as the expectation of Z
(t)
e . Since e ∈ E attempts verification
against him/herself, g(t)v is equal to g
(t)
e , and hence D
(t)
e can be regarded as the expectation of
Z
(t)
min (= Z
(t)
v = Z
(t)
e ). Thus, the expectation of Z
(t)
tot is maximized at any number of biometric
inputs t, by sorting the input order in descending order of D(t)e . As a result, it can be expected
that Z(t)tot exceeds A with the smaller number of biometric inputs, and ANI is further reduced.
Note that the above input order can be either a requirement or a recommendation to
further reduce ANI. In the latter case, the system allows other input orders, which can be
particularly helpful in the case where e ∈ E cannot use some modalities at the verification
time (due to injury, for example). Theorem 6.1 in Section 6.4.1 also guarantees the security
against wolves and lambs, irrespective of the input order.
6.5.2 Estimation of the KL divergence
We also explain how to estimate the KL divergence D(t)e in our input order decision scheme.
Here it is important to note that we only have to compute the order relation between the KL
divergences. In Section 6.3.1, we described that it is diﬃcult to correctly estimate an enrollee-
specific genuine distribution from a small number of training samples. In the same way, it is
diﬃcult to correctly estimate the KL divergence D(t)e using a small number of genuine scores
from e ∈ E.
However, since we use not the KL divergences themselves but the order relation between
them to decide the input order, a little estimation error of the KL divergences does not matter.
Furthermore, Poh et al. [91] showed that the average of the enrollee-specific genuine distribu-
tion can be more reliably estimated than the standard deviation. Taking these matters into
account, we propose to estimate D(t)e by taking the average of Z
(t)
e = log f (t)(s(t))/g
(t)
e (s(t))
over genuine scores from e ∈ E (recall that D(t)e is the expectation of Z(t)e as shown in (6.75)),
in the case where more than one biometric sample can be obtained from e ∈ E. By doing so,
we can expect that the order relation between the KL divergences of e ∈ E can be reliably
estimated, while considering the recognizability of e ∈ E. In our experiments in Section 6.6,
we demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of this estimation method.
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6.6 Experimental Evaluation
6.6.1 Experimental Set-up
As described in Section 6.2.1, zero-eﬀort wolves and lambs cannot be blocked using anti-
spoofing measures such as liveness detection. Thus, it is especially important to demonstrate
the security of our schemes against these animals, using datasets whose subjects have no intent
to spoof the system. To this end, we evaluated our two schemes using the NIST BSSR1 Set3
dataset [77] and the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [21]. We assumed that face and fingerprint
biometrics are mutually independent, and created 500 virtual subjects who have one face and
8 fingerprints (T = 9), in a similar way to [39, 103]. We describe this in detail below.
Datasets
The NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset contains face scores from 3000 subjects, each of whom con-
tributed two query samples and one template (3000 × 3000 × 2 scores in total; there are no
scores between templates). Although there are scores from two algorithms (“C” and “G”) in
this dataset, we used those from the algorithm “G”.
The CASIA-FingerprintV5 contains 20000 fingerprint images (left and right thumb / index
/ middle / ring finger) from 500 subjects, each of whom contributed 5 samples per finger.
We assumed, for each finger, the first sample as a template, the remaining four samples as
query samples, and computed scores using SourceAFIS Version 1.4 [104], a freely available
fingerprint matcher (8 × 500 × 500 × 5 scores in total, including scores between templates).
We then randomly selected 500 subjects from 3000 subjects in the face dataset, and created
500 virtual subjects who have one face and 8 fingerprints (T = 9). Here, we tried 100 ways
to randomly select 500 subjects from 3000 subjects, and carried out, for each set of virtual
subjects, the following experiment.
Experiment
From 500 virtual subjects, we randomly selected 300 subjects for evaluation (i.e. claimants
or enrollees), and used the templates of the remaining 200 subjects as dummy-templates. We
then carried out an experiment where each of 300 claimants attempts verification against each
of 300 enrollees by sequentially inputting the last query sample of each modality (we used
the remaining one face query sample and three fingerprint query samples to estimate the KL
divergence, which is described later in details). The number of genuine attempts was 300,
while the number of impostor attempts was 89700 (= 300× 299).
We evaluated FAR, WAR, LAR, FRR, and ANI in the above experiment, and averaged
them over the 100 sets of virtual subjects to obtain stable performance.
Evaluated schemes
For comparison, we evaluated the following sequential fusion schemes:
• LRSV: the LRSV scheme [107]. This scheme computes a log-likelihood ratio log f (t)/g(t),
where g(t) is an impostor distribution common to all users. We used the logistic regres-
sion model which estimates log f (t)/g(t) = w1(t)s(t) + w0(t), where w1(t) and w0(t) are
regression coeﬃcients (we describe the training method later in detail). We randomly
decided the input order for each e ∈ E.
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• MLRSV: the MLRSV scheme. As described in Section 6.3.2, it computes the minimum
of log f (t)/g(t)e and log f (t)/g
(t)
v . We used the logistic regression model which estimates
log f (t)/g(t)e = w1
(t)
e s(t)+w0
(t)
e and log f (t)/g
(t)
v = w1
(t)
v s(t)+w0
(t)
v (see (6.20) and (6.21)).
The input order is the same as that of the LRSV scheme.
• MLRSV-KL: the MLRSV scheme using the input order decision scheme based on the
KL divergence.
Training of the regression coeﬃcients and the KL divergences
We trained each of the regression coeﬃcients (w1(t), w0(t), w1
(t)
e , w0
(t)
e , w1
(t)
v , and w0
(t)
v ) using
200 genuine scores and 200 impostor scores. First, we trained w1(t) and w0(t) in the LRSV
scheme using 200 genuine scores and 200 impostor scores between 200 dummy-templates
and 200 corresponding first query samples (we randomly selected one impostor query sample
for each dummy-template). Then, we trained w1
(t)
e and w0
(t)
e in the MLRSV scheme using
the above 200 genuine scores and 200 impostor scores between dummy-templates and the
template of e ∈ E (here we substituted the first query samples for dummy-templates in the
NIST BSSR1 Set3 because there were no scores between templates). Similarly, we trained
w1
(t)
v and w0
(t)
v using the above 200 genuine scores and 200 impostor scores between the query
sample of v ∈ V and dummy-templates. As a training method, we adopted the Newton-
Raphson method [12] which approximates the maximum likelihood estimates since there were
a number of (hundreds of) training samples.
As for the KL divergence D(t)e , we used a small number of genuine scores from e ∈
E as described in Section 6.5.2: three scores for a fingerprint and one score for a face.
First, we computed, for each fingerprint, three genuine scores between the remaining three
query samples (other than the last one query sample which was used for evaluation) and the
template. Then, we estimated the KL divergence D(t)e by taking the average of the estimated
log-likelihood ratios log f (t)/g(t)e (= w1
(t)
e s(t) + w0
(t)
e ) over the three scores. In the same way,
we computed, for each face, one genuine score between the remaining one query sample and
the template, and estimated the KL divergence by computing the corresponding log-likelihood
ratio log f (t)/g(t)e .
6.6.2 Experimental Results
Figure 6.3 shows the relationship between WAR/LAR and a required WAR/LAR (i.e. α =
e−A) in our proposals. It was found that the MLRSV scheme kept WAR and LAR less than
the required value, irrespective of the input order, as described in Theorem 6.1 in Section
6.4.1. We consider this is because the logistic regression parameters were correctly estimated.
We also show in Figure 6.4 the logarithm of the ratio between the frequency distribution of
genuine scores and that of impostor scores (left: face, right: left thumb), obtained using all the
scores between query samples and templates (left: 3000×3000×2 scores, right: 500×500×4
scores). There is a close-to-linear relationship between the log-likelihood ratio and the score,
especially in the case of left thumbs. We also confirmed that a similar tendency was obtained
for the other types of fingers.
Figure 6.5 shows the trade-oﬀ between FRR and FAR in the three schemes. It was found
that the MLRSV scheme outperformed the LRSV scheme. We consider this is because the
MLRSV scheme can provide an optimal trade-oﬀ between FRPe and FAPe for any e ∈ E
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Figure 6.3: Relationship between WAR/LAR and a required WAR/LAR (i.e. α = e−A) in our
proposals. WAR/LAR is less than α in the gray area.
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Figure 6.4: Logarithm of the ratio between the frequency distribution of genuine scores and that of
impostor scores (left: face, right: left thumb). The width of the interval is 0.5 and 1.0, respectively.
We do not show both side edges where the number of genuine scores or impostor scores is less than
10.
if the input order is the same (see Theorem 6.2 in Section 6.4.2). It was also found from
Figure 6.5 that the trade-oﬀ between FRR and FAR was further improved by changing the
input order using our input order decision scheme. We consider this is because ANI was
significantly improved by using this scheme, as shown in the following.
Figure 6.6 shows the trade-oﬀ between FAR/WAR/LAR and ANI in the three schemes. It
was found that the trade-oﬀ of the MLRSV scheme was better than that of the LRSV scheme
and was significantly improved by using the input order decision scheme. We examined, for
each enrollee and each modality, the estimated value of the KL divergence, and confirmed
that the value diﬀered from one modality to another (i.e. the condition (ii) did not hold).
Thus, we consider the reason the input order decision scheme worked very well is that the
order relation of the KL divergences of e ∈ E was reliably estimated using genuine scores
from e ∈ E, and the expectation of the likelihood ratio Z(t)tot was maximized using the order
relation, as described in Section 6.5. For example, when the maximum of WAR and LAR
was fixed to 0.01%, ANI of the LRSV scheme, the MLRSV scheme, and the MLRSV scheme
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Figure 6.5: Trade-oﬀ between FRR and FAR in the three schemes.
Table 6.2: Proportion of each modality for each rank decided by the input order decision scheme [%].
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
Face 0.25 0.40 1.5 2.5 4.3 6.1 11.3 22.5 51.3
Left thumb 14.4 13.0 12.9 10.9 12.1 10.2 10.5 9.1 7.0
Left index 13.2 11.9 12.4 11.3 12.3 11.4 12.8 9.9 4.8
Left middle 18.6 15.4 13.9 12.9 10.3 9.9 10.1 6.2 2.8
Left ring 11.6 10.6 10.7 11.4 11.6 13.0 9.1 11.2 10.7
Right thumb 11.5 11.9 10.9 12.1 11.5 11.6 11.6 11.8 7.1
Right index 10.5 12.6 13.3 14.4 12.1 11.8 10.7 9.1 5.5
Right middle 14.8 14.5 13.7 12.4 12.6 11.6 9.8 7.1 3.5
Right ring 5.1 9.7 10.9 12.1 13.2 14.4 14.2 12.9 7.4
using the input order decision scheme were 1.94, 1.72, and 1.19, respectively.
To more thoroughly investigate the eﬀectiveness of the input order decision scheme, we
finally examined, for each rank (1st, 2nd, · · · , 9th) decided by the input order decision scheme,
the proportion of each modality. Table 6.2 shows the results. It can be seen that a face was
ranked very low in most cases, while the 1st modality was a fingerprint in most cases. This
indicates that the KL divergence significantly diﬀers from one biometric trait (e.g. face,
fingerprint, iris) to another. Thus, in the case of multiple biometric traits, the optimal input
order can be common to most enrollees, and finding the order can be a trivial problem (i.e.
we only have to start from the accurate biometric trait). On the other hand, it can be seen
from Table 6.2 that the type of the most discriminative finger diﬀered from one enrollee to
another, which indicates finding the optimal input order in the case of multiple instances (e.g.
multiple fingerprints, multiple finger-veins) is not trivial. Even in such a case, the input order
decision scheme can provide an optimal input order for each enrollee, and significantly reduce
ANI, as shown in Figure 6.6. Thus, we can conclude that this scheme is highly eﬀective not
for multiple biometric traits but for multiple instances.
6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we first introduced a taxonomy of wolves and lambs, defined security measures
for the animals, and proposed the MLRSV scheme as a countermeasure against the animals.
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Figure 6.6: Trade-oﬀ between FAR/WAR/LAR and ANI in the three schemes.
We proved its security against the animals except for adaptive spoofing wolves and optimality
with regard to FRP under the condition (i) (Theorem 1 and 2). We also proved its asymptotic
optimality with regard to ANI under the condition (i) and (ii) (Lemma 1 and Theorem 3).
We finally proposed the input order decision scheme based on the KL divergence to further
reduce ANI in the case where the condition (ii) does not hold.
The experimental results demonstrated the security of our schemes against zero-eﬀort
wolves and lambs who cannot be blocked using anti-spoofing measures such as liveness de-
tection. On the other hand, our schemes are not secure against adaptive spoofing wolves as
discussed in Section 6.4.5, while anti-spoofing measures can block spoofing wolves and lambs
to some extent. Thus, it is desirable to use our schemes in conjunction with anti-spoofing
measures to have total security against wolves and lambs.
It should also be noted that although we focused on verification in this chapter, wolves
and lambs cause more serious security problems in identification. The MLRSV scheme is
a modification of the LRSV sequential fusion scheme to have security against wolves and
lambs by computing the minimum of two log-likelihood ratios obtained using two kinds of
user-specific impostor distributions. Since the LRSI scheme proposed in Section 3.4.3 is the
extension of the LRSV sequential fusion scheme to the identification mode, we consider we
can construct a sequential fusion scheme in identification which has security against wolves
and lambs by modifying the LRSI scheme to compute the minimum of two log-likelihood
ratios using two kinds of user-specific impostor distributions. We shall refer to such a scheme
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as the MLRSI (Minimum Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Identification) scheme. As future
work, we plan to define security measures for wolves and lambs in identification, and prove
the security and optimality of the MLRSI scheme.
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In this dissertation, we studied on optimization of security and convenience in biometric
identification. We included false accepts, wolves, and lambs as factors which aﬀect security,
and false rejects, the number of inputs, and response time as factors which aﬀect convenience.
We mainly addressed the following three challenges: (1) optimization of identification errors
(false accepts and false rejects) and the number of inputs; (2) optimization of response time
along with the above factors; (3) optimization of security against wolves and lambs and
convenience in terms of the number of inputs and false rejects.
In the following, we summarize the contributions of this dissertation, and conclude this
dissertation with directions for the future.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
7.1.1 Optimization of Identification Errors and the Number of Inputs
In Chapter 3, we focused on MSPRT’s (Multi-hypothesis Sequential Probability Ratio Tests)
[30], and proposed two sequential fusion schemes in identification: the PPSI (Posterior
Probability-based Sequential Identification) scheme and the LRSI (Likelihood Ratio-based
Sequential Identification) scheme. The PPSI scheme is based on MSPRT (Test δa) and can
optimize the trade-oﬀ between the identification error probabilities (EFRP/EFAP/NFAP)
and ANI (the average number of inputs), while the LRSI scheme is a simpler one which
can be carried out quickly. Then we proved that the LRSI scheme can also optimize the
above trade-oﬀ by showing some properties of N -dimensional score distributions (such as
“Pythagorean theorem for N -dimensional score distributions”), and proving that this scheme
is equivalent to MSPRT (Test δb) based on the properties. We also discussed the conditions
to achieve the optimality of the two schemes. We finally evaluated our two schemes using the
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NIST BSSR1 Set1 dataset [77] (one face and two fingerprints), and showed the eﬀectiveness
of our schemes through comparison with the OR rule [14] and the posterior probability-based
parallel fusion scheme in identification [76].
7.1.2 Optimization of Response Time
In Chapter 4, we proposed the PPS (Posterior Probability-based Search) scheme which nor-
malizes pseudo-scores to the posterior probabilities of being in the answer to the range query,
and uses them as probability-based pseudo-scores to search non-pivots. We proposed an al-
gorithm which computes the probability-based pseudo-scores using the object-specific param-
eters in logistic regression, and learns the parameters using MAP (Maximum a Posteriori)
estimation. We also proposed a technique which speeds up learning the parameters using
pseudo-scores. We proved that the PPS scheme has an optimal property with regard to the
number of score computations and the expected number of retrieval errors, and showed that
it outperforms the standard pivot-based indexing scheme [22] and the permutation-based in-
dexing scheme [4, 22] with regard to both the number of score computations and the CPU
time in various datasets from the Metric Space Library [37].
In Chapter 5, we proposed a sequential indexing and fusion framework in biometric identi-
fication which is constructed from (I) a pseudo-score based indexing scheme, (II) a sequential
search scheme, and (III) a sequential fusion scheme in identification which handles missing
scores. Then we proposed the PPSS (Posterior Probability-based Sequential Search) scheme,
a modification of the PPS scheme to compute posterior probabilities using not only pseudo-
scores at the current input but past pseudo-scores and scores, as (II). We discussed the optimal
property of this scheme with regard to the trade-oﬀ between the number of score computa-
tions and the retrieval error probability, and described that it does not have a problem of
the learning time. We also proposed a technique which optimizes the number of pivots with
regard to the retrieval error probability. We finally evaluated our proposals using a large-scale
multi-modal dataset (N = 1800 enrollees; one face and two fingerprints) obtained by com-
bining the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [77] and the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [21], and
showed that our proposals reduce the number of score computations to 10[%] while keeping
the identification error rates (EFRR/EFAR/NFAR) and ANI of the PPSI scheme.
7.1.3 Optimization of Security against Wolves and Lambs and Convenience
In Chapter 6, we introduced a taxonomy which classifies wolves into three categories (zero-
eﬀort wolves, non-adaptive spoofing wolves, and adaptive spoofing wolves) and lambs into
two categories (zero-eﬀort lambs and spoofing lambs), and defined LAP (Lamb Accept Prob-
ability) as a security measure for lambs in the same way as WAP (Wolf Attack Probability)
[116]. Then we proposed the MLRSV (Minimum Likelihood Ratio-based Sequential Verifica-
tion) scheme as a sequential fusion scheme in verification which has an optimal property with
regard to security against wolves and lambs and convenience. We proved that this scheme can
keep WAP and LAP less than a desired value except in the case of adaptive spoofing wolves,
and minimize FRP (False Reject Probability) and ANI. We also discussed the conditions to
achieve the security and optimality. We then proposed an input order decision scheme based
on the KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence to further reduce ANI of the MLRSV scheme in the
case where the KL divergence diﬀers from one modality to another. We finally evaluated our
schemes using a multi-modal dataset (one face and eight fingerprints) obtained by combining
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the NIST BSSR1 Set3 dataset [77] and the CASIA-FingerprintV5 dataset [21], and showed
the eﬀectiveness of our schemes through comparison with the LRSV scheme [107].
7.2 Future Work
In this dissertation, we included false accepts, wolves, and lambs as factors which aﬀect
security, and false rejects, the number of inputs, and response time as factors which aﬀect
convenience in biometric identification. There are still some challenges which need to be
addressed to optimize all of these factors:
Firstly, we proposed a countermeasure against wolves and lambs only in the verification
mode in Chapter 6. As described at the end of Chapter 6, one of our major future work is to
define security measures for wolves and lambs in identification, and extend our countermeasure
to the identification scenario. Secondly, although we proved a number of optimal properties
of our proposals with regard to security and convenience (Theorem 3.1, Proposition 4.1,
Proposition 5.1, Theorem 6.1, 6.2, 6.3), the conditions to achieve the optimality are not
satisfied in reality, as discussed in Section 3.5.3 and 6.4.5. The proof of the optimality without
the conditions, or developing such algorithms is another challenging future work.
In Chapter 1, we described that a spoofing attack and a leakage of biometric information
are also major security problems which are common to verification and identification. One
of the advantages of our proposals is that they can be used in conjunction with a template
protection scheme which outputs scores [93, 106, 111, 112], as described in Section 2.4. Our
proposals can also be combined with anti-spoofing measures such as liveness detection. In
Section 6.7, we also described that this combination is important to increase total security
against wolves and lambs. It is desirable to use our proposals, anti-spoofing measures, and
template protection to have total security in biometric identification.
Recall that we need to design a system which is simultaneously secure and convenient
to overcome the security vs. convenience dilemma, as described in Chapter 1. Biometric
identification, which does not require a user ID, password, nor card but recognizes a user
based on “something you are” (an inherence factor), has a potential to provide the best
solution with regard to security and convenience. We believe this dissertation, which studied
on optimization of security and convenience in biometric identification, plays a significant role
in achieving this ultimate goal.
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